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The growing illegal wildlife trade, including the illegal trade of elephant ivory, has damaging 
ecological, social, economic, political, and health impacts. The growing transnational illicit ivory 
trade is increasingly supplied with ivory from African elephant poaching and unsecure, poorly 
managed ivory stockpiles legally owned by African elephant range states. If unabated, the illegal 
ivory trade poses a serious threat to sustainable conservation, human security, and international 
development. My master thesis is focused on the management of ivory stockpiles in sub-Saharan 
Africa as one of the necessary actions to combat the illegal ivory trade. It is accepted by the 
international community that collective action through the use of united, cooperative strategies is 
the most effective approach for combatting the illicit trade of wildlife and their products. 
However, African elephant range states are currently using two opposing (dichotomous) ivory 
stockpile management strategies – ivory stockpile destruction and ivory stockpile sale. This 
dichotomy threatens the necessary collective action to most effectively combat the illegal ivory 
trade. This is further complicated by the international community contradictorily calling for use 
of both ivory stockpile management strategies and by the current research inconclusively 
determining which strategy is more effective. Therefore, my master thesis seeks to explore this 
dichotomy and, through inductive analysis of archival data, answer my research question: which 
elephant ivory stockpile management strategy used by African elephant range states correlates 
better with more effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade, operationalized as decreased 
behavioral intention to poach as well as decreased poaching behavior? 
 
Keywords: Illegal (or illicit) ivory trade, ivory stockpile management, ivory stockpile 
destruction, ivory stockpile sale, African elephant range state, effective combatting, poaching 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 The demand for wildlife and their products has existed throughout history and continues 
to thrive today fueling both a large legal wildlife trade as well as a growing illegal wildlife trade 
(Conrad, 2012; Haken, 2011; Lawson & Vines, 2014; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; 
UNEP, CITES, IUCN, & TRAFFIC, 2013; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Wildlife and their products 
are demanded globally for a wide variety of purposes (Felbab-Brown, 2011; Gao & Clark, 2014; 
Haken, 2011; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; UNEP et al., 2013). An unsustainably high 
demand for wildlife and their products prompted the necessitated Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES] (see section, Definition of 
Terms) (CITES, no date [n.d.]). The convention passed by the United Nations in 1975 monitors 
and regulates the international trade of wildlife and their products to protect species from 
overexploitation.  
 Despite the efforts of CITES, the illegal wildlife trade is one of the largest transnational 
illicit trades (see section, Definition of Terms) (Haken, 2011; Lawson & Vines, 2014; Ratchford, 
Allgood, & Todd, 2013). Furthermore, the illegal wildlife trade is extremely difficult to combat 
due to its high profit and low risk opportunities for perpetrators. This is further complicated by 
the treatment of the illegal wildlife trade, until very recently, as a low priority issue by the 
international community (see section, Definition of Terms) (Akella & Allan, 2012; Ratchford, 
Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Combined, 
these barriers are fueling the continued growth of the illegal wildlife trade. 
 The illegal wildlife trade is a serious international development issue due to its negative 
global implications and must be addressed. Research has shown that the illicit trade of 
endangered wildlife and their products not only overexploits these species threatening their 
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continued existence in the wild, but, equally alarming, it also directly threatens human well-
being around the world (Nellemann et al., 2014; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Wyler and 
Sheikh, 2008; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). The devastating global implications of the illegal wildlife 
trade include: (a) threatening the environment and biodiversity; (b) threatening social and 
economic development; (c) threatening national and international security; and (d) threatening 
global health (Nellemann et al., 2014; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Wyler and Sheikh, 
2008; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Overall, the damaging impacts of the illicit wildlife trade threaten 
sustainable conservation and international development efforts around the world (Nellemann et 
al., 2014).  
 Although the transnational trade of elephant ivory is currently banned by CITES, today 
ivory is one of the highest globally demanded wildlife products (elephant ivory will from now on 
be referred to as ivory, unless otherwise noted) (Akella & Allan, 2012; Gao & Clark, 2014; 
Nijman, 2010; UNEP et al., 2013; WWF & Dalberg, 2012; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Ivory 
consumers are willing to pay exorbitant prices, valued much higher than ivory’s weight in gold, 
for both legal domestically traded ivory and illegal internationally traded ivory (Akella & Allan, 
2012; Nijman, 2010; WWF & Dalberg, 2012; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). The high demand for 
ivory and large profit for perpetrators fuel a growing illegal (or illicit) ivory trade (see section, 
Definition of Terms) (Gao & Clark, 2014; Milliken, 2015; Patel et al., 2015; Ratchford, Allgood, 
& Todd, 2013; UNEP et al., 2013). The illicit ivory trade is primarily supplied with ivory from 
African elephant poaching and from unsecure, poorly managed ivory stockpiles legally owned 
by African elephant range states (see section, Definition of Terms) (Bennett, 2014; Harvey, 
2015; Neme, 2013; UNEP et al., 2013). Stockpiled ivory often enters or reenters the illegal trade 
after being robbed by criminals or being misappropriated by corrupt officials (Bennett, 2014; 
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Neme, 2013). Therefore, African elephants are one of the species most threatened by the illegal 
wildlife trade (Conrad, 2012; Harvey, 2015). 
 Since 2007, the illicit ivory trade has steadily grown. The implications of this growing 
illicit trade include:  
• threatening the survival of elephants, particularly African elephants, and the vital 
ecosystems supported by these elephants (Akella & Allan, 2012; Bennett, 2014; Bulte, 
Damania, & van Kooten, 2007; Nellemann et al., 2014; UNEP et al., 2013; WWF & 
Dalberg, 2012);  
• threatening the economic, social, and political development and stability of elephant 
range states (Lawson & Vines, 2014; Nellemann et al., 2014; Rosen & Smith, 2010; 
WWF & Dalberg, 2012); 
• threatening national and international security (Akella & Allan, 2012; Harvey, 2015; 
Lawson & Vines, 2012; Nellemann et al., 2014; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). 
Therefore, the illicit ivory trade must be effectively combatted.   
 The international community has recently taken action to combat the illegal wildlife 
trade, including the illicit trade of ivory, and its devastating global implications. The leading 
collaborative effort is the 2014 London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade [London 
Declaration] (see section, Definition of Terms) (London Conference, 2014). The London 
Declaration recognizes and calls for collective action as the most effective approach for 
combatting the illegal wildlife trade, particularly the illicit trade of highly demanded products 
such as ivory.  
 My master thesis strongly agrees with the international community that a united, 
cooperative approach is necessary for the most effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade (see 
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section, Definition of Terms). I narrowed the focus of my master thesis to explore one particular 
approach to combatting the illegal ivory trade – the management of ivory stockpiles legally 
owned by African elephant range states. Effective management of these states’ ivory stockpiles 
is important because unsecure, poorly managed ivory stockpiles supply ivory for the growing 
illicit ivory trade (Bennett, 2014; Neme, 2013; Harvey, 2015). Currently, African elephant range 
states are using two opposing (dichotomous) ivory stockpile management strategies – (a) ivory 





















 A brief historical background is necessary to understand the use of dichotomous ivory 
stockpile management strategies by African elephant range states. A highly demanding legal 
international ivory trade led to a concentrated increase in African elephant poaching during the 
1970s and 1980s to supply a growing transnational legal ivory trade (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009; 
van Kooten, 2008). This poaching crisis significantly decimated the total African elephant 
population. In order to protect African elephants from further overexploitation, the international 
community through CITES moved all elephants to an Appendix I status beginning January 1, 
1990, and, subsequently, made the international commercial trade of ivory illegal (CITES, n.d.; 
Lemieux & Clarke, 2009).  
 Following the ivory trade ban, African elephant populations began to recover and 
increase. Between 1997 and 2000, four African elephant range states had their well managed and 
protected elephant populations downlisted from Appendix I to Appendix II by CITES (CITES, 
n.d.). With Appendix II elephant populations, these four countries are allowed to sell ivory from 
their legal government-owned ivory stockpiles in CITES-authorized one-off sales to CITES-
approved buyers and use the revenue to fund elephant conservation (CITES, n.d.; CITES, 2007; 
Harvey, 2015). Thus, these countries use an ivory stockpile sale strategy to manage their ivory 
stockpiles. Due to uncertainty of the impact of ivory stockpile sales as well as to allow time to 
fully determine the impact, the international community enacted a nine-year moratorium 
preventing any proposal or another sale of stockpiled ivory until after November 2017 (CITES, 
2007; CITES, 2008; Harvey, 2015).  
 Although the African elephant population had begun to recover following the ivory trade 
ban, this progress is now being reversed. Since 2007, there has been a steady increase of African 
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elephant poaching and of illegal ivory trade activity (Conrad, 2012; Harvey, 2015; Milliken, 
2014; UNEP et al., 2013). Effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade is necessary in order to 
protect the elephant population as well as decrease the other negative global implications of this 
illicit trade (Harvey, 2015).  
 Alternatively, some African elephant range states have taken an entirely different 
approach to manage their ivory stockpiles since the ivory trade ban. These African elephant 
range states have used an ivory stockpile destruction strategy where the country has destroyed a 
portion of its ivory stockpile through a large public event of burning or crushing the illicit ivory 
to emphasize its zero tolerance of poaching and the illicit ivory trade (Harvey, 2015; Neme, 
2013; Welch, 2016). Additionally, the international community through a specific action of the 
2014 London Declaration calls for every country to destroy its legal government-owned ivory 
stockpile (London Conference, 2014). Since 2014, there has been a major increase in the number 
of ivory stockpile destructions (London Conference, 2014; Welch, 2016). It should also be noted 
that other African elephant range states have not yet implemented one of the two ivory stockpile 
management strategies; instead, these states are storing their ivory stockpiles without currently 
choosing to sell or destroy them. 
 African elephant range states’ use of dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies 
is facilitated by the international community’s contradiction of calling for one ivory stockpile 
management strategy – destruction – while continuing to allow a different ivory stockpile 
management strategy – sale. The use of dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies by 
African elephant range states and the problem it poses are explored and addressed by my master 
thesis. 
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Problem Addressed by My Master Thesis 
 The international community has agreed on the necessary use of united, cooperative 
approaches to most effectively combat the illegal wildlife trade, including the illicit trade of 
ivory. Therefore, African elephant range states’ use of dichotomous ivory stockpile management 
strategies is a serious problem as it threatens the collective action needed to most effectively 
combat the illegal ivory trade and its devastating global implications (Harvey, 2015; Kasane 
Conference, 2015). This presents the question: which ivory stockpile management strategy – (a) 
ivory stockpile destruction or (b) ivory stockpile sale – should all African elephant range states 
use for a united, cooperative effort? Answering this question is extremely relevant now as the 
number of ivory stockpile destructions is rapidly increasing and the end of the moratorium on 
ivory stockpile sales is rapidly approaching. Therefore, further use of dichotomous strategies by 
African elephants range states is imminent unless this question is answered.   
 Before this question can be answered, a preliminary problem is raised and, thus, 
addressed by my master thesis. Although African elephant range states use two different 
strategies, their intended outcome is the same: to promote African elephant conservation; to 
combat illegal African elephant poaching; and to combat the illicit trade of ivory (Bennett, 2014; 
CITES, 2007; CITES, 2008; Harvey, 2015). By determining which strategy has the most 
effective outcomes when combatting the illegal ivory trade, there will be greater support for its 
unanimous use by African elephant range states. Additionally, the strategy chosen for unanimous 
use must be effectively implemented by all African elephant range states. This requires 
overcoming the many political and economic factors influencing the current use of dichotomous 
strategies. Factors of implementation are beyond the scope of my master thesis. I narrowed the 
focus of my research study to understand which ivory stockpile management strategy – (a) ivory 
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stockpile destruction or (b) ivory stockpile sale – used by African elephant range states is 
correlated with better outcomes and, thus, is more effective at combatting the illegal ivory trade. 
 Furthermore, despite the literature widely debating this topic, the research is inconclusive 
as to the impact and effectiveness of each ivory stockpile management strategy (CITES, 2007; 
CITES, 2008; London Conference, 2014; t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014). A review of the 
debated arguments and counterarguments is fully discussed in my literature review (see Chapter 
2). I also identified a gap in the research. Existing literature and research studies have failed to 
directly compare the outcome of an ivory stockpile destruction strategy used by an African 
elephant range state to the outcome of an ivory stockpile sale strategy used by an African 
elephant range state. Overall, it is left undetermined by the literature which strategy is 
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Purpose of my Master Thesis 
 Through my unique methodology and results, the purpose of my master thesis is to bridge 
the current gap in the literature as well as to direct future research by identifying correlations 
requiring further research. Since the current literature and research are inconclusive and do not 
identify the most effective ivory stockpile management strategy, it hinders collective action by 
the international community and African elephant range states. Only through future research 
producing substantial evidence of the most effective ivory stockpile management strategy, a 
process foundationally supported by my research study, will African elephant range states be 
able to shift from their current use of dichotomous strategies to a united, cooperative approach 
(Duffy & Humphreys, 2014; Harvey, 2015; Lawson & Vines, 2014; London Conference, 2014). 
With this collective action, their efforts are then guaranteed to be most effectively combatting the 
illegal ivory trade. Ultimately, the goal is to fully eradicate the illegal ivory trade and its 
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Research Question of My Master Thesis 
 My master thesis uses an inductive, non-experimental research methodology. I conducted 
a quantitative secondary analysis of archival data to explore and answer my research question: 
which elephant ivory stockpile management strategy used by African elephant range states – (a) 
ivory stockpile destruction or (b) ivory stockpile sale – correlates better with more effective 
combatting of the illegal ivory trade, operationalized as decreased behavioral intention to poach 
as well as decreased poaching behavior? In order to operationalize the construct of effective 
combatting of the illegal ivory trade, the theoretical framework of my master thesis was based on 
Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior (see section, Definition of Terms).   
 Accordingly and supported by my review of the literature in Chapter 2, the design and 
methodology of my research study is fully described in Chapter 3. The final three chapters of my 
master thesis will: (a) describe my data analysis and found results (see Chapter 4); (b) discuss my 
results and the limitations of my research study (see Chapter 5); and (c) summarize my 
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Definition of Terms 
 The following is a list of important terms and their definitions within my master thesis.  
African Elephant Range State 
 A country (state) that has wild African elephants living within its national borders. 
African elephants are found in 35-38 range states in Central, Eastern, Western, and Southern 
Africa (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009; UNEP et al., 2013). 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
[CITES] 
 In order to protect species from overexploitation caused by a global demand for wildlife 
and their products, the international wildlife trade had to be regulated. In 1975, the United 
Nation’s Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
[CITES] was passed. Today, it remains the primary mechanism that regulates the international 
wildlife trade in order to protect endangered species from overexploitation. Since its inception, 
CITES has through international collaboration and agreement sought: to ensure sustainable 
extractive use of species; to promote species’ survival; and to legally regulate the global wildlife 
trade (Abensperg-Traun, 2009; CITES, n.d.; Holden, 1979; IUNC, 2000; Pires & Moreto, 2011; 
Reeve, 2006; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013).  
 The convention regulates the international trade of species by categorizing each species 
into an appendix that outlines its trade parameters (IUNC, 2000; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Species 
are placed into an appendix based on their risk for extinction. Regulated trade is tracked through 
import and export permits. The CITES’ appendices and their trade parameters are:  
• Appendix I meaning international trade is not permitted unless exceptional 
circumstances;  
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• Appendix II meaning international trade is limited to non-detrimental exceptions 
requiring export permits;  
• Appendix III meaning international trade of that species is banned in at least one country 
while recommended for other states to assist in control of its trade;  
• any species not listed in these appendices are non-CITES and have no international trade 
parameters. (CITES, n.d.; Rosen and Smith, 2010; UNEP et al., 2013)  
Furthermore, the convention provides a framework for its parties or member countries to pass 
national laws to protect wildlife against overexploitation due to domestic trade (CITES, n.d.).  
Effective Combatting of The Illegal Ivory Trade 
 The construct – effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade – is nominally defined 
within my master thesis as the use of united, cooperative approaches by the international 
community to eradicate this illicit trade. This definition was based on the argument of the 
London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade that cooperative, united strategies must be used 
to most effectively combat the illegal wildlife trade (London Conference, 2014). This construct 
was further operationalized within my research study as decreased intent to poach (behavioral 
intention) and decreased poaching (behavior) of African elephants. This operationalization was 
based on the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, my master thesis assumed that 
use of a united, cooperative ivory stockpile management strategy by all African elephant range 
states results in the most effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade. 
Illegal (or Illicit) Ivory Trade 
 The illegal (or illicit) ivory trade is defined by my master thesis as all sales, exchanges, or 
possessions of elephant ivory tusks or ivory products in contravention of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.  
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Illegal Wildlife Trade 
 Although it is important to recognize that there is a broader definition of the illegal 
wildlife trade, my master thesis used a narrower definition in order to better study and explore 
the trends related to it. The full definition of the illegal wildlife trade according to International 
Criminal Police Organization [INTERPOL] (2010) is the “taking, trading, exploiting or 
possessing of the world's wild flora and fauna in contravention of national and international 
laws" (as cited in Pires & Moreto, 2011, p. 103). For the purposes of my master thesis and its 
research study, first, I will not explore the illegal trade of flora, for example the timber trade. 
Second, my thesis will not explore the domestic legal or domestic illegal wildlife trades. Finally, 
my thesis excludes the killing of protected wildlife for sustenance or due to human-animal 
conflict, such as a local community killing an elephant that destroyed crops or a tiger that 
attacked a local person or livestock, from my definition (Nijman, 2010; Pires & Moreto, 2011). 
Therefore, I define the illegal trade of wildlife as any sale, exchange, or possession of the 
world’s wild fauna and their products in contravention of the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, such as the illicit trade of elephant ivory. 
International Community 
 The international community is defined as the countries of the world considered 
collectively. For my master thesis, the consensus of the international community is taken from 
collaborative agreements, declarations, or conventions signed by a large collective group of 
countries, such as the United Nations’ Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora or the 2014 London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade.  
Ivory Stockpile 
 Ivory stockpile is defined within my master thesis as a collection of elephant ivory, raw 
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
20 
(tusks) or worked (carved), legally owned and managed by a country. I particularly focus on 
ivory stockpiles legally owned and managed by African elephant range states. The elephant ivory 
may come into possession of the country from naturally deceased elephants, euthanized 
elephants due to human-elephant conflict, or illegally traded ivory confiscated in the country by 
authorities.   
Ivory Stockpile Destruction 
 Ivory stockpile destruction is one of two ivory stockpile management strategies. Within 
my master thesis, it is defined as the approach of an African elephant range state to manage its 
elephant ivory stockpile resulting in a publicized event where the country destroys all or a 
portion of its ivory stockpile through burning or crushing the illicit ivory. 
Ivory Stockpile Sale 
 Ivory stockpile sale is one of two ivory stockpile management strategies. Within my 
master thesis, it is defined as the approach of an African elephant range state to manage its 
elephant ivory stockpile resulting in CITES listing its African elephant population as Appendix 
II and then the country sells a portion of its ivory stockpile in a CITES-authorized one-off sale. 
London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade [London Declaration] 
 The London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade [London Declaration] was 
established in February 2014 after the international community met at the London Conference on 
the Illegal Wildlife Trade (London Conference, 2014). The declaration fully recognizes the 
global impacts of the illegal wildlife trade and is the leading collaborative effort of the 
international community to combat the illicit trade of wildlife and their products. Furthermore, it 
calls for a cooperative, united approach to effectively combat the illegal wildlife trade through 
implementing its three strategies: (a) a demand reduction strategy to decrease the high demand 
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market; (b) an enforcement strategy to increase enforcement, punitive standards, and capacity to 
enforce; and (c) an alternative livelihood strategy to promote development efforts to provide 
alternative economic opportunity for local communities in supply regions (Lawson & Vines, 
2014; Duffy & Humphreys, 2014). 
Theory of Planned Behavior 
 Ajzen (1991) published The Theory of Planned Behavior in 1991. His theory of planned 
behavior provides an understanding of and predicts the decisional process of human behavior. 
His theory argues that human behavior is primarily a result of intention (behavioral intention). 
Additionally, the theory defines three independent determinants of behavioral intention: attitude, 
subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. A high level of behavioral intention, or intent 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The illegal wildlife trade is a growing, lucrative transnational crime characterized by high 
illicit profits, relatively low risk of getting caught, and minimal punitive action against 
perpetrators. The main illicit wildlife products traded are elephant ivory, rhino horn, tiger blood, 
bear bile, shark fin, and pangolin scales (Hastie & McCrea-Steele, 2014; Nellemann, Henriksen, 
Raxter, Ash, & Mrema, 2014; Sonricker Hansen, Li, Joly, Mekaru, & Brownstein, 2012; Wyler 
& Sheikh, 2013). In the last decade, the international community and research within this field 
have increasingly recognized the illegal trade of wildlife as a major threat to social and economic 
development, national and international security, and global health (Nellemann et al., 2014; 
Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). These impacts are in addition to the illegal wildlife trade’s well-known 
and accepted negative impact on the environment and biodiversity. Furthermore, the 
international community has expressed greater commitment to combatting this illegal trade and 
diminishing its devastating global impacts.  
 African elephants are one of the species most threatened by the illegal wildlife trade 
(Conrad, 2012; Harvey, 2015). African elephant poaching or ivory taken from unsecure, poorly 
managed ivory stockpiles owned by African elephant range states are the main supply sources of 
illegal ivory. Today, illegal ivory is illicitly traded predominantly to China and other regions of 
Asia (UNEP, CITES, IUCN, & TRAFFIC, 2013). This illegal trade threatens the survival of 
elephants, the social and economic development of elephant range states, and national and 
international security (Akella & Allan, 2012; Bennett, 2014; Duffy & St. John, 2013; Nellemann 
et al., 2014; UNEP et al., 2013; van Kooten, 2008; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Therefore, it is 
necessary to effectively combat the illegal ivory trade through united, cooperative actions 
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(Harvey, 2015). One particular action is effective management of the legal government-owned 
ivory stockpiles (Harvey, 2015; London Conference, 2014).  
 Specifically, my master thesis is focused on the management of ivory stockpiles owned 
by African elephant range states. Despite the international community’s recent call for all 
countries to destroy their ivory stockpiles, the community contradicts itself by continuing to 
allow legal, regulated sale of ivory stockpiles by authorized countries (CITES, n.d.; London 
Conference, 2014). This allows the use of two dichotomous ivory stockpile management 
strategies – (a) ivory stockpile destruction and (b) ivory stockpile sale – by African elephant 
range states. This dichotomy goes against the necessary use of a united, cooperative action to 
effectively combat the illegal ivory trade. Therefore, my thesis conducted the following literature 
review to explore this dichotomy.  
 In brief, my literature review chapter has two main parts, a historical background 
followed by a review of the literature relevant to my research question. The first part of this 
chapter provides the necessary historical background to understand the illegal wildlife and ivory 
trades. Each section of the historical background generally summarizes the illegal wildlife trade 
to provide context for my summary of any available information specific to the illegal ivory 
trade. The intricacies of the illegal wildlife and ivory trades as well as their devastating impacts 
are clearly presented through this historical background. Furthermore, this part of the chapter 
presents the necessary importance of effectively combatting the illegal trade of wildlife and their 
products, despite the barriers, through united, cooperative actions as outlined by the 2014 
London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade (London Conference, 2014). However, it was 
found that dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies are currently being used by 
African elephant range states.   
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 The second part of this chapter provides a review of the literature on the existing use of 
dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies used by African elephant range states. 
Additionally, it provides a review of the debated effectiveness of each ivory stockpile 
management strategy. During my review, I found a gap in the literature. This led to the 
development of my research question and conducted study for my master thesis. This gap in the 






















 A historical background of the illegal wildlife trade and its impact on African elephants is 
critical to understand why and how best to combat this transnational crime. As an overview of 
the historical background part of this chapter, I will first discuss the history of the wildlife trade, 
specifically the trade of ivory. This includes discussion of the use of wildlife and their products, 
the overexploitation of wildlife to supply the demand for these products, and how this led to the 
creation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna [CITES]. Second, the structure of the illegal wildlife and ivory trades will be overviewed 
to understand its demand side as well as the supply side. Third, the global implications of the 
illegal wildlife and ivory trades will be outlined, including: the environmental impacts; social 
and economic impacts; national and international security impacts; and global health impacts. 
Then, the barriers to combatting the illegal wildlife and ivory trades will be discussed. This is 
followed by an overview of the international community’s efforts to combat the illegal wildlife 
and ivory trades, with particular focus on a single action outlined within the 2014 London 
Declaration on Illegal Wildlife Trade.  
History of the Wildlife Trade 
 The trade of wildlife and their products is not a new practice. It has been likely practiced 
throughout human history; physical evidence of the wildlife trade can be traced back for 
thousands of years. The trade in exotic species traces back to 2500 B.C. by the Egyptians and to 
the 7th century B.C. by the Greeks (Ayling, 2013; van Kooten, 2008). The trade of wildlife and 
their products are greatly influenced by culture, social practices, medicine, science, myth, and 
folklore (Haken, 2011; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013). Historically as well as today, these 
influences are important reasons for the high demand for wildlife and their products, irrelevant if  
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the supply is legal or illegal. 
 Uses of traded wildlife and their products. The use of wildlife and their products spans 
a wide range of purposes, including: (a) as sustenance or income sources; (b) as superstitious 
agents; (c) as delicacies; (d) as medicine or falsely perceived medicinal value, such as for sexual 
potency or as a cure for cancer; (e) as ornaments; (f) as fashion pieces; (e) as exotic pets; (g) for 
conspicuous consumption; and (h) as financial investments (Felbab-Brown, 2011; Gao & Clark, 
2014; Haken, 2011; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; UNEP et al., 2013). Recently, there is 
increasing use of wildlife products for conspicuous consumption to express one’s wealth or 
status as well as for financial investment, as notably seen within the illicit trade of ivory (Gao & 
Clark, 2014; Harvey, 2015; UNEP et al., 2013).  
 Traded elephant products. Ivory is the primary product from elephants that is demanded 
and traded. There are two species of elephants: Loxodonta africana (commonly known as the 
African elephant with two subspecies including the African Savanna and Forest elephants) and 
Elephas maximus (commonly known as the Asian elephant with a variety of subspecies) (Blanc, 
2008; Choudhury et al., 2008). All male elephants typically have ivory tusks. Whereas only 
female African elephants typically have ivory tusks while female Asian elephants typically do 
not have tusks. Elephant ivory can be traded as either raw tusks or worked pieces of ivory, such 
as ivory carvings (see Figure 1 on next page). In addition to ivory, live elephants may be traded 
as well as elephant-derived products such as meat and leather (UNEP et al., 2013). A history of 
these non-ivory trades is not further discussed in my literature review.  
 Ivory has been commercially traded throughout history. The earliest recorded 
documentation of the trade of ivory appears in 206 B.C. – 220 A.D. during China’s Han Dynasty 
(Conrad, 2012). Additionally, various Roman, Arab, European, and Asian writers have recorded 
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the commercial trade of ivory throughout history (van Kooten, 2008). The trade of ivory is even 
referenced in the Old Testament scriptures of 1 Kings, Ezekiel, and 2 Chronicles (Bible Hub, 
2016). For example, King Solomon’s ships brought ivory back from Africa which he used to 
decorate his palace (1Kings 10:22; 22:39) (Bible Hub, 2016; van Kooten, 2008).   
 
 
Figure 1. Raw and worked ivory. The figure shows an example of worked ivory (carved 
ivory tusk) as well as examples of raw ivory (elephant tusks). (Source: http://www.reut 
ers.com/article/ us-china-ivory-idUSKCN0S90BB20151015)  
    
 Not only does the trade of ivory date back thousands of years, the use of ivory is also 
deeply ingrained in many cultures and traditions worldwide. First, the art of ivory carving is 
deeply rooted in Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian traditions (Gao & Clark, 2014). Ivory 
carving was extremely important during the Ming (1368-1644 A.D.) and Qing (1644-1911 A.D.) 
dynasties (Gao & Clark, 2014). The carvings were commissioned and collected during these 
dynasties by the imperial court, scholar-officials, and the upper classes in order to display their 
affluence, wealth, and power (Gao & Clark, 2014). Additionally, ivory may be traded for its 
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religious and medicinal purposes. Ivory embodies an essence understood and highly valued 
within the Buddhist religion resulting in the trade of religious ivory talismans (Gao & Clark, 
2014). Also, powdered ivory and bangles have been minimally used within Chinese Traditional 
Medicine (Gao & Clark, 2014). Finally, Europeans and Americans have historically highly 
valued the aesthetic beauty of ivory, particularly using it for religious carvings (UNEP et al., 
2013). During the middle of the 1900s, European and American use of ivory widely expanded 
and was highly desired to make piano keys, gun grips, billiard balls, and buttons (UNEP et al., 
2013). This demand waned with the introduction of plastic. Currently the demand for ivory is 
much more specific and localized. Today, the demand is almost exclusively for worked ivory 
carvings (Gao & Clark, 2014; Harvey, 2015; UNEP et al., 2013). Additionally, the demand is 
localized primarily to China and Thailand (Gao & Clark, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013).  
 Currently, China has the largest market for ivory. Ivory is extensively sought for 
conspicuous or luxury consumptive purposes due to China’s recent economic growth providing 
increased purchasing power to consumers (Gao & Clark, 2014; Harvey, 2015; UNEP et al., 
2013). Also, the high demand and consumption relates to the socially constructed values of ivory 
within Chinese culture. For example, Gao and Clark (2014) explain that Chinese consumers 
choose to purchase ivory for the following purposes: (a) as a financial investment because it has 
economic value with its perception to be inflation-proof, have value appreciation, or like gold; 
(b) as an art investment because a cultural revival, sparked by the promotion of ivory as 
intangible cultural heritage in 2002, began a booming ivory art trade; (c) to give consumers 
prestige or face within society because ivory has social value to reflect one’s monetary wealth 
and status; or (d) to give consumers prestige or face within society through bestowing it as a gift 
to another, which is an important cultural practice for maintaining interpersonal relationships, 
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both personal and professional. Overall, deeply rooted cultural and traditional factors have and 
continue to drive the increasing demand for ivory.  
 Overexploitation of species to supply the wildlife trade. Tradition, culture, and 
sustenance as well as economic growth and buying power have played a primary role in creating 
a high demand for wildlife and their products. Milliken (2014) points out that “wildlife harvest 
has sustained many of the essential needs of human communities for food, clothing, medicine, 
utilitarian goods, building materials, adornment, entertainment, companionship and income for 
centuries” (p. 1). Historically, exploitation for sustenance purposes was often sustainable 
conducted in a manner that guaranteed the continued survival of all species involved (Milliken, 
2014). As the global demand for wildlife and their products increased, an expansive international 
market and trade developed. However, there is not an endless supply of wildlife. Often in order 
to meet the growing demands, the supply for the trade began to overexploit species threatening 
their survival (Milliken, 2014; Rosen & Smith, 2010; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Milliken (2014) 
argues two of the most prominently overexploited species for trade of their products are 
elephants and rhinoceroses.  
 Overexploitation of African Elephants. Overexploitation of elephants in order to supply 
the demand for them and their products is not a new occurrence. Ayling (2013) describes the 
exploitation of wildlife by the Romans from around 186 BC to AD 523. Exotic species, 
including elephants, were overexploited and imported by the Romans in order to use them in 
their Roman amphitheater games. The demand and supply exceeded sustainable exploitation of 
the species because the animals were killed for entertainment during the games and each game 
needed an entirely new supply of exotic animals. Ayling (2013) made an important reference to 
the research of Leakey and Lewin (1996). Their research determined that the African elephant 
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sub-species, called the Atlas or Carthaginian elephant, once inhabited Northern Africa but 
became extinct in the 2nd century B.C. (Leakey & Lewin, 1996, as cited in Ayling, 2013). The 
use of this species in Roman amphitheater games overexploited this population to extinction. 
However, the Atlas or Carthaginian elephant population was already heavily exploited. The 
elephants in this region were locally poached for their ivory and captured for their utility as war 
animals; most notably, Hannibal Barca used these war elephants during his command of the 
Punic Carthaginian military and famous crossing of the Alps to attack Rome (Leaky and Lewin, 
1996, as cited in Ayling, 2013; Mulligan, 2015).   
 In more recent history, poachers killing elephants for their ivory tusks in order to supply 
the global demand for ivory is the primary overexploitation of elephants (UNEP et al., 2013). 
Elephants are also overexploited by being poached for bush meat and leather, which are the other 
two in-demand elephant products (Choudhury et al., 2008; Conrad, 2012; UNEP et al., 2013). 
Yet, the demand for these two products is minimal compared to the demand for ivory. African 
elephants are more threatened by poaching and overexploitation due to the high demand for 
ivory because poachers see less value in poaching the small Asian elephant population which 
also inherently offers less ivory with females usually not having tusks (Milliken, 2014; UNEP et 
al., 2013). Additionally, the survival of wild elephants is threatened by factors other than 
overexploitation, such as habitat loss and global warming (Blanc, 2008; Choudhury, 2008; 
UNEP et al., 2013). Although my thesis narrows its focus to the overexploitation of African 
elephants due to ivory poaching, I do not want to minimalize: the threat of the illegal ivory trade 
to the Asian elephant population; the threat of overexploitation due to non-ivory products; and 
the other threats to the survival of wild elephants (habitat loss and global warming). I believe all 
of these threats must be combatted in order to effectively protect and conserve all wild elephants. 
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I chose to specifically focus my thesis on African elephant poaching in order to better explore 
and understand one of the many factors threatening the survival of wild elephants.  
 The overexploitation of African elephants due to ivory poaching is a serious threat to this 
species because it significantly decreases their population numbers. One of the most devastating 
overexploitations of the entire elephant population occurred during the poaching crisis of the 
1970s and 1980s (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009; van Kooten, 2008). For example, the total African 
elephant population declined from approximately 1.3 million elephants in 1979 to 600,000 
elephants in 1989 (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009). The impact differed across the elephant ranges. 
African elephants are found in 35-38 countries or range states in sub-Saharan Africa and their 
range spans Central, Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa (see Figure 2 on next page) 
(Lemieux & Clarke, 2009; UNEP et al., 2013). Elephant presence and range is uncertain in 
Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan due to lack of reporting related to the instability of these countries. 
The largest, well-managed elephant populations are in Southern Africa while the populations in 
Central and Western Africa are smaller and less protected (UNEP et al., 2013, p. 15). As such, 
the elephants in Central and Western Africa were dramatically decreased during the poaching 
crisis (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009).  
 Poaching is particularly devastating because it can decrease the elephant population at a 
rate higher than their natural population growth rate (UNEP et al., 2013). Additionally, poaching 
removes the best specimens and skews the sex ratio of the population (Mondol, Mailand, & 
Wasser, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013). The poaching crisis of the 1970s and 1980s required action by 
the international community to protect elephants from continued overexploitation. This resulted 
in the 1989 ivory trade ban by the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES] prohibiting international commercial trade of ivory (CITES, n.d.; 
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Lemieux & Clarke, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 2. African elephant population by country in 2007. The figure shows the estimated 
minimum to maximum population of African elephants in each African elephant range 
state, as recorded by the African Elephant Database. (Source: UNEP et al., 2013, p. 25) 
  
 Protection of overexploited species through CITES. In order to protect species 
threatened by overexploitation fueled by a global demand for wildlife and their products, the 
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international community acted by regulating the international commercial trade of wildlife and 
their products. This regulation and subsequent criminalization did not occur until 1975 (Ayling, 
2013). The first recognition of the need to regulate the wildlife trade occurred at a meeting of the 
international community in 1900 and resulted in the London Convention Designed to Ensure the 
Conservation of Various Species of Wild Animals in Africa (IUCN, 2000). However, the 
convention did not gain the support of enough nations (referred to as Parties) and failed to enter 
into force. A similar international convention designed to prevent overexploitation of wildlife 
was able to gain enough support and entered into force in 1936 but failed to be effective when 
only a few Parties ratified its recommendations into their national legislation (IUCN, 2000).  
Beginning in the 1960s, there was a global shift towards international cooperation to 
protect wildlife by controlling the growing wildlife trade. This global shift included a series of 
wildlife protection resolutions from the International Union for Conservation of Nature, drafts of 
more conventions, and countries passing national legislation regulating wildlife trade (IUCN, 
2000). This set the stage for a meeting of the international community in 1973 at the Washington 
Conference (IUCN, 2000). At this conference, the international community adopted the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES], 
which formally entered into force in 1975 (CITES, n.d.).  
 Since 1975, CITES has been and remains the primary international collaboration and 
agreement to monitor and regulate the transnational commercial trade of wildlife (Abensperg-
Traun, 2009; CITES, n.d.; Holden, 1979; IUCN, 2000; Pires & Moreto, 2011; Reeve, 2006; 
Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Its purpose is to ensure sustainable extractive use of species and 
promote species survival. The trade is regulated by CITES categorizing endangered species into 
three appendices, which outline specific trade parameters, and, then, export and import permits 
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are used to monitor the trade (IUCN, 2000; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Species are placed into one 
of three trade appendices based on their risk for extinction. Challender, Harrop, and MacMillian 
(2015a) explain the CITES’ appendices: 
• “Appendix I—Includes species threatened with extinction. Trade for commercial 
purposes is prohibited and only permitted in exceptional circumstances, subject to the 
grant of import and export permits (Article III)” (p. 130); 
• “Appendix II—Includes species that could become threatened with extinction from 
international trade unless it is regulated. Trade is subject to the grant of (re-)export 
permits based on a NDF, which is a declaration that trade in specimens of a given species 
will not be detrimental to the survival of that species in the wild. This calls on Parties to 
limit trade such that species are maintained throughout their range at levels consistent 
with their ecosystem roles and above levels at which they would be eligible for inclusion 
in Appendix I (Article IV, 3)” (p. 130); 
• “Appendix III—Includes species for which trade is regulated by one Party, but that Party 
requests the cooperation of other signatories in preventing unsustainable trade. Trade is 
subject to the grant of export permits (Article V)” (p. 130). 
Furthermore, the convention provides a framework for its 181 Parties or member countries to 
pass national legislation to regulate trade and protect wildlife (Cites, n.d.). Overall, CITES is a 
crucial international collaboration and framework for combatting the illegal wildlife trade, but 
most importantly it illegalized international trade of threatened wildlife and their products.  
 Elephant ivory trade ban. The dramatic decrease in the elephant population as a result of 
the poaching crisis of the 1970s and 1980s required the international community to address 
overexploitation of African and Asian elephants in order to protect these species (Lemieux & 
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Clarke, 2009; van Kooten, 2008). The international community took action through the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES] and 
in 1989 decided on internationally banning the commercial trade of ivory (CITES, n.d.). Elephas 
maximus (Asian elephants) were already raised to Appendix I in 1975 due to their endangerment 
(CITES, n.d.). However, the 1989 ivory trade ban decision led to the listing of Loxodonta 
africana (African elephants) as Appendix I beginning January 1, 1990 (CITES, n.d.).  
 The African elephant population began to recover and grow following the ivory trade 
ban, particularly the elephant populations in Southern and Eastern Africa (UNEP et al., 2013). 
As a result, some of the African elephant range states in Southern and Eastern Africa with well-
managed elephant populations petitioned CITES to downlist their populations to Appendix II 
status. The African elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were downlisted 
in 1997 followed by the African elephant population of South Africa being downlisted in 2000 
(CITES, n.d.). These four countries remain today as the only elephant populations with an 
Appendix II status by CITES (CITES, n.d.). The Appendix II status allows these countries to sell 
their ivory stockpiles under regulated trade conditions. This quota trade system functions through 
legal CITES-authorized joint one-off ivory stockpile sales to CITES-approved buyers. Two joint 
one-off sales have occurred since 1997 (CITES, 2007; CITES, 2008). Ivory stockpile sales will 
be discussed further in the literature review part of this chapter. 
 Despite the improvement of elephant populations following the ivory trade ban, another 
alarming poaching crisis and dramatic decrease in the total number of African elephants began in 
2007 (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013; Wittemyer et al., 2014). Again, 
this second poaching crisis is fueled by an increasing demand for ivory. It has resulted in a 
growing illegal ivory trade. Although unsecure, poorly managed ivory stockpiles owned by 
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African elephant range states are a source of illicit ivory entering the illegal ivory trade, the main 
source is ivory directly taken from illegally poached and killed African elephants (Bennett, 2014; 
Douglas-Hamilton, 2013; Milliken, 2015; Welch, 2015). The percentage of illegally killed 
African elephants [PIKE], recorded by the CITES’ Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants 
[MIKE] Program, has been steadily increasing since 2007 (see Figure 3) (UNEP et al., 2013). 
Similar to the first poaching crisis, the elephants in Central and Western Africa are the most 
heavily poached populations (IUCN/AfESG, 2016; UNEP et al., 2013). As elephant populations 
in Central and Western Africa further decline, Bennett (2014) argues that fairly well-managed 
and secured elephant populations in Southern and Eastern Africa will face a much greater risk of 
poaching compared to their current lower rate of poaching.  
 
                         
Figure 3. Trend in proportion of illegally  Figure 4. ETIS’s illegal ivory transaction 
killed elephants (PIKE) in Africa. The index. The figure shows a rise in illegal 
figure shows an increase of poaching in ivory trade activity. (Source: UNEP et al., 
Africa. (Source: UNEP et al., 2013, p. 33) 2013, p. 45) 
 
 Furthermore, the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS), which monitors the 
confiscations of illegally traded ivory transactions, has reported increased activity within the 
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illicit trade (see Figure 4 on previous page). Its data showed that “seizure of large shipments of 
ivory hit an all-time high in 2011, indicating an increasingly active, profitable and well-
organized illegal ivory trade between Africa and Asia” (Milliken, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013, p. 6). 
Overall, the result is a decreasing total African elephant population in order to supply a growing 
illegal ivory trade (Conrad, 2012; Milliken, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013). Therefore, it is crucial to 
combat the illegal ivory trade and poaching of African elephants to protect the species from 
history repeating itself with a second major poaching crisis, which could feasibly remove this 
species from the wild in Central and Western Africa. Before determining how best to do so, it is 
necessary to understand how the illegal wildlife trade operates, including the illicit trade of ivory.  
Illegal Wildlife Trade 
 The international illegal wildlife trade (also referred to as the illicit wildlife trade, wildlife 
trafficking, and wildlife crime) is a transnational environmental crime. The World Wildlife Fund 
defines it as an “ environment-related crime that involves the illegal trade, smuggling, poaching, 
capture or collection of endangered species, protected wildlife (including animals and plants that 
are subject to harvest quotas and regulated by permits), derivatives or products thereof” (WWF 
& Dalberg, 2012, p. 9). Similarly, it is defined by the International Criminal Police Organization 
[INTERPOL] (2010) as the “taking, trading, exploiting or possessing of the world's wild flora 
and fauna in contravention of national and international laws" (as cited in Pires & Moreto, 2011, 
p. 103). Albeit the legal international wildlife trade is estimated at over $300 billion per year and, 
arguably, requires better regulation, this topic is beyond the scope of my thesis. I have chosen to 
narrow my focus to exploring the alarming scope, growth, and detriments of the illegal wildlife 
trade, particularly the illegal ivory trade (Lawson & Vines, 2014; Nellemann et al., 2014; 
Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013). Furthermore, for the purposes of my master thesis, the 
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illegal wildlife trade will be defined as any sale, exchange, or possession of the world’s wild 
fauna and their products in contravention of CITES. Following then, the illegal ivory trade is 
defined as all sales, exchanges, or possessions of elephant ivory tusks or ivory products in 
contravention of CITES. 
The illegal wildlife trade is a growing, lucrative transnational environmental crime 
(Elliott, 2012; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003). The value of the global illegal wildlife trade is 
estimated to be US $7.8 to $10 billion annually, excluding fish and timber trades (Haken, 2011). 
However, when excluding only the timber trade, the illegal wildlife trade is conservatively 
estimated at a total value of US $12 to $19.5 billion (Haken, 2011). As such, the illegal wildlife 
trade is comparable to other transnational crimes (see Table 1 on next page). As of 2011, the 
illegal wildlife trade is ranked “as the fourth largest global illegal activity after narcotics, 
counterfeiting, and human trafficking, and ahead of oil, art, gold, human organs, small arms, and 
diamonds” (Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013, p. 4). More recently, Wyler and Sheikh (2013) 
argue the estimated value of the illegal wildlife trade, excluding timber, had increased to a total 
of US $17 to $23 billion annually. It is only continuing to grow as shown by trends of increased 
poaching of many protected species, particularly elephants for their ivory tusks and rhinoceros 
for their horns, to supply the increased demand (WWF & Dalberg, 2012).  
It is extremely challenging to assess the true scale of the illegal wildlife trade. Reasons 
for this include: (a) it does not have the attention or precedence to be tracked similar to other 
crimes, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, or money laundering; (b) it is part of the 
criminal industry meaning there is a great deal of undocumented and untraceable revenue; and 
(c) it is difficult to accurately estimate the physical amounts of wild animals and their products 
illegally sold in the global black market or the extent of the overexploitation on species (Felbab-
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Brown, 2011; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003). Due to the 
challenges of determining its scale, the assessed value of the illegal wildlife trade is likely 
underestimated (Felbab-Brown, 2011). 
 
 
Table 1. Illegal transnational trade markets and their estimated value. The table shows 
the different illicit transnational markets (left column) and their estimated value in US 
dollars in 2011 (right column). (Source: Haken, 2011, p. 56). 
 
To better understand this growing illicit transnational crime, I will next describe the 
demand for and supply of illicit wildlife and their products within the illegal wildlife trade. I will, 
also, specifically discuss the supply of and demand for illicit ivory. 
 Demand for illegal wildlife and their products. The illegal wildlife trade is similar to 
any trade operating on supply and demand principles. In general on the demand side of the 
illegal wildlife trade, the largest markets are in China, the United States of America, and the 
European Union (Haken, 2011; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 
2003; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008).  
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 Consumers driving the demand for wildlife and their products can be generalized into the 
following groups: (a) individuals buying for traditional, cultural, religious, and superstitious 
purposes; (b) individuals opportunistically buying to possess rare or exotic pets or items; and, the 
most common today, (c) individuals, primarily located in newly developed regions, capable of 
paying high prices as well as who are seeking to show their affluence or social status through 
their purchases or making investment purchases (Akella & Allan, 2012; Haken, 2011; Ratchford, 
Allgood, & Todd, 2013; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Not only does high global demand influence 
the species that are illegally overexploited, but also it has led to the development of a highly 
complex and illicit transnational network to supply consumers. Before discussing the supply 
side, a review of the ivory demand market follows. 
 Demand for illicit ivory. A variety of cultural, economic, and social factors have 
influenced the high demand and price paid for ivory, irrespective of the ivory being illicit or not. 
Historically, the high demand for ivory was spread across the world with large markets in Japan, 
the United States of America, and Europe. Today, the demand market has localized. By 
researching ivory seizure data, Underwood, Burn, and Milliken (2013) found evidence of a 
rapidly increasing illegal ivory trade resulting from a growing demand for ivory in China and 
Thailand. Similarly, Patel et al. (2015) quantitatively measured the prevalence of countries 
involved in the illegal trade of elephant, rhinoceros, and tiger products. They found the key 
importers of ivory in descending order were China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Vietnam (Patel et 
al., 2015). With the exception of some spikes in online illicit sales of ivory in the United States 
in the late 2000’s, the demand for illicitly traded ivory is principally in Asia (Ratchford, Allgood, 
& Todd, 2013; UNEP et al., 2013).  
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 The research strongly supports the conclusion that China is the largest demand market for 
legal and illegal ivory (Gao & Clark, 2014; Patel et al., 2015; Vira, Ewing, & Miller, 2014; 
UNEP et al., 2013). Related to increased demand for ivory, China has seen a dramatic increase in 
the wholesale price of ivory from an estimated US $450 per kilogram in 2010 to an estimated US 
$2,100 per kilogram in 2014 (Vira, Ewing, & Miller, 2014, p. 40). Furthermore, China’s large 
legal domestic trade, including a large online market, serves as conduit for sale of illegal ivory 
and, thus, facilitates the illegal ivory trade (Gao & Clark, 2014; Vira, Ewing, & Miller, 2014; 
UNEP et al., 2013). Interestingly, in September 2015, China along with the United States of 
America announced they would enact a nearly complete ban on ivory import and export as well 
as China would ban its legal domestic ivory trade (The White House, 2015). However, this has 
not yet resulted in any policy and, therefore, will not be further discussed within my master 
thesis.  
 Although ivory demand in China waned through most of the 20th century (due to civil 
wars and the Maoist communist regime), Chinese demand for ivory has dramatically returned 
since the economic liberalization in the late 20th century (Gao & Clark, 2014). The returned 
demand is attributed to: (a) the economic growth of China; (b) increase of individual wealth and 
buying power; (c) increased conspicuous consumption of ivory and ivory art investment by 
consumers; and (d) a revived cultural value of ivory carving and collection (Gao & Clark, 2014; 
Milliken, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013).  
 As the Chinese are the largest consumers of ivory, the motivations for their consumption 
offer the best understanding of the demand for illicit ivory. Harvey (2015) identified the three 
types of consumers explaining the motive behind their consumption. He intended this 
information to better inform ivory demand reduction campaigns and more effectively combat the 
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illegal ivory trade by being able to specifically target campaigns towards all consumers.  
 First, there are consumers that purchase ivory as an investment. Ivory is durable and non-
perishable making it ideal for storing as an investment, similar to gold or silver (Bennett, 2014). 
Also, it is considered to be inflation-proof and of increasing value appreciation as elephants and 
ivory become scarce. Therefore, these consumers will continue to drive demand for ivory unless 
their tastes change. Bennett (2014) argues that ivory consumers may not be the only individuals 
interested in ivory as an investment; criminals could also have reason to stockpile illegal ivory 
for higher profits at a later time.  
 Next, Harvey (2015) identifies consumers who purchase ivory for its ability to bring them 
prestige and status. This is strongly aligned with the importance of face and gift giving within 
Chinese culture. Gift giving is almost required within Chinese business culture; ivory’s 
perceived prestige and status make it an exceptional gift. This conspicuous, luxury consumption 
is related to the increasing purchase power of many Chinese consumers (Gao & Clark, 2014).  
 The third type of ivory consumers is the purchaser of affordable carved ivory trinkets 
(Harvey, 2015). If the Chinese economy continues to grow, these consumers with increased 
buying power could consume greater amounts of ivory and higher priced ivory products (Harvey, 
2015). This could increase the demand for ivory and, therefore, increase elephant poaching to 
supply this increased demand. 
 Furthermore, Harvey (2015) argues that these three Chinese consumers are not limited to 
only purchasing ivory in China, the largest demand market in the world. These Chinese 
consumers are likely increasing ivory consumption in Africa. There has been an increase in 
Chinese businessmen, foreign investors, and individuals involved with infrastructure 
development projects working in Africa. The presence of these consumers (with buying power 
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
43 
and cultural or traditional motivations to consume ivory) have likely increased the demand for 
ivory in Africa domestic ivory markets and, therefore, likely increased African elephant 
poaching necessary to supply this new demand (Harvey, 2015; UNEP et al., 2013). 
 Also, Harvey (2015) argues for greater consideration of ivory’s price elasticity due to 
these different types of consumers and its impact on the demand for ivory. He states “ivory 
appears to be an unusual form of luxury good. Theoretically, demand for normal luxury goods is 
price-elastic (the quantity demanded is relatively sensitive to changes in the price)” (Harvey, 
2015, p. 9). An article by t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, and Stiles (2014) also expresses the importance 
for understanding this relationship as it impacts effectiveness of trade restrictions and demand 
reduction campaigns. They explain:   
 If buyers are relatively insensitive to higher prices and tend to sustain their consumption, 
 the demand is price inelastic and trade bans face significant hurdles. Even a small 
 reduction in supply will lead to correspondingly larger increases in  price. Conversely, if 
 demand is highly elastic, increasing legal supply may have little effect on prices or levels 
 of illegal exploitation. The price elasticity of demand for carvings needs to be understood 
 and not conflated with income increases that also affect demand. (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, 
 & Stiles, 2014, p. 69) 
Overall, these factors show the extremes of the high demand for ivory and its ability to fuel the 
illegal ivory trade and the poaching of African elephants to supply this demand. Before 
specifically discussing the supply of illicit ivory, I will first generally discuss the supply chain of 
illegal wildlife trade. 
 Supply of illegal wildlife and their products. Within the illegal wildlife trade, sub-
Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (regions often characterized by their high biodiversity and 
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concentration of developing nations) are the largest suppliers of wildlife or their products 
(Haken, 2011; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Rosen & Smith, 2010). Wildlife and their 
products are trafficked from these regions to the demand markets around the world in one of 
three ways: (a) transporting them by land, air, or sea by hiding them in shipping containers, 
cargo, personal luggage, or worn clothing; (b) transporting them through legal conduits by 
fraudulently declaring them on custom forms or trade permits, such as claiming them as look-
alike items, non-protected species, declaring less than the actual number being shipped, declaring 
a worth lower than actual value, or declaring wild species falsely as captive-bred species; or (c) 
transporting them through legal conduits by using forged or stolen trade permits (Wyler & 
Sheikh, 2008). 
 Furthermore, the literature agrees that the illegal wildlife trade is comprised of a complex 
supply network driven by economic motivation. However, there is disagreement on the exact 
structure of that network. On one side, Pires and Moreto (2011) as well as others argue that there 
is a more defined network involving a “multi-level chain that typically involves poachers, 
middlemen, processing centers, and markets” (Pires & Moreto, 2011, p. 104; WWF & Dalberg, 
2012). Figure 5 (see on next page) shows a generic example of the illegal wildlife supply-
demand chain. Pires and Moreto (2011) argue that impoverished locals most often commit the 
initial poaching either as an opportunistic economic opportunity or under coercion from crime 
syndicates (Pires & Moreto, 2011; TRAFFIC, 2008). They, then, argue that after the initial act of 
poaching the supply chain becomes more organized. This includes local, regional, and 
international middlemen using processing centers and markets. Pires and Moreto (2011) note, 
“depending on the species and region of the world, 'organized' can simply mean anything from 
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three individuals who are loosely organized together to a vast criminal enterprise that comprises 
all stages of the wildlife trade” (p. 104). 
 
 
Figure 5. A generic supply-demand chain. The figure shows the flow of illicit wildlife 
through the illegal wildlife trade from the source country (right) through transit country(s) 
(middle) to the consumer country (left). (Source: WWF & Dalberg, 2012, p. 11)  
 
Alternatively, Wyler and Sheikh (2013) along with Warchol, Zupan, and Clack (2003) 
argue that there is no one distinct chain to describe poaching and wildlife trafficking. Each illicit 
trade is unique and entirely different. Regardless of the supply-demand chain structure, it is 
agreed that the high demand and paying market for illegal wildlife and their products drives 
perpetrators to poach wildlife and continually supply the illicit trade. As such, the primary 
motivating factor for perpetrators is the economic incentive, whether it is to achieve a small 
income to support one’s livelihood or a major profit for an illicit criminal network (Pires & 
Moreto, 2011; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). 
Next, the supply chain of the illegal ivory trade will be more specifically discussed.  
 Illicit ivory supplied by poaching and unsecure ivory stockpiles. Ivory enters the illegal 
ivory trade by: (a) being directly poached from illegally killed elephants, primarily African 
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
46 
elephants (Bennett, 2014; t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013) or (b) corrupt 
removal or criminal raiding of legal government-owned ivory stockpiles, primarily owned by 
African elephant range states, that are unsecure and poorly managed (Bennett, 2014; Douglas-
Hamilton, 2013; Neme, 2013; Welch, 2015). As the supply and demand locations are continents 
apart, the illicit ivory must be transported from Africa to the main demand markets in China and 
other Asian countries (Bennett, 2014; t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014). The supply chain of 
the illicit ivory trade is therefore very elaborate with illicit ivory handled by many parties from 
the time the ivory is supplied in Africa until it is consumed in Asia (Bennett, 2014; t’ Sas-Rolfes, 
Moyle, & Stiles, 2014).  
 Milliken (2014) studied the supply chain routes of the illegal ivory trade overtime. He 
found that the frequency and scale of large illegal ivory movements have significantly increased 
since 2000 (Milliken, 2014). Since 2009, he argues the primary transportation of large amounts 
of illegal ivory is in large, containerized shipping from seaports in Africa to Asia (Milliken, 
2014). Additionally, he found that trade routes continually change. For example, during 2009-
2011, the supply shifted from originating out of the seaports in Western and Central Africa to 
leaving from seaports in Eastern Africa. Regardless of the path the illicit ivory took, he found 
that ivory increasingly originated in Africa and ended in Chinese markets during this period 
(Milliken, 2014). 
 Similar to the general trend of the illegal wildlife trade, the illegal ivory trade is 
increasingly being run by organized criminal syndicates and networks (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & 
Stiles, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013). These syndicates and networks are not passive. Rather, they 
exert violence, concealment, bribery, and other methods to actively and successfully avoid law 
enforcement in order to illicitly supply ivory for the illegal ivory trade (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & 
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Stiles, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013). Additionally, these groups have the capacity to necessarily 
move large-scale illicit ivory shipments from Africa to Asia (UNEP et al., 2013, p. 6).  
 Related to the supply chain of the illegal ivory trade, the supply of illicit ivory for the 
illegal trade is facilitated by the high concentration of developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The common structures of developing countries within this supply region enable criminals to 
more easily poach African elephants for their ivory and supply this illicit trade. The five common 
structures identified in the literature are: corruption, weak governance, violent conflicts, poverty, 
and domestic ivory markets. These common structures will be overviewed now; they are also 
discussed later in this chapter as a barrier to combatting the illegal wildlife and ivory trades. 
 First, Bennett (2014) explains that corruption allows for the laundering of illegal ivory 
into legal conduits of trade. This may include bribing officials to overlook illegal activities of 
poaching, trade, and transport or to falsely alter and certify necessary paperwork and permits 
(Bennett, 2014; Bulte, Damania, & van Kooten, 2007; UNEP et al., 2013). Additionally, 
corruption undermines and weakens governance. 
 Second, Wyler and Sheikh (2013) reported that weak governance is also a factor. It has 
been consistently shown in the research that indicators of poor governance, such as the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators or Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, are strongly correlated with poaching levels more so than any other national-
level indicator (UNEP et al., 2013).  
 Third, UNEP, CITES, IUCN, and TRAFFIC (2013) explain that in the last few decades 
elephant poaching has most often occurred in conflict regions. These regions facilitated poaching 
due to the presence of lawlessness and abundance of small arms. However, this trend is 
becoming less apparent as poaching is increasingly happening across all of Africa, regardless if it 
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is a conflict or non-conflict region. Additionally, criminal organizations use violence and create 
conflict, such as conducting mass scale elephant poaching operations using sophisticated 
intelligence equipment, powerful weapons, and helicopters while killing the law enforcement or 
conservation officials attempting to stop them (Milliken, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013).   
 Fourth, poverty facilitates poaching and the supply of illicit ivory because criminal 
organizations are able to “recruit, bribe or threaten locals and underpaid police, military 
personnel and wildlife rangers” (UNEP et al., 2013, p. 6). Locals with no alternative livelihood 
often turn to elephant poaching to sustain their families (Bennett, 2014). Also, poverty leads to 
human-elephant conflict when locals and elephants must compete for usage of the same land to 
both survive (UNEP et al., 2013). Angry locals for the initial reason of crop destruction may 
illegally kill an elephant, but often the ivory does not remain with the carcass.  
 Finally, many major cities in African elephant range states have thriving domestic ivory 
markets (UNEP et al., 2013). These exist despite many of these countries having national 
legislation prohibiting the domestic trade of ivory. The easy access for ivory consumption 
increases demand resulting in increased poaching to supply this demand and, often, illicit ivory 
trade.  
 In addition to African elephant poaching, the other source of illicit ivory into the illegal 
ivory trade is from ivory stockpiles legally owned by African elephant range states (Bennett, 
2014; Douglas-Hamilton, 2013; Welch, 2015). Again, corruption and violence are factors related 
to this source. Ivory from these stockpiles often enters or reenters the illegal ivory trade. This 
occurs in two ways: (a) corruption leading to ivory disappearing from these stockpiles, such as 
corrupt officials illegally selling it for personal profit or (b) criminals raiding and stealing ivory 
from these stockpiles for illegal sale (Bennett, 2014; Douglas-Hamilton, 2013; Welch, 2015). 
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 Overall, the supply side of the illegal ivory trade is currently threatening the African 
elephant population. The high demand for ivory is currently fueling a second African elephant 
poaching crisis. African elephant poaching to supply the trade is unsustainable (Douglas-
Hamilton, 2013; Harvey, 2015). The population growth rate of African elephants cannot support 
the current demand and supply of this illicit trade (Bennett, 2014; Harvey, 2015; UNEP et al., 
2013; Wittemyer et al., 2014). If the supply of this illicit trade (increased African elephant 
poaching and poor management of ivory stockpiles by African elephant range states) is left 
unabated, there is a grave threat to the survival of the wild elephant population, particularly the 
decimated African elephant populations in Central and Western Africa (Douglas-Hamilton, 
2013; Harvey, 2015; UNEP et al., 2013). However, the implications of the illegal wildlife and 
ivory trades go beyond negatively impacting the survival of elephants or other threatened 
species.  
Global Implications of the Illegal Wildlife Trade 
 The illegal wildlife trade is a growing, lucrative transnational environmental crime, 
which includes an increasing illicit ivory trade. The international community has only recently 
recognized and accepted that the impact of illegal wildlife trade goes beyond its environmental 
impacts of endangering species, disrupting ecosystem stability, and threatening biodiversity 
conservation. A 2008 report by the International Fund for Animal Welfare was one of the first 
publications of its kind to assert that the illicit trade in wildlife is not just an environmental crime 
with environmental impacts (Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013). Since 2008, the problem has 
continued to worsen and the international community has taken notice. On May 1, 2013, the 
United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice agreed to a resolution 
calling on the nations of the world to “recognize wildlife and forest crimes as a serious form of 
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organized crime and strengthen penalties against criminal syndicates and networks profiting 
from such illegal trade” (Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013, p. 4).  
 The illegal wildlife trade is recognized as a threat to: (a) the environment; (b) social and 
economic development; (c) national and international security; and (d) global health (Nellemann 
et al., 2014; Wyler and Sheikh, 2008; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Moreover, each of its impacts and 
the relevant research will be discussed in detail, including more specific impacts of the illicit 
ivory trade. 
 Environmental impacts. It has long been recognized that the illegal wildlife trade 
threatens the environment in multiple facets. First, overexploitation by the illegal trade decreases 
species’ populations, particularly threatening endangered species and, at times, leading to their 
extinction (Wittemyer et al., 2014; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Nijman (2010) and Ayling (2013) 
argue that species’ survival is not only threatened by overexploitation due to the illegal wildlife 
trade but is also further susceptible to habitat loss, invasive species, and global climate change. 
Ayling (2013) states that illegal wildlife trade and these other factors combined have decreased 
the populations of all vertebrates by an average of 30% between 1970 and 2005.  
 Furthermore, the illicit wildlife trade removes the fittest individuals or best specimens 
from the breeding population due to their increased attractiveness and value within the illicit 
trade (Rosen & Smith, 2010; Tella & Hiraldo, 2014). Simultaneously, the demand for these 
desired species and their products increase because the supply is reduced. This, in turn, causes 
the remaining best specimens to increase in value leading to a cycle of more poaching (Tella & 
Hiraldo, 2014). Further, when critically threatened or endangered species have a small existing 
population and are highly demanded, the impact of poaching and its overexploitation is further 
pronounced (Felbab-Brown, 2011). As each individual is removed, there is a significant 
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detriment to the population’s ability to ever possibly recover and survive.  
 Second, the illegal wildlife trade poses a risk of introducing invasive species, which 
threaten native species by disrupting ecosystems and spreading disease (Derraik & Phillips, 
2010; Karesh et al., 2007; Rosen & Smith, 2010; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). The illegal wildlife 
trade can result in the introductive of invasive species locally or even globally, such as releasing 
exotically owned pets in non-native habitats. Introduction of invasive species globally by the 
illegal wildlife trade is a growing issue because of the increased ease and accessibility to illegally 
purchase live-specimens, such as exotic pets, through online internet sale (Derraik & Phillips, 
2010; Hastie & McCrea-Steele, 2014). For example, Derraik and Phillips (2010) researched 
invasive species (not native to the country) in New Zealand. They found the invasive species had 
been illegally traded online and then either intentionally or accidentally been released. 
 Third, this illicit trade disrupts environmental ecosystems upon which humans and 
wildlife critically rely. Humans around the world rely on biological diversity and thriving 
ecosystems for: (a) livelihood; (b) fresh water supply; (c) arable land for sustainable harvests; (d) 
sustenance species; (e) medicines; (f) buffering effects of extreme weather; (g) future 
development and economic opportunities, such as tourism; and (h) nature resource revenue to 
support developing economies (Nellemann et al., 2014). Although ecosystems and biological 
diversity are threatened by a number of environmental insecurities, a major threat is the 
“smuggling of endangered, threatened, and protected species” (Elliott, 2012, p. 89).  
 Finally, the illegal wildlife trade disrupts, reverses, or prevents conservation efforts to 
preserve and promote the survival of species, healthy ecosystems, and biodiversity (WWF & 
Dalberg, 2012). Biodiversity is defined as:  
 the term given to the variety of life on earth. [It] comprises all the millions of different 
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 species that live on our planet, as well as the genetic differences within species. It also 
 refers to the multitude of different ecosystems in which species form unique 
 communities, interacting with one another and the air, water and soil. (WWF, n.d.,            
 para. 1-2)  
To understand the scale of this impact, Akella and Allan (2012) maintain that in the past decade 
the illegal wildlife trade has exponentially increased its role in the decline of many threatened 
species. Felbab-Brown (2011) focused his work on the illegal wildlife trade in Southeast Asia 
and found that if unabated, “scientists believe that 13% to 42% of Southeast Asian animal and 
plant species will be wiped out this century. At least half of those losses are species endemic to 
Southeast Asia and hence would represent global extinctions” (p. 6). The illegal wildlife trade’s 
devastating impact is not limited to the environment. It, also, threatens social and economic 
development. Before exploring another impact, a review of the environmental impact of the 
illicit ivory trade is presented.  
 Environmental impacts of the illicit ivory trade. The illicit ivory trade has a devastating 
impact on the African elephant population as well as African ecosystems. Poaching of elephants 
to supply the illegal wildlife trade has dramatically increased and continues to decrease the total 
African elephant population. The African elephant population was estimated in 2007 between 
470,000 and 690,000 and has decreased in six years to between 400,000 and 630,000 in 2013 
(IUCN/AfESG, 2016). Supporting that this decline was strongly related to poaching, there was 
also during this time an increase in the percentage of illegally killed African elephants. The 
CITES’ Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) Program has shown a steady 
increase of illegal killing since 2006 (UNEP et al., 2013). The African elephant populations in 
Western and Central Africa have the highest poaching rates and, hence, the greatest population 
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decline (UNEP et al., 2013). Since 2002, Milliken (2014) argues the Central African elephant 
population has decreased by 60% with forest elephants in the Congo Basin declining by 76%. 
 The current demand for ivory and poaching to supply it is unsustainable, particularly for 
African elephants in Central and Western Africa. Wittemyer et al. (2014) explains that elephants 
have the longest gestation period of any mammal to produce a single offspring and, therefore, 
have the lowest maximum finite rate of population increase of all mammals. As such, their 
population growth rate cannot compete against the dramatic decrease of their population due to 
poaching (Bennett, 2014; Harvey, 2015).  For example, it was estimated that poachers illegally 
killed 7.4% of the total African elephant population in 2011 (UNEP et al., 2013). The natural 
annual growth rate of a healthy elephant population has been estimated between 5% to 6%, with 
a theoretical maximum of 7% (UNEP et al., 2013). It was found that “illegal off-take in 2011 
indicates an unsustainable trend of elephants being killed faster than they can breed. If this trend 
continues over a number of years, current poaching levels will lead to significant population 
declines across much of the continent” (see Figure 6 on next page) (UNEP et al., 2013, p. 33).  
 Furthermore, the illicit ivory trade threatens African elephant populations by removing 
the best specimens while skewing of the sex and age ratio of the population (Mondol, Mailand, 
& Wasser, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013; van Kooten, 2008; Wittemyer et al., 2014). For example, 
van Kooten (2008) reports that the average tusk weight and average age of African elephants 
have decreased since the 1970s. This is a result of the current elephant population being younger 
due to older animals with larger tusks (best specimens) being targeted by poaching. 
 The second environmental impact of poaching is the reduction or removing of elephant 
populations from the African ecosystems they vitally support. For example, Wasser et al. (2010) 
argues that decreased elephant populations in Central Africa, who are the primary seed disperser 
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of large trees in the region, could  “substantially affect long-term viability of the second most 
important carbon capture forests in the world ” (p. 1331). Increased poaching to supply the illicit 
ivory trade is threatening certain elephant populations with impending extinction as well as is 
threatening to disrupt vital ecosystems. This disruption additionally poses a threat to the other 
species and humans dependent on the health of these ecosystems. This is related to the next 
discussed implication of the illegal wildlife trade, its social and economic impacts.  
 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of elephants illegally killed in Africa. The figure shows that the 
annual total percentage of illegally killed African elephants (calculated with data from 
MIKE monitoring sites) surpassed the off-take sustainability limit, meaning it has 
exceeded the total population growth rate of African elephants, since 2010. (Source: 
UNEP et al., 2013, p. 33) 
  
 Social and economic impacts. The illegal wildlife trade threatens social and economic 
structures, particularly in the supply regions where poaching occurs. As previously mentioned, 
the majority of the supply regions for the illegal wildlife trade are in developing countries. The 
illegal wildlife trade impedes the sustainable development of these countries by threatening or 
preventing the social and economic structures necessary for them to progress (Nellemann et al., 
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2014; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Nellemann et al. (2014) found the illegal wildlife trade involves 
“a complex combination of weak environmental governance, unregulated trade, loopholes and 
laundering systems used to conduct serious transnational crime, and undermining government 
institutions and legitimate business” (p. 97; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). WWF and Dalberg (2012) 
argue that corruption is necessary for the illegal wildlife trade to thrive, but it amounts to 
economic loss for the country (WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Corruption reduces rule of law, weakens 
civil engagement and trust in the state, threatens good governance, and impedes financial 
transparency. Thus, it also weakens macroeconomics, financial stability, and development of 
legitimate business within the country (WWF & Dalberg, 2012). 
  Furthermore, Haken (2011) argues that illegal wildlife trade traffickers are invested in 
preventing these supply countries from socially and economically developing. Criminal 
organizations exploit these structures within developing nations to enable their poaching efforts. 
Criminals exploit food insecurity and inequality to attract or exploit impoverished locals for 
poaching as well as exploit poor governance and corruption in order to facilitate their poaching 
activities (Haken, 2011; Lawson & Vines, 2014; Rosen & Smith, 2010). Criminal organizations 
sell the poached wildlife or their products through the illegal wildlife trade to fund their criminal 
activities (Haken, 2011). This undermines a country’s natural resource management and robs the 
country of valuable assets (Rosen & Smith, 2010; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Also, it leads to great 
economic loss for developing nations while the instigated violence and crime by these criminal 
organizations further hinders or reverses the social development, economic growth, and tourism 
within these nations (Lawson & Vines, 2014; Rosen & Smith, 2010).     
 Finally, the illegal ivory trade impacts social and economic development because its 
“unregulated trade and consumption of wildlife can spread viruses and diseases, endangering 
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local species and food supplies, introducing harmful invasive species that generate ecological 
and further economic losses, and facilitating species-jump of disease from animals to humans” 
(also see section, Global Health Impacts) (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 6).  
 Overall, the illegal wildlife trade is a national resource theft that: (a) deteriorates social 
structures and sustainable development while (b) it imposes crime, violence, and corruption; (c) 
threatens local industries, such as ecotourism and wildlife safari tourism; and (d) economically 
and socially devastates the local communities dependent on these robbed species for food and 
income as well as threatens their health. In addition to undermining social and economic 
development, the illegal wildlife trade undermines national and international authorities thereby 
threatening national and international security (Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003). Before 
discussing this security impact, the social and economic impacts of the illicit ivory trade are 
overviewed. 
 Social and economic impacts of the illicit ivory trade. The illicit trade of ivory threatens 
the social and economic stability and development of African elephant range states. Duffy and 
St. John (2013) studied the illicit elephant ivory and rhino horn trades in Africa. They found that 
the illegal ivory trade, corruption, poverty, and violence are all linked. These linked factors 
threaten the social and economic stability of the African elephant range states by weakening rule 
of law, undermining good governance, and causing physical and economic insecurity leading to 
further widespread poverty (Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). It inhibits 
the country’s future development as well as reverses its current progress.  
 Perpetrators of the illegal ivory trade use and rely on corruption. Bennett (2014) explains  
that corruption allows for the laundering of illegal ivory through legal conduits. For example, 
perpetrators exploit corrupt government officials and underpaid wildlife rangers by bribing them: 
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(a) to overlook illegal activities of poaching, trade, and transport and (b) to obtain falsely altered 
and certified necessary paperwork and permits (Bennett, 2014; Bulte, Damania, & van Kooten, 
2007; Duffy & St. John, 2013; UNEP et al., 2013).  
 Criminal syndicates also exploit impoverished locals with no alternative livelihood to 
illegally poach for them (Duffy & St. John, 2013). However, Bennett (2014) points out that the 
local poacher receives a highly disproportionate price for the ivory compared to the price paid by 
consumers at the end of the supply chain. As such, local poachers are not gaining a legitimate 
and secure income necessary for improved economic development.  
 In areas of conflict, organized criminal syndicates commonly use the illicit trade of ivory 
and rhino horn to fund their operations and fuel further violence (Duffy & St. John, 2013). 
Continued conflict and violence undermines good governance and law enforcement while 
robbing the country of its natural resources (Duffy & St. John, 2013; Lawson and Vines, 2012). 
It also decreases or prevents the potential economic revenue from ecotourism available to these 
countries and leaves locals further inclined to turn to poaching because they have no alternative 
livelihood and face severe threats to their physical security (Akella & Allan, 2012; Duffy & St. 
John, 2013; Lawson and Vines, 2012; Nellemann et al., 2014; WWF & Dalberg, 2012).  
 Overall, the illegal wildlife trade’s association with corruption, poverty, and violence 
prevents the region from economically and socially developing. The illicit ivory trade’s 
association with violence and use by criminal syndicates to fund their illicit operation and 
activities is an example of how the illegal wildlife trade is, also, a threat to national and 
international security.  
 National and international security impacts. A major focus of the international 
community is the national and international security impact caused by the illegal wildlife trade. 
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This threat is a result of the illegal wildlife trade’s link to organized crime and involvement of 
militias, non-state armed forces, and terrorists (Lawson and Vines, 2012; Nellemann et al., 2014; 
UNEP et al., 2013). Lawson and Vines (2012) completed a report on the illegal wildlife trade 
that found it “erodes state authority and fuels civil conflict, threatening national stability and 
provoking substantial economic losses internationally” (p. ix). Additionally, these criminal 
syndicates are a corruptive force as they pay for or use violence to maintain impunity and 
undermine law enforcement (Akella & Allan, 2012). For example, heavily armed poachers have 
used violence against rangers and individuals guarding wildlife in order to poach the species. 
Poachers or wildlife traffickers have killed at least 1000 wildlife rangers in the last decade in 
thirty-five countries around the world (Nellemann et al., 2014).  
 The illegal wildlife trade is disturbingly linked to conflict regions, militia, terrorists, and 
non-state armed groups, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia. These groups target 
developing or conflict regions with weak governance and poor capability to protect species as 
ideal locations to run their illegal wildlife trade operations, which fund their criminal operations 
and activities (Akella & Allan, 2012; Nellemann et al., 2014; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Further, 
there has been an increasing trend of overlapping transnational organized crime operatives, such 
as criminal syndicates sharing the same routes for trafficking illicit wildlife products, humans, 
and illicit drugs (WWF & Dalberg, 2012). The illegal wildlife trade poses an alarmingly grave 
threat to national and international security as it funds and unites highly organized criminal 
organizations, including international terrorist groups. The illicit trade of ivory is one of the 
wildlife trades most often exploited by these criminal organizations (Akella & Allan, 2012; 
Nellemann et al., 2014; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). The impacts of this will be discussed next. 
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 National and international security impacts of the illicit ivory trade. The large-scale 
movement of illicit ivory traded from Africa to Asia increasingly requires criminal organizations, 
illegal networks, and sophisticated techniques (Milliken, 2014). These organized criminal 
syndicates poach African elephants in order to sell their ivory within the illicit trade. Their 
criminal operation and activities, which are funded by this illicit trade, undermine national and 
international security.  
 Harvey (2015) argues that these criminal syndicates are adept at avoiding law 
enforcement and are extremely well resourced. Harvey (2015) provided an example of the scope 
of sophisticated methods of poaching syndicates. He states, that on March 15, 2012: 
 A foreign helicopter entered DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] airspace, and 22 
 elephants were killed by a marksman firing from the helicopter, killing the elephants with 
 a single shot to the top of the  head. While the actual slaughter was not witnessed, a 
 Russian manufactured MI-17 troop-carrying helicopter was photographed in the vicinity 
 at the same time. The helicopter was illegal and of unknown origin. (Harvey, 2015, p. 14) 
Organized criminal syndicates, also, exploit factors of weak governance, corruption, conflict, and 
poverty in order to operate with relative impunity (Harvey, 2015; Lawson & Vines, 2012).  
 Additionally, militias, non-state armed forces, and terrorists have used illegal traded ivory 
and rhino horn to fund their operations and activities (Akella & Allan, 2012; Nellemann et al., 
2014; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). For example, the Sudanese Janjaweed and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army have been connected to poaching elephants and illegally trading the ivory in order to fund 
their efforts. The “funds finance further illegal activity including linked transnational crimes, 
insurgency and political destabilization… [and] are fueling civil conflict in already unstable 
states, threatening the stability and security of states involved in all aspects of this trade and 
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beyond” (Lawson & Vines, 2012, p. 18). Nellemann et al. (2014) calculated the number of 
elephants that were poached for their ivory in Africa within the range of militia or non-state 
armed groups making the assumption that these groups poached the elephants. Their study then 
estimated the amount of poached ivory and the monetary value of ivory finding an estimated US 
$3.9 – 12.3 million per year could have been acquired by the criminal syndicates to finance their 
efforts (Nellemann et al., 2014). This is a significant resource for their illicit activities. Overall, 
the use of the illegal wildlife trade to fund criminal activity undermines national security of the 
African elephant range states where these criminal syndicates operate as well as threatens 
international security of countries impacted by their illicit activities. Related to the illegal 
wildlife and ivory trades’ national and international security impacts, the illegal wildlife trade is 
a major threat to global health security.  
 Global health impacts. The illegal wildlife trade, as a driver of disease emergence in 
humans, flora, and fauna, poses a major threat to global health. This is ironic because one of the 
high demands fueling the illicit trade is the untrue but falsely believed health benefits of certain 
wildlife products to offer sexual potency or a cancer cure (Felbab-Brown, 2011). This is separate 
from wildlife products used by traditional medicine with actual curative properties. 
 Research has found that the illegal trade of animals is a major conduit for the spread of 
zoonotic diseases increasing the potential for global pandemic outbreaks (WWF & Dalberg, 
2012). “The One Health Initiative recognizes that some 70% of emerging or reemerging diseases 
are zoonotic—i.e., they can be transmitted from animals to humans” (Ratchford, Allgood, & 
Todd, 2013, p. 10). The illegal animal wildlife trade creates an environment for easy spread of 
these zoonotic diseases from animals to humans (Haken, 2011; Karesh et al., 2007; Ratchford, 
Allgood, & Todd, 2013). First, the illicit trade of live-specimen wildlife and their bushmeat 
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creates close contact between illicitly traded species, humans, livestock, and native species 
(Rosen & Smith, 2010). Second, the illegal wildlife trade facilitates illicit cross-border flow and 
exposure without completing the required health and safety examinations in place to prevent 
pandemic disease spread or outbreak. Third, the presence of the illicit trade overlaps with some 
of the other influences of disease outbreak, including poverty, weak governance, and population 
growth (Haken, 2011; Karesh et al., 2007; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013). Hence, the illegal 
wildlife trade facilitates the potential for spread of zoonotic diseases posing a severe global 
health threat with the possibility of causing pandemic disease outbreaks. 
Furthermore, this global health threat of the illegal wildlife trade has been directly 
documented. “Avian Influenza (H5N1), Secure Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
Heartwater Disease, and Monkeypox are primary examples of deadly diseases facilitated by 
illicit animal trafficking” (Campbell, 2012; Gómez & Aguirre, 2008; Haken, 2011, p. 13; Karesh 
et al., 2007; Rosen & Smith, 2010). For example, the 2003 SARS pandemic began in China and 
spread globally to 51 countries around the world (Rosen & Smith, 2010). The SARS pandemic 
was linked back to civets that were part of the illegal wildlife trade from Southeast Asia and 
spread the disease to humans in China. Rosen and Smith (2010) further comment:  
The large number of illegal shipments originating in Southeast Asia is of particular 
 interest since rapid population growth, high population density, and high biodiversity 
 make this region a ‘‘hotspot’’ for future emerging zoonoses. The presence of the illegal 
 wildlife trade in a zoonotic disease ‘‘hotspot’’ multiplies the risk that future emerging 
 zoonotic diseases will spread internationally. Moreover, poor infrastructure in the region 
 makes the prospect of disease outbreaks especially dangerous. (p. 29)   
As the illicit ivory trade is not a live-specimen or bushmeat trade, it does not directly threaten 
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global health. However, it could potentially indirectly threaten global health.  
 Global health impacts of the illicit ivory trade. My review of the literature did not find a 
discussion of the potential global health impacts of the illicit ivory trade. The trade of ivory is not 
as threatening as live specimen and bushmeat trades because ivory cannot carry and spread 
disease. However, I would suggest further research be conducted on the potential indirect threat 
of the illicit ivory trade. For example, it is conceivable that an elephant poached for its ivory 
would be further poached for its bushmeat, whether by the ivory poachers or locals that discover 
the fresh carcass. Indirectly, ivory poaching could be linked with elephant bushmeat trade. The 
large African bushmeat trade does pose a threat to global health with its potential to spread 
disease (Felbab-Brown, 2011; Rosen & Smith, 2010; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). Also, it is 
conceivable that the illicit ivory indirectly poses a global health threat by preventing the 
development or provision of needed healthcare through its deterioration of social institutions and 
systems as well as human security within African elephant range states.  
 In summary, each of the global threats of the illegal wildlife and ivory trades are not 
independent, rather they are interconnected. For example, the impact of the illegal wildlife trade 
as a driver of disease emergence is not limited only to global health. It also can cause devastating 
economic impacts. For example, the illegal trade led to the 2003 mad cow disease epidemic and 
caused an economic loss of two-thirds of the global meat trade, as well as, threatened the 
livelihood of many farmers (Karesh et al., 2007). As shown in Figure 7 (see on next page), WWF 
and Dalberg (2012) have created a visualization of the impacts and their interconnections. 
Finally, Elliott (2012) summarizes the impacts of the illegal wildlife trade as well as introduces 
the barriers of combatting it, which will be discussed next. Elliott (2012) states it is: 
  a serious crime that is not always taken seriously enough in the wider transnational 
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 crime fighting community. It generates profits of billions of dollars for individuals 
 and criminal networks, undermines environmental protection and sustainable 
 development, robs governments of income, compromises the rule of law, fosters 
 corruption, brings violence to local communities, and puts those who defend against 
 this form of criminal activity in danger. (p. 99-100)  
Due to the extensive detriment of the illegal wildlife trade, it is critical that it be effectively 
combatted in order to protect humans, wildlife, and the environment. 
 
 
Figure 7. Interconnected global impacts of the illegal wildlife trade. The figure shows that 
the four impacts of the illegal wildlife trade are not independent, rather interconnected 
posing an even greater threat to international development and emphasizing the need to 
combat the illegal wildlife trade. (Source: WWF & Dalberg, 2012, p. 16) 
 
Combatting the Illegal Wildlife Trade 
 This section of the historical background part of this chapter focuses on combatting the 
illegal wildlife trade, including the illicit trade of ivory. The recognition of the devastating 
impacts of this illicit trade has finally led the international community to take action to combat it, 
regardless of the many barriers making that not an easy feat. First, this section overviews the 
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barriers to effectively combatting the illegal wildlife trade. Also, a summary of the barriers to 
combatting the illegal ivory trade is included. This will be followed by a discussion of the efforts 
by the international community to combat the illegal wildlife trade both in general as well as 
specifically discussing the efforts to address the illicit ivory trade. Then, I narrow my focus to the 
most recent and largest collaborative effort by the international community to combat the illegal 
wildlife trade, namely the 2014 London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade (London 
Conference, 2014). This section concludes with an overview of the ivory stockpile management 
strategy the London Declaration calls the international community to use. Effective ivory 
stockpile management is the main interest of my master thesis and will be further explored in the 
literature review section of this chapter. 
 Barriers. The literature has identified five major barriers to combatting the illegal 
wildlife trade, related to both the supply and demand of protected wildlife and their products. 
These barriers support the continual growth of this high profit, low risk transnational crime. 
First, I will discuss the primary barrier, the high demand and price for protected wildlife and 
their products. Then, I will discuss each of these barriers: (a) limitation of CITES; (b) treatment 
of the illegal trade as a low-priority international issue; (c) challenging structures present in the 
regions supplying illicitly traded wildlife and their products; and (d) globalization. Finally, these 
barriers are not independent from each other but are interconnected posing a complex challenge 
to combatting the illegal wildlife trade (Elliott, 2012; Nijman, 2010). Before moving on to the 
international community’s efforts to combat the illegal wildlife and ivory trades, I will 
specifically summarize the barriers posing a challenge to combatting the illegal ivory trade. 
 High demand and price for illicit wildlife and their products. First, the main barrier to 
combatting the illegal wildlife trade is a highly demanding global market that is willing to pay 
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
65 
extremely high prices for illicit wildlife products (Akella & Allan, 2012; Nijman, 2010; WWF & 
Dalberg, 2012; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Akella and Allan (2012) found the worth of many illegal 
products from endangered wildlife species is more than their weight in gold. This incredible 
worth is driving this illicit trade’s classification as highly profitable for perpetrators. For 
example, “Asian demand is bringing rhinoceros to the edge of extinction, driving up the price of 
rhino horn in the black market, currently at around US $30,000 per pound (US $66,139 per 
kilogram) more than the value of gold and platinum” (Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013, p. 8-
9). Or, “cut pieces of illegal ivory have been reported as selling for US $1,836 a kilogram in 
Vietnam” (Elliott, 2012, p. 92). Wyler and Sheikh (2008) explain that as consumer demand 
exceeds what the market can legally supply then the value of illegal wildlife and their products in 
the illicit market continues to increase. However, consumers are willing and capable to pay these 
exorbitant and rising prices thereby raising the prices does not necessarily reduce the demand. 
This makes the high demand within this illicit trade a challenging barrier to overcome because it 
is difficult to reduce demand. 
  Demanding consumers remain willing to pay exorbitant prices and not lessen their 
demand because use of wildlife and their products are deeply rooted in history, culture, and 
tradition, particularly in Asia (Akella and Allan, 2012; Gao & Clarke, 2014). For example, 
Chinese Traditional Medicine has been used for over 3,000 years to maintain good health, 
vitality, and longevity (Akella and Allan, 2012). This medicine focuses on preventative use of 
natural plant, animal, and mineral-based materials and remains in practice today by hundreds of 
millions of people (Felbab-Brown, 2011). Further, consumers may hold traditional Chinese 
perspectives such as: (a) wild animals are to be exploited by humans and (b) consumption of 
wildlife is sign of one’s status and prestige (Felbab-Brown, 2011). More importantly, this is not 
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to argue Chinese and other Asian culture and practices are the scapegoat. Rather, it is presented 
as an example of how deeply-rooted cultural practices pose a challenge to changing behavior 
necessary when combatting the illegal wildlife trade through demand reduction strategies. A 
historical practice, such as use of wildlife products as a cure or treatment of a disease, is not 
capable of being stopped overnight and must be respected when finding a sustainable solution to 
protect both humans, endangered wildlife, and traditional cultures (Akella and Allan, 2012). 
 Additionally, there is an increasing amount of wildlife consumers who are also 
increasingly capable of paying the exorbitant prices for highly demanded illicit wildlife and their 
products. This is a result of the rising population and economic growth in Asia providing more 
individuals with affluence and disposable income (Akella & Allan, 2012; Nijman, 2010). As 
noted earlier in the chapter (see section, demand for illegal wildlife and their products), there are 
a number of influences that drive this high demand for illicit wildlife and their products 
including cultural traditions, globalization, buying power, and conspicuous consumption.   
 Although there is a very high demand for illegal wildlife and their products that fuels this 
lucrative illicit trade, it is only one of the barriers to combatting this illegal trade. The other 
barriers to combatting the illegal wildlife trade relate to the supply side of this illicit transnational 
crime. Before discussing the other barriers, it is important to once again reiterate the 
interconnection of all of these barriers (Nijman, 2010). They simultaneously influence or 
reinforce each other to further facilitate the illegal trade of wildlife and their products.  
 Limitations of CITES. The second barrier to combatting the illegal wildlife trade after 
reviewing the literature is the limitations of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES]. It is the main international regulatory mechanism of 
the transnational commercial trade of wildlife and their products. Positively, CITES is ratified, 
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accepted, or approved by 180 countries or Parties making it the largest multilateral agreement for 
species conservation and regulates the trade of more than 30,000 species (Abensperg-Traun, 
2009; CITES, n.d.; Lawson & Vines, 2014). However, Holden (1979), Pires and Moreto (2011), 
Nowell (2012), and Challender, Harrop, and MacMillan (2015a) have all evaluated CITES as a 
regulation measure. They identified limitations of CITES that threaten the protection of the 
species on its appendices. The limitations include: 
• it is only a recommended framework that absolutely depends on the voluntary 
ratification, implementation, and enforcement of its convention by its Parties within their 
national policies and laws. Its effectiveness is rendered by its inability to guarantee its 
regulations are implemented and enforced (Abensperg-Traun, 2009; Nowell, 2012);  
• it only regulates the international commercial trade of species meaning domestic trade of 
wildlife and their products is unregulated and, often, continues to threaten the species’ 
survival (Pires & Moreto, 2011). 
• it only recommends regulation and enforcement efforts rather than implementation of all 
strategies necessary to most effectively combat the illegal wildlife trade, such as also 
decreasing consumer demand and increasing alternative economic opportunities for rural, 
poor populations (Challender, Harrop, and MacMillan, 2015a);   
• its classification of species into its appendixes may not be necessarily accurate because 
the classification may be influenced by politics and emotions rather than scientific data 
and the classification may be based on scientific data from Parties failing to accurately 
determine the true status of the species’ population and the threats to its survival 
(Challender, Harrop, & MacMillan, 2015a).  
Related to CITES not being implemented or enforced by its Parties, the third barrier to 
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combatting the illegal wildlife trade is the historical lack of the international community to 
address the illegal wildlife trade as a serious transnational crime. 
 Non-prioritized international issue. Third, the international community has treated the 
illegal wildlife trade, until recently, as a low priority international issue. This has created a 
substantial barrier, which continues to challenge efforts to universally and effectively combat 
this illicit trade. The illegal wildlife trade has historically been seen as an environmental issue 
rather than as a higher priority transnational crime or justice issue. Therefore, many local, 
national, and international political, law enforcement, and security organizations have not given 
it the attention it needs to be addressed (Akella & Allan, 2012; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 
2013; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Additionally, Elliott (2012) 
reports that national laws on the prosecution of poaching, smuggling, or illegal logging seldom 
sentence perpetrators to four or more years of deprivation of liberty, a requirement that would 
establish them as serious crimes defined by the international United Nations’ Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime. Although prioritization of this issue has shifted, the 
international community’s historical lack of considering the illegal wildlife trade as a non-
prioritized international issue has allowed it to increasingly grow. The fourth barrier also 
facilitates this growth with the challenging structures in supply regions creating more barriers to 
combatting the illicit trade of wildlife and their products.  
 Challenging structures in the regions supplying the illicit trade. The fourth barrier to 
combatting the illegal wildlife trade is the challenging structures in the regions supplying the 
wildlife and their products entering the illicit trade. Supply regions are heavily concentrated 
within developing countries, which have challenging structures including: (a) often being a 
biologically diverse and rich environment home to many species, often including the highly 
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demanded endangered species within this illicit trade; (b) failing to protect wildlife within their 
national or local legislation; (c) having poor law enforcement or capacity to protect wildlife; (d) 
having high corruption and weak governance; and (e) having wide-spread poverty facilitating 
economic-driven poaching (Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008; Wyler & 
Sheikh, 2013). It is necessary to explain how these challenges interact to understand them as a 
major barrier to combatting the illegal wildlife trade.  
 Since supply regions are often in areas of rich biodiversity, including endangered and 
endemic species, wildlife traffickers often have access to a wide variety of highly demanded 
wildlife (Haken, 2011; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Rosen & Smith, 2010). Additionally, 
perpetrators can exploit the weak structures within these developing nations to facilitate their 
illicit activities (Haken, 2011; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; Rosen & Smith, 2010). First, 
these regions often: lack wildlife protection legislation; lack resources, training, or capacity to 
properly monitor and enforce against the illegal trade; and have minimal punitive action against 
perpetrators (Elliott, 2012; Nellemann et al., 2014; Nowell, 2012; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). For 
example, Milliken (2014) reported that between 2009 and 2013 only 12% of the 76 cases of 
illegal ivory seizures reported to ETIS had indicated a suspect was arrested. It is uncommon for 
successful investigations or arrests to be made, and, if they are, it is uncommon for them to be 
convicted (Milliken, 2014).  
 Related to weak legislation and enforcement, Elliott (2012), the International Fund for 
Animal Welfare (Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013), and Wyler and Sheikh (2013) found that 
large unregulated domestic commercial trades of wildlife and their products in these regions 
creates even greater opportunity for illicit activity because products are traded illicitly through 
legal conduits. This is possible due to developing countries often also having: weak governance, 
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poor law enforcement, and corruption (Haken, 2011; Karesh, Cook, Gilbert & Newcomb, 2007; 
Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; WWF & Dalberg, 2012). Criminals use forged paperwork 
and bribe corrupt officials to illicitly trade wildlife through these legal conduits as well as pay to 
have their convictions corruptly dropped if caught (Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Furthermore, vast 
corruption within these countries leads to weak rule of law, weak political accountability, and 
physical and economic insecurity, which results in widespread poverty (WWF & Dalberg, 2012). 
  Poverty is another challenge within this barrier to combatting the illegal wildlife trade. 
Criminal syndicates can exploit impoverished law enforcement and wildlife officials through 
bribing. Additionally, local individuals, often whom have no other economic alternative while 
grasping a deep knowledge of the area, become involved in illicit poaching as a livelihood or 
become coerced into it by larger criminal syndicates (WWF & Dalberg, 2012; Wyler & Sheikh, 
2008). Wyler and Sheikh (2008) reiterate this point but argue for the importance of 
differentiating between locals poaching to maintain cultural or traditional hunting practices to 
generate a subsistence-level income or livelihood in a changing world compared to commercial 
poachers and crime syndicates poaching to make an economic profit. Although poverty may 
motivate poaching, poverty should not be blamed for causing poaching; if high paying and 
demanding consumers did not exist, impoverished individuals would not be economically 
motivated to unsustainably exploit wildlife (Duffy & St. John, 2013). 
 Overall, these challenges allow poachers and wildlife traffickers to operate with relative 
impunity and view the supply chain as a low-risk operation. This is combined with the existing 
high demand and high illicit profits within the trade. Therefore, this barrier results in the 
growing, lucrative illegal wildlife trade being recognized as a high-profit, low-risk transnational 
crime by perpetrators (Elliott, 2012). More alarming, the classification of this transnational crime 
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as high-profit, low-risk motivates involvement of organized crime syndicates (Wyler and Sheikh, 
2013, p. 1). Additionally, these supply regions do not only attract wildlife trafficking operations 
but also drug and human trafficking operations. This has resulted in parallel trafficking of the 
illegal wildlife trade with other transnational crimes (Elliott, 2012). Research has shown that 
connections between the illegal wildlife trade, illicit drug trafficking, and international money 
laundering exist. Examples of these parallel trafficking incidences include traffickers using the 
same transit routes for drugs and wildlife products, at times even packaged together, or cases of 
money laundering with payments of illicit wildlife or their products in exchange for drugs 
(Elliott, 2012; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003; WWF & Dalberg, 2012; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). 
In summary, the challenging structures common in many supply regions facilitate the illegal 
wildlife trade and pose a major barrier to it being effectively combatted, especially when it 
encourages transnational criminal organizations to become heavily involved.   
 Globalization. Finally, globalization is a major barrier to combatting the illegal wildlife 
trade. Primarily, the impact of globalization is seen through the internet becoming a major 
driving force behind the growth of the illegal wildlife trade. The literature argues that the 
unprecedented level of illegal wildlife trade facilitated by international online trade is the leading 
threat to the protection of many species and their survival, particularly those traded as exotic pets 
(Derraik & Phillips, 2010; Hastie & McCrea-Steele, 2014; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013; 
Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). The internet has facilitated greater access to the illicit trade for 
consumers by allowing easy, cheap, and discrete illicit sales and purchases of protected wildlife 
and their products (Akella & Allan, 2012; Derraik & Phillips, 2010; Hastie & McCrea-Steele, 
2014; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). The internet has also created new challenges for law enforcement 
to combat the trade because it requires entirely different approaches (Akella & Allan, 2012; 
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Derraik & Phillips, 2010; Hastie & McCrea-Steele, 2014; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). Furthermore, 
the actions to address, regulate, and protect against the online sale and purchase of illegal 
wildlife and their products is a relatively new effort (Akella & Allan, 2012). For example, eBay, 
a U.S. based global online auction website, only banned the sale of ivory on its website starting 
in 2009 (Derraik & Phillips, 2010, p. 1477).  
 In other regards, the influence of globalization as a barrier is recognized in the opening 
and rapidly growing Asian economies, such as China and Vietnam, and the increased access of 
remote or isolated regions to markets following the building of infrastructures and roads (Akella 
& Allan, 2012; Felbab-Brown, 2011; Suárez et al., 2009). Growing Asian economies have led to 
greater demand for illegal wildlife and their products as well as have led to greater individual 
purchasing power and consumption. For remote communities with new access to markets, there 
is an increase shift from their once sustainable personal sustenance poaching to economic-based 
poaching of wildlife, such as the poaching of wildlife to sell as bushmeat at the markets rather 
than eat (Suárez et al., 2009). Overall, globalization has in many ways facilitated the expansion 
of the illegal wildlife trade.   
  These five interconnected barriers of the illegal wildlife trade create major challenges to 
effectively combatting it. For each illegally traded species or their products, a unique set of 
barriers to combatting its illicit trade exists involving all or some of these general barriers.      
Next, I provide an overview of the major barriers to combatting the illegal trade of ivory. 
 Summary of the barriers to combatting the illicit ivory trade. The major barriers to 
combatting the illicit ivory trade exemplify some of the general barriers to end the illicit wildlife 
trade as a whole. Specifically, these barriers are as follows:   
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• An extremely high demand for ivory with consumers willing to pay exorbitantly high 
prices. However, the prices of ivory are unique as they are relatively inelastic, meaning 
that the ivory market is not price sensitive nor are the consumers willing to accept 
substitutes regardless if it requires illicit purchase. Inelastic demand and lack of 
acceptable substitutes provides increasingly high return for illegal ivory traders from the 
high prices paid for illicit ivory. The lack of accepting substitutes relates to a long history 
of cultural affinity, which also poses a difficult and multi-generational process for 
successfully reducing the demand for ivory and combatting the illicit ivory trade. 
(Conrad, 2012; Gao & Clark, 2014; Harvey, 2015) 
• The limitations of CITES prevent it from effectively protecting African elephants 
because of what Conrad (2012) calls a “perfect storm.” She identified five factors when 
combined cause the trade ban to instead threaten the species it seeks to protect, which is 
the case for African elephants. The five combined factors therefore threatening African 
elephants are: a high demand for ivory; a strong cultural affinity for ivory; ambiguous 
property rights (elephants existence on public lands causes an economic tragedy of 
commons causing poachers to help themselves before their “neighbor” does); human-
elephant conflict causes negative incentives for locals to conserve the species; and 
inadequate enforcement of the trade ban. These combined factors create a major barrier 
for CITES to protect African elephants as well as for effective combatting of the illegal 
ivory trade. (Conrad, 2012) 
• The challenging structures commonly found in many African elephant range states, 
which are primarily developing countries, are lack of political will, corruption, weak 
governance, poor or lacking law enforcement capacity and punitive action, conflict, and 
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poverty (Conrad, 2012; Duffy & St. John, 2013; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003; WWF 
& Dalberg, 2012). The high demand for ivory along with the weak enforcement and 
minimal punitive action for perpetrators cause the illicit ivory trade to be characterized as 
a high-profit, low-risk illicit trade. This has attracted large criminal organizations, 
including an international terrorist group, to use the trade to fund their activities. These 
challenging structures and the consequences of them pose a major barrier to combatting 
this illicit trade. 
• There are large legal domestic ivory trades in Africa and Asia as well as a large online 
auction market for ivory in China, which are all used by perpetrators to traffic illegal 
ivory through these legal conduits (Gao & Clark, 2014; Vira, Ewing, & Miller, 2014; 
UNEP et al., 2013). This is a barrier to combatting the illicit ivory trade as it shows the 
limitation of CITES to protect species from overexploitation for domestic ivory trades 
and shows the role of globalization in expanding the illicit marketplace.  
These barriers are also interconnected thereby posing an even greater challenge for effectively 
combatting the illegal ivory trade.  
 In summary, the barriers to combatting the illegal wildlife trade, including the illicit trade 
of ivory, show the grave challenges to eradicating this trade. However, they also emphasize the 
dire need to address this global issue. Together these barriers have identified this transnational 
crime as an enticing high-profit, low-risk endeavor for perpetrators (Elliott, 2012; Nijman, 2010). 
Since the general illegal wildlife trade and the illicit ivory trade are continuing to grow, it is 
evermore important to effectively combat these trades and their negative global implications. 
Understanding these barriers and their interconnections is critical in order to design targeted 
approaches to successfully address this illicit transnational crime. Next, I will summarize the 
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international community’s current efforts to combat the illegal wildlife and ivory trades. 
 Efforts by the international community. Considering the devastating impacts of the 
illegal wildlife trade, it is crucial that this illicit trade is effectively combatted. The first effort 
was to gain international consensus that the illegal wildlife trade was a serious issue that needed 
addressed. Both international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, supported 
by the findings of academia and research studies, played a significant role in creating the 
awareness of the illegal wildlife trade and its impacts. Notably, the major international 
intergovernmental organizations were the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES], the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the UN Security Council, UN General 
Assembly, INTERPOL, and the World Customs Organization among others (Nellemann et al., 
2014). While, key international non-governmental organizations were the International Fund for 
Animal Welfare [IFAW], the International Union for Conservation of Nature (also known as 
World Conservation Union)[IUCN], WildAid, Wildlife Alliance, the Wildlife Trade Monitoring 
Network [TRAFFIC], and the World Wide Fund for Nature (also known as World Wildlife 
Fund)[WWF] (Rosen & Smith, 2010). The international community has recently prioritized this 
issue and begun efforts to combat the illegal wildlife trade.  
 Before the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations convinced the 
international community to prioritize combatting the illegal wildlife trade, they had to bring 
attention to key species impacted by it and show how the illicit trade of them or their products 
posed a global threat. Elephants were one of these key species. The same organizations listed 
above and their programs have played a major role in addressing the illegal ivory trade as well as 
gaining the support of the international community to support these efforts. As a result, specific 
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actions, including monitoring mechanisms and action plans, have been implemented to 
effectively combat the illegal ivory trade and elephant poaching.  
 CITES implemented two monitoring mechanisms after the elephant trade ban in 1989. 
The Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants [MIKE] Program was established in 1997 
(UNEP et al., 2013). It is a standardized monitoring system that measures trends of illegally 
killed African and Asian elephants. It collects data from its elephant monitoring sites within 
African and Asian range states and publically disseminates the information. This information 
shows trends that help inform decision-making regarding the elephant population. Similarly, the 
Elephant Trade Information System [ETIS] monitors the illegal trade but by tracking ivory 
confiscation occurrences (date and location) and amounts of confiscated illegally traded ivory 
(UNEP et al., 2013). Both of these monitoring mechanisms collaborate with the IUCN African 
and Asian Elephant Specialist Groups that operate the African and Asian Elephant Databases. 
These databases monitor and collect data on the total number and location of elephants within 
both the Asian and African elephant populations (IUCN/AfESG, 2016; UNEP et al., 2013). 
These monitoring mechanisms showed the international community, particularly in African 
elephant range states, that the illegal ivory trade and poaching to supply it were a serious issue 
that needed addressed. 
 Additionally, in 2010, the African Elephant Action Plan was created and adopted by the 
38 African elephant range states following recommendations by CITES (UNEP et al., 2013). The 
action plan identified eight priority objectives for the range states to collectively implement in 
order to protect African elephants. In order to achieve these objectives, African elephant range 
states can request funds for their related activities from the African Elephant Fund (UNEP et al., 
2013). The fund was created in 2011 and is financed by members of the international 
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community, who were now convinced and willing to prioritize efforts to combat the illegal trade 
of ivory and other wildlife products.  
 Convinced of the proven global implications of the illegal wildlife trade, the international 
community has collectively acted to address and combat the illegal wildlife trade. First, the 
international community created a collaborative international consortium. The International 
Consortium on Combatting Wildlife Crime [ICCWC] was founded in 2010 (WWF & Dalberg, 
2012). The ICCWC is comprised of the CITES Secretariat, INTERPOL, WCO, United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, and the World Bank (Elliott, 2012). With its mission to have 
wildlife crime perpetrators face formidable and coordinated responses by the law, it provides 
support to national law enforcement agencies and regional networks to promote better and 
greater enforcement of the illegal wildlife trade (Elliott, 2012; UNEP et al., 2013).  Furthermore, 
it encourages and ensures collaborative efforts by the international community to combat the 
illegal wildlife trade (WWF & Dalberg, 2012). International collaboration is critical. Otherwise, 
there is the risk of committing “both failures of omission – when opportunities for synergy and 
cohesive action across agendas are missed and failures of commission – when activities designed 
to meet one agenda’s objectives unintentionally undermine efforts to reduce wildlife crime” 
(Akella & Allan, 2012, p. 5).  
 The next major action by the international community was to hold multiple important 
United Nations conferences and high-level political dialogues to discuss the illegal wildlife trade 
and propose ways to address it (Nellemann et al., 2014). These occurred in New York 
(September 2013), Botswana and Paris (December 2013), London (February 2014), and Dar es 
Salaam (May 2014) (Nellemann et al., 2014). At these events, the international community 
recognized illegal wildlife trade as “a threat to all the three pillars of the United Nations – human 
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rights, peace and security, and development” (Messone & Wittig, 2013, p. 2). With an 
acknowledgment of the full scope of the devastating impacts of the illegal wildlife trade to the 
environment, social and economic development, national and international security, and global 
health, the international community was seriously motivated to actively combat it. Previous 
efforts to combat the illegal wildlife trade were focused on conservation and protecting wildlife 
(WWF and Dalberg, 2012). However, the illegal wildlife trade is not, nor ever really was, simply 
a conservation or animal welfare issue (Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 2013). With the far-
reaching impacts of the illegal wildlife trade, it was even more important to develop effective, 
comprehensive strategy to combat the illegal wildlife trade. 
 Following these meetings, the international community outlined a comprehensive 
strategy for combatting the illegal wildlife trade. The research field argued “a global and holistic 
response needs to be implemented to support national, regional and international efforts by 
strengthening and synchronizing actions targeting coherent environmental legislation, poverty 
alleviation and demand reduction” (Nellemann et al., 2014, p. 4). With an understanding and an 
agreement on the need for a collective approach, the international community accepted the 2014 
London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade (London Conference, 2014). This collective 
approach to combat the illicit trade would help to eliminate its devastating global impacts to the 
environment, development, security, and health. 
 The 2014 London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade. The London Declaration 
on the Illegal Wildlife Trade [London Declaration] is the leading cooperative, collective 
approach to combat the illegal wildlife trade by the international community (London 
Conference, 2014). In February 2014, world leaders from over 40 nations along with 
representatives from major international organizations collaboratively met for the London 
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Conference on the Illegal Wildlife Trade (Lawson & Vines, 2014). They agreed upon a 
declaration outlining a strategy to combat the illegal wildlife trade. The London Declaration 
called for an urgent and decisive collective action to address the illegal wildlife trade and the 
poaching fueling it (London Conference, 2014). Further, it called for the international 
community to act together through effective cooperation. The declaration outlined three main 
strategies: (a) eradicate the high demand for wildlife and their products; (b) strengthen law 
enforcement and capacity to enforce; and (c) support the development of sustainable livelihoods 
for communities affected by wildlife crime (Duffy & Humphreys, 2014; Kasane Conference, 
2015; Lawson & Vines, 2014; London Conference, 2014). Furthermore, the declaration argues 
that the use of united, collaborative efforts encompassing all of its three strategies is the most 
effective way to combat the illegal wildlife trade (Kasane Conference, 2015; London 
Conference, 2014).  
 The London Declaration has additionally guided the strategies and efforts to specifically 
combat the illegal trade of ivory. The current efforts to combat this illicit trade are implemented 
by actors at the international, national, non-governmental, and grassroots levels (Duffy & 
Humphreys, 2014). The efforts encompass all three strategies outlined by the London 
Declaration. This includes: (a) decreasing the high demand for ivory through demand reduction 
campaigns targeted to specific ivory consumers (Duffy & Humphreys, 2014; Harvey, 2015; 
Kasane Conference, 2015; Ramirez Corte, 2015); (b) increasing countries’ enforcement and 
capacity to enforce against African elephant poaching and the illegal ivory trade as well as 
protect their African elephant populations (Duffy & Humphreys, 2014; Kasane Conference, 
2015); and (c) increasing social, economic, and community development of local communities 
sharing land with elephants (Duffy & Humphreys, 2013; Duffy & Humphreys, 2014; Harvey, 
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2015; Kasane Conference, 2015). An in-depth discussion of all the efforts to combat the illicit 
wildlife and ivory trades is beyond the capacity of my master thesis. However, in 2015, the 
international community met at the Kasane Conference to discuss and publish a review of 
progress of the London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade (Kasane Conference, 2015). 
This report provides an excellent summary of the international communities’ efforts (Kasane 
Conference, 2015).  
 Under each of its three strategies, the London Declaration outlines specific unanimous 
actions to be taken by the international community to combat the illegal wildlife trade. My 
master thesis narrowed its focus to one particular action of the London Declaration addressing 
the management of ivory stockpiles for effectively combatting the illegal ivory trade.  
 Call for united action to destroy ivory stockpiles. The London Declaration directly 
recognized the dramatic escalation in the rate of poaching of elephants and rhinoceroses as well 
as these trades’ expansive negative implications (London Conference, 2014). It further argues for 
active combatting of these illicit trades because it will strengthen the international community’s 
ability to effectively combat the trade of other endangered species while generally promoting 
sustainable consumption of all wildlife (Kasane Conference, 2015; London Conference, 2014).  
 One specific action of the declaration is of interest to my master thesis as it directly 
relates to combatting the illegal ivory trade. The London Declaration states, under its strategy to  
eradicate the market for illegal wildlife products, that the international community should:  
 endorse the action of Governments which have destroyed seized wildlife products being 
 traded illegally; and encourage those Governments that have stockpiles of  illegal 
 products, particularly of high value items such as rhino horn or elephant ivory, to destroy 
 them and to carry out policy research on measures which will benefit conservation. 
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 Independent audits, or other means of ensuring transparent  management, should be 
 carried out prior to destruction. (London Conference, 2014, p. 5) 
To clarify, an ivory stockpile is a collection of elephant ivory, raw (tusks) or worked (carved), 
legally owned and managed by a country, such as an African elephant range state (see Figure 8). 
The ivory may come into possession of the country from naturally deceased elephants, 
euthanized elephants due to human-elephant conflict, or illegally traded ivory confiscated in-
country by authorities. Relevant to my master thesis, the London Declaration calls for all African 
elephant range states to destroy their ivory stockpiles in order to most effectively combat the 
illegal ivory trade (Kasane Conference, 2015; London Conference, 2014).  
  
 
Figure 8. Legal government-owned ivory stockpile. The figure shows a portion of the  
ivory in Zimbabwe’s stockpile. (Source: http://www.cnn.com/ 2013/09/25/world/africa/ 
Zimbabwe-elephant-poaching/)   
  
 Overall, the historical background provided in this chapter made apparent the serious 
global threat of the illegal wildlife trade and its devastating impacts. This is similarly the case for 
the illicit trade of ivory. Additionally, these complex illicit trades must be effectively combatted. 
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For the illegal ivory trade, the international community, particularly African elephant range 
states and countries with large ivory demand markets, must collectively act together to combat it. 
The London Declaration clearly expresses the importance of using united, cooperative actions in 
order to most effectively combat the illegal wildlife trade (Kasane Conference, 2015; London 
Conference, 2014). However, this is currently not being done by African elephant range states. 
Instead, they are using dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies: (a) ivory stockpile 
destruction and (b) ivory stockpile sale (CITES, n.d.; Welch, 2015). This dichotomy of African 
ivory stockpile management threatens the necessary use of united, cooperative actions to most 



















 The second part of this chapter is a review of the literature on the use of dichotomous 
ivory stockpile management strategies by African elephant range states. To briefly outline it, 
first, the two ivory stockpile management strategies – (a) ivory stockpile destruction and (b) 
ivory stockpile sale – are described. Second, I provide an explanation for the use of these 
dichotomous strategies. Third, the intended outcome of these strategies is described. Although 
the two strategies share the same intended outcome, their effectiveness in achieving that outcome 
is widely debated. Next, I present a review of the literature arguing for and against ivory 
stockpile destruction as well as a review of the literature arguing for and against ivory stockpile 
sale. Finally, with an understanding of the historical background and after reviewing the related 
literature, my master thesis found a gap in the literature requiring further research. A discussion 
of this gap in the literature as well as a summary concludes this chapter.  
 Before continuing, it is necessary to nominally define pertinent terms used within my 
master thesis. The first important term is ivory stockpile. t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, and Stiles (2014) 
identified two types of ivory stockpiles. They state: 
 Illegal stockpiles are privately held and clandestine—their location and extent is not 
 known, but we assume that they consist mostly of raw ivory. This assumption is based on 
 the dominance by weight observed of raw ivory being smuggled to Asia in seizures. 
 Legally held stockpiles consist of both raw and worked ivory (carvings) and are mostly 
 owned by governments, having been sourced from natural mortality and culls in range 
 states or from confiscations of illegal ivory in range, transit, or consumer countries.  
 (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014, p. 69)  
Considering their definition and the focus of my research study, I selected a more narrow 
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definition for ivory stockpile. As mentioned before, ivory stockpile is nominally defined by my 
study as a collection of ivory, raw (tusks) or worked (carved), legally owned and managed by a 
country. The ivory comes into possession of the country from naturally deceased elephants, 
euthanized elephants due to human-elephant conflict, or illegally traded ivory confiscated in-
country by authorities.  
 Specifically, my thesis is focused on the ivory stockpiles legally owned and managed by 
African elephant range states. The nominal definition of African elephant range state used within 
my study is a country that has wild African elephants living within its national borders. African 
elephants are found in 35-38 countries or range states in sub-Saharan Africa with their ranges 
spanning across Central, Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009; 
UNEP et al., 2013).  
Management of Ivory Stockpiles  
 African elephant range states are responsible for managing and securing their legally 
owned ivory stockpiles. One of the ways ivory enters or reenters the illicit ivory trade is from 
unsecure, poorly managed ivory stockpiles (Neme, 2013; Harvey, 2015). Therefore, proper, 
secure management of their ivory stockpiles by African elephant range states is very important. 
Furthermore, cases of large portions of ivory going missing from ivory stockpiles owned and 
managed by African elephant range states are a serious concern (Neme, 2013). An unsecure, 
poorly managed ivory stockpile faces the threat of its ivory being raided by ivory traffickers or 
misappropriated by corrupt officials (Neme, 2013; Harvey, 2015). For example, in 2012, Zambia 
had three tons of ivory disappear from its stockpile while Mozambique had one ton disappear 
from its stockpile (Neme, 2013). In order to prevent ivory from these stockpiles supplying the 
illicit ivory trade, it is necessary to ensure proper, secure management of all legal government-
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owned ivory stockpiles, especially those owned and managed by African elephant range states.  
 Therefore, my literature review focuses on the management of ivory stockpiles by 
African elephant range states. Currently, these range states use two dichotomous ivory stockpile 
management strategies – (a) ivory stockpile destruction and (b) ivory stockpile sale. Next, I 
nominally define and discuss each strategy.  
 Ivory stockpile destruction. Within my master thesis, ivory stockpile destruction is 
nominally defined as the strategy of an African elephant range state to manage its ivory stockpile 
resulting in a publicized event where all or a portion of its stockpiled ivory is destroyed through 
burning or crushing it. There is an increasing trend to destroy ivory stockpiles by both African 
elephant range states and other countries around the world. Prior to 2011, only four ivory 
stockpiles had been partially or entirely destroyed including events by both African elephant 
range states and other countries (Welch, 2015). Whereas from 2011 through 2015, there have 
been fifteen recorded destructions of all or a portion of an ivory stockpile owned by African 
elephant range states and other countries (Welch, 2015). More specifically, the trend of increased 
destruction of ivory stockpiles applies directly to African elephant range states. Prior to 2014, 
three African elephant range states had conducted five ivory stockpile destructions, including: by 
Kenya in 1989, 1991, and 2011; by Zambia in 1992; and by Gabon in 2012 (Welch, 2015). With 
a total of five ivory stockpile destructions in the past two decades, there is an obvious increase in 
destruction rate with five destructions alone by African elephant range states in the two past 
years (Welch, 2015). These five destructions were in 2014 by Chad and in 2015 by Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Republic of Congo, and Mozambique (Welch, 2015).  
 The destruction of ivory stockpiles is done by either burning or crushing the ivory (see 
Figure 9 on next page) (Neme, 2013). Prior to June 2013, most ivory stockpile destructions were 
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
86 
conducted by burning the ivory in large, publicized displays (Neme, 2013). However, it was 
criticized that burning the ivory may only destroy the outside of a tusk (Neme, 2013). If it did not 
destroy the entire tusk, it potentially meant the tusk could be smuggled back into the black 
market. Ivory stockpile destructions are now more commonly conducted by crushing the ivory 
during the event or after a burned display (Neme, 2013). Ivory is crushed into powder form, 
which guarantees that it cannot reenter the illicit trade. 
 
 
Figure 9. Ivory stockpile destruction. The figure shows the destruction of five-tons of illicit 
ivory from Kenya’s ivory stockpile during a public event in 2011. A separate report 
estimated that two tusks from an average elephant weigh approximately 10 kilograms 
(Minerva & Woomer, 2013). This means that the five tons of illicit ivory in the photo prior 
to being confiscated by Kenyan officials was poached from at least 450 killed African 
elephants. (Source: http://disappearing elephants.com/what-should-we-do-with-it/) 
  
 Ivory stockpile sale. Within my master thesis, ivory stockpile sale is defined as the 
strategy of an African elephant range state to manage its ivory stockpile resulting in CITES 
listing its African elephant population as Appendix II and then the country sells a portion of its 
stockpiled ivory in a CITES-authorized one-off sale. The one-off sale of ivory stockpiles is a 
legal exception to the international ivory trade ban. This exception of regulated quota trade is 
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approved by CITES and allowed for countries with an Appendix II African elephant population. 
 Recalling a brief history of the regulation of the international commercial trade of ivory is 
necessary to understand this ivory stockpile management strategy. Due to the major elephant 
poaching crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, CITES enacted the 1989 international ivory trade ban 
and listed all African elephants as Appendix I beginning in 1990 to protect the species from 
overexploitation (UNEP et al., 2013). Since 1990, multiple African elephant range states with 
well-managed, healthy elephant populations successfully petitioned CITES to downlist their 
elephant populations to Appendix II. CITES downlisted the elephant populations of Botswana, 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe in 1997 and of South Africa in 2000 (UNEP et al., 2013).  
 With Appendix II elephant populations, these four states are allowed under authorization 
by CITES to sell their ivory stockpiles in one-off auctioned sales approved by the convention to 
its approved buyers, currently Japan and China (Bulte, Damania, & van Kooten, 2007; UNEP et 
al., 2013). This exception requires that all revenue earned from the sale be used for elephant 
conservation. Since 1997, two joint one-off sales of ivory stockpiles have occurred. Despite 
being legal and infrequent, one-off sales of ivory stockpiles are extremely contentious issues 
(Bulte, Damania, & van Kooten, 2007, p. 613). The first sale was in 1999 with Botswana, 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe jointly selling portions of their stockpiles, roughly 50 tons, to Japan for 
approximately US $5 million (CITES, 2008). Since the sale was controversial, measures were 
taken to appease its non-supporters. The non-supporters feared it could increase poaching. 
Therefore, two mechanisms to monitor poaching and the illicit ivory trade were started. They are 
called the Monitoring Illegal Killing of Elephants Program and the Elephant Trade Information 
System (Bulte, Damania, & van Kooten, 2007).  
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The second sale occurred in 2008 with all four countries jointly selling portions of their 
stockpiles, roughly 102 tons, to China and Japan for over US $15 million (CITES, 2008). Again, 
there was a controversial debate over the sale because information from the monitoring 
mechanisms was inconclusive and the impact of the first sale on African elephants was 
uncertain. To once again appease non-supporters, the second sale occurred with the stipulation 
that no confiscated illicit ivory could be sold as well as it was agreed that a nine-year moratorium 
would begin preventing proposal for another sale until November 2017 (CITES, 2007). The 
moratorium would allow more time to better understand the impact, if any, of a sale on the 
African elephant population. Further, it is interesting to point out the countries that have 
Appendix II elephant populations or have petitioned for that are located in Southern and Eastern 
Africa, which is home to more than half of all elephants in Africa (Bulte, Damania, & van 
Kooten, 2007; CITES, 2007; CITES, 2008; UNEP et al., 2013). Thus, the use of ivory stockpile 
sale strategies potentially impacts (though it is unknown whether to be positive, negative, or no 
impact) a large percentage of the African elephant population. 
 Overall, these two strategies are used by African elephant range states to manage their 
legally owned ivory stockpiles. To summarize the usage of these strategies by country from 1990 
through July 2015, seven out of the 35-38 African elephant range states have destroyed a portion 
of their ivory stockpiles at least once (UNEP et al., 2013; Welch, 2015). During this same time, 
four out of the 35-38 African elephant range states have sold a portion of their ivory stockpiles at 
least once. An additional three range states petitioned and were denied by CITES to downlist 
their elephant populations in order to sell their ivory stockpiles (UNEP et al., 2013; Welch, 
2015). The remaining African elephant range states have chosen to store their ivory stockpiles 
without choosing to implement one of the two ivory stockpile management strategies. The 
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following section explores the reason behind African elephant range states currently using two 
dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies. 
Reason for Use of Dichotomous Ivory Stockpile Management Strategies 
 The use of dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies by African elephant range 
states is a result of many economic and political incentives that strongly influence each country’s 
chosen strategy. Some “want to be allowed to sell their stockpiled ivory (purportedly to fund 
conservation initiatives), whereas others are committed to the destruction thereof” (Harvey, 
2015, p. 17). The different strategies used are also influenced by the social, political, and 
economic capacity of the county and the current situation within the country.  
 Some African elephant range states are incentivized to manage their ivory stockpiles 
through use of an ivory stockpile destruction strategy. For example, range states in Western and 
Central Africa have weak institutional mechanisms for conservation as well as limited resources 
and capacity to fight poaching (Harvey, 2015). The result is concentrated elephant poaching in 
these regions. These range states have a greater incentive to keep their elephants at an Appendix 
I status to ensure their protection as well as greater economic incentive to destroy their stockpiles 
of illegal ivory to eliminate expensive costs associated with securing it. For example, Tanzania 
spent US $75,000 in 2010 to secure its 12,000-tusk stockpile (The East African, 2010, as cited in 
Neme, 2013). Further, the 2008 one-off sale forbid sale of confiscated illegal ivory (CITES, 
2007). This suggests to these countries that their stockpile may not have much value, as their 
stockpiled ivory is primarily or entirely confiscated illicit ivory (Harvey, 2015). This supports 
their choice to destroy their stockpiles rather than heavily invest in securing a stockpile that is 
unlikely to bring future revenue. Also, it is highly unlikely their elephant populations will be 
downlisted to Appendix II which is necessary for them to even be able sell their stockpile 
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(Harvey, 2015). Additionally, in my opinion, there may be political factors influencing a 
country’s decision to destroy its ivory stockpile. For example, destruction of an ivory stockpile 
could be a tool for the country to show its alignment with the international community and 
London Declaration. This, in turn, could increase its likelihood to secure needed support or aid 
from the international community.  
 Contrastingly, other African elephant range states are incentivized to manage their ivory 
stockpiles through use of an ivory stockpile sale strategy. For example, the four countries 
authorized to sell their stockpiles have relatively more secure, well-managed elephant 
populations (CITES, n.d.; Harvey, 2015). Therefore, they are politically and economically 
incentivized to sell their ivory stockpiles through CITES-authorized one-off sales and use the 
funds for continued conservation (Harvey, 2015). Also, these countries are economically 
incentivized to not allow the return of all African elephants to Appendix I to ensure their ivory 
stockpile sales can continue (Harvey, 2015). The ivory stockpiles of these four countries are 
much more valuable. Their stockpiles are not only supplied by confiscated illicit ivory. More 
importantly, they are supplied with ivory from naturally deceased or euthanized elephants within 
their large, well-managed elephant populations. This ivory can be legally sold in order to fund 
elephant conservation efforts. As these states have secure, well-managed elephant populations 
and an economically valuable stockpile, they are politically incentivized to exercise their 
statehood and right to choose how best to manage their ivory stockpiles, namely sale, while 
opposing interference by the international community (Bulte, Damania, and van Kooten, 2007). 
Overall, these discussions very briefly shows how some of the many influences and factors 
interact and lead to a country to select a specific ivory stockpile management strategy. Harvey 
reiterates, “these dynamics show just how complex the issue of securing a future with elephants 
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can be. Each policy decision on one variable has an impact on a number of other equilibria, none 
of which can be considered in isolation” (Harvey, 2015, p. 20). 
 Understanding why there is a dichotomy is important. As argued by my master thesis and 
supported by the London Declaration, African elephant range states must collectively use a 
united, cooperative ivory stockpile management strategy (London Conference, 2014). However, 
the “disparate interests of range states and their differing development priorities create a 
collective action problem” (Harvey, 2015, p. 19). Harvey (2015) suggests that a way to 
overcome this problem is to ensure all African elephant range states are necessarily compensated 
for their loss from unanimous use of a united strategy. With this assurance, all African elephant 
range states could collectively use a united ivory stockpile management strategy, which is 
necessary to most effectively combat poaching and the illegal ivory trade (London Conference, 
2014). The challenge of solving how to achieve the unanimous use of a united ivory stockpile 
management strategy as well as the required in-depth analysis of all factors and influences 
causing this dichotomy is beyond the scope of my master thesis. 
 My master thesis recognizes that all of these considerations must be made before a united 
strategy of ivory stockpile management could be chosen and unanimously implemented by all 
African elephant range states. My study narrowed its focus to explore one of these many 
considerations: which strategy has the most effective outcomes for combatting the illegal ivory 
trade. Yet, I highly recommend that before a united strategy is chosen, the political and economic 
factors influencing its implementation be fully considered. Thus, the chosen ivory stockpile 
management strategy would not only be one that effectively combats the illegal ivory trade (the 
focus of my master thesis), but it, also, must be a strategy that can be effectively implemented 
unanimously by African elephant range states. I recommend further research be conducted on the 
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causes of the dichotomous strategy use by African elephant range states as well as explore which 
strategy could be effectively and unanimously implemented. Any findings from this area of 
research would complement the findings of my study. Relating back to my study, I will now 
continue to review the literature on current management of ivory stockpiles owned by African 
elephant range states. 
Intended Outcome of Ivory Stockpile Management Strategies 
 Regardless of the use of dichotomous strategies, all African elephant range states are 
united in their intended outcome when using the two strategies. African elephant range states use 
the strategy – ivory stockpile destruction – to result in the conservation of their African elephant 
populations by clearly showing their state does not tolerate poaching nor tolerate the illicit trade 
of ivory (Harvey, 2015; Bennett, 2014). African elephant range states use the strategy – ivory 
stockpile sale – to also result in the conservation of their African elephant populations by 
funding efforts to protect elephants from being poached for their ivory (CITES, 2007; CITES, 
2008). However, the effectiveness of these two strategies to achieve their shared outcome is 
widely debated.  
Debated Effectiveness of Each Ivory Stockpile Management Strategy 
 The debated effectiveness and argument for use of a particular ivory stockpile 
management strategy is not new. It is also intertwined with the debate to either legalize or ban 
the international commercial trade of ivory. The debate over the effectiveness of destruction and 
sale of ivory stockpiles was initially raised prior to the first legal CITES-authorized one-off sale 
in 1999. Despite this initial debate, African elephant range states have continued to use the two 
opposing ivory stockpile management strategies – (a) ivory stockpile destruction and (b) ivory 
stockpile sale.  
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 This debate greatly escalated following the growing increase in elephant poaching in the 
mid-2000s and another legal one-off stockpile sale in 2008. Again, the two strategies remain 
used today and the debate continues. On one hand, the international community has been 
increasingly pushing for destruction of ivory stockpiles and directly called for use of this strategy 
in its London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade (London Conference, 2014; t’ Sas-Rolfes, 
Moyle, & Stiles, 2014). On the other hand, the international community contradicts itself by 
continuing to allow CITES-authorized one-off sales of ivory stockpiles by four African elephant 
range states (CITES, 2007; CITES, 2008). This contradiction as well as the use of dichotomous 
ivory stockpile management strategies by African elephant range states is likely a result of the 
conflicting research and literature supporting and rejecting both of these strategies.  
 Following is a summary of the arguments within the literature for and against ivory 
stockpile destruction by African elephant range states. After, the arguments within the literature 
for and against ivory stockpile sale by African elephant range states will be reviewed.  
 Arguments for ivory stockpile destruction. Intending to address the current poaching 
crisis in Africa supplying a growing illegal ivory trade, there has been an increased number of 
ivory stockpile destructions as well as an international call for all countries to destroy their ivory 
stockpiles (Kasane Conference, 2015; London Conference, 2014; Welch, 2016). Further, 
influential governments have developed international policies on the management of ivory 
stockpiles. For example, the United States of America calls for “all countries to destroy stocks of 
illegal, confiscated ivory” (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014, p. 63). Ivory stockpile 
destruction is argued by its proponents to conserve the elephant population through decreasing 
the illegal ivory trade and elephant poaching by: (a) creating a zero-tolerance message against 
poaching and illicit trade of ivory with international attention; (b) by preventing stockpiled ivory 
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from entering the illicit trade; and (c) by showing a consistent effort to combat the illegal ivory 
trade. The literature explaining these arguments will now be reviewed. This will be followed by 
a summary of counterarguments against the destruction of ivory stockpiles.  
 Zero-tolerance message with international attention. The first argument for ivory 
stockpile destruction is that it sends a powerful message to criminals that a country has zero 
tolerance towards elephant poaching and the illicit ivory trade through a large public display 
generating international attention (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014; Welch, 2015). “WWF 
also calls for ivory destructions to be backed-up with additional law enforcement efforts to 
combat poaching and trafficking, a stronger judicial process to end impunity for wildlife 
criminals, and enhanced local stewardship of natural resources” (Welch, 2015, para. 9). As such, 
ivory stockpile destruction expresses both a country’s zero tolerance for the illegal ivory trade 
and its intensified effort to combat the illegal trade (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014; Welch, 
2015). The zero-tolerance message deters elephant poachers, illicit ivory traders, and ivory 
consumers from their illicit activity within the illegal trade of ivory because the prioritized 
efforts by the country pose a greater risk of getting caught (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014). 
 Prevents stockpiled ivory from entering the illicit ivory trade. The second argument for 
ivory stockpile destruction is that it prevents stockpiled ivory from entering or reentering the 
illicit ivory trade. Douglas-Hamilton (2013) argues for destruction of ivory stockpiles, 
particularly by countries that cannot protect their elephant population nor prevent elephant 
poaching within their borders. It may be argued that these countries in theory could best benefit 
from sale of their ivory stockpiles to fund improved conservation efforts and combatting of 
illegal poaching. However, Douglas-Hamilton (2013) notes that a country in this circumstance 
would never be able to sell its ivory stockpile. Since it has an unprotected, poorly managed 
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elephant population, the country would not be able to achieve the Appendix II listing of its 
elephant population necessary to be able to sell its ivory stockpile.  
 More concerning, the stockpiled ivory owned by these countries are at great risk of being 
stolen or corruptly entering the illegal ivory trade (Douglas-Hamilton, 2013). Bennett (2014) 
argues that keeping ivory stockpiles secure is expensive and challenging but unsecure, poorly 
managed ivory stockpiles are a significant source of illicit ivory entering or reentering the trade. 
For as long as ivory stockpiles exist, criminals will attempt and find ways to access them 
(Harvey, 2015). Criminals will target stockpiles held by African elephant range states that have 
weak governance, low capacity, and minimal funds to secure or properly manage them (Harvey, 
2015). Also, the high corruption levels within many African elephant range states presents 
another risk of corrupt officials misappropriating stockpiled ivory to illicitly selling it for 
personal gain (Bennett, 2014).  
 Additionally, Harvey (2015) found that the great cost and effort for many African 
elephant range states to maintain and secure their ivory stockpiles occurs “largely through 
diverting scarce capital away from anti-poaching and anti-trafficking efforts” (p. 29). Therefore, 
ivory stockpile destruction also offers a way to remove the financial burden or inability to afford 
to secure stockpiles. Harvey (2015) argues for destruction of ivory stockpiles while recognizing 
the importance of identifying other funding streams for conservation and protection of African 
elephants. Further, Welch (2015) explains that WWF and TRAFFIC call for documentation and 
audits of all ivory stockpiles to further monitor and prevent the risk of ivory reentering the illegal 
ivory trade. CITES now calls for monitoring and inventory of stockpiles (Bennett, 2014). 
However, Bennett (2014) still argues that the only guarantee of the ivory not entering or 
reentering the illicit trade, whether by corrupt officials or criminal raids, is for ivory stockpiles to  
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
96 
be destroyed (Harvey, 2015). 
 Shows a consistent, collective effort. The third argument for ivory stockpile destruction 
is that it shows a consistent, collective effort to combat the illegal ivory trade by complementing 
the demand reduction and enforcement strategies. Douglas-Hamilton (2013) argues for the need 
of consensus rather than division by African elephant range states in efforts to protect African 
elephants from poaching. Harvey (2015) used an economic game theory model to determine the 
most effective and efficient way to combat African elephant poaching. Similar to Douglas-
Hamilton’s call for collaboration amongst African elephant range states, Harvey’s model found 
collective, collaborative action by African elephant range states is the strongest and best 
approach. Harvey (2015) explained that without collective action, poaching would not cease as 
criminals benefit and thrive off of African elephant range states’ divisions.  
 CITES-authorized one-off ivory sales and unregulated, domestic ivory trade confuse the 
market. They inhibit demand reduction strategies by confusing consumers, who are hearing stop 
buying but seeing new products available to buy. Therefore, similar to the call by the London 
Declaration, Harvey (2015) argues for destruction of ivory stockpiles by all African elephant 
range states. This strategy combats the illegal ivory trade while complementing and supporting 
enforcement and demand reduction strategies. Together, they show a consistent, collective effort 
to combat the illicit ivory trade while clearly expressing the illicit trade of ivory must end.   
  It is important to explain Harvey’s (2015) model calls for two required antecedents 
before collective destruction of ivory stockpiles occurs. First, ivory destruction should only occur 
after demand for ivory is reduced (Harvey, 2015). If demand is not reduced and ivory destruction 
occurs, criminals could increase their poaching to replace or create their own illicit ivory 
stockpiles or attempt to raid stockpiles before their destruction. Therefore, ivory demand must be 
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reduced before destroying ivory stockpiles to ensure it does not increase poaching. Similarly, 
there must be complementary enforcement deterring the illicit trade. 
 Second, if ivory stockpiles are destroyed, ivory demand reduced, and ivory trade is 
completely banned, the asset value of elephants will be diminished (Harvey, 2015). Therefore, it 
is necessary to increase the value of elephants before the destruction of ivory stockpiles. This 
requires ensuring that all countries gain equivalent or greater value from elephants than the 
potential loss of revenue from destroying rather than selling their ivory stockpiles (Harvey, 
2015). This could be achieved through increased ecotourism, photographic holidays, and game-
viewing safaris. It additionally requires revenue from these activities benefitting local 
communities that may have previously benefited from the illicit ivory trade or poaching (Harvey, 
2015). This will help local communities to value the elephants more alive than dead for its meat 
or ivory. To do this, Harvey (2015) argues it is necessary to consider cost-analysis of land use 
and alternative livelihoods, prevention of new human-elephant conflicts, and avoidance of 
competing development priorities overriding the prioritization of conserving elephants (Harvey, 
2015). Overall, these arguments support ivory stockpile destruction as the most effective strategy 
assuming parameters for its implementation are initially met. Only through destruction of ivory 
stockpiles is a consistent, collective effort expressed and used to most effectively combat this 
illicit trade. 
 Counterarguments against ivory stockpile destruction. Proponents of ivory stockpile 
sale argue against the destruction of ivory stockpiles by African elephant range states. First, a 
counterargument was presented by t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, and Stiles (2014) stating that the call 
for ivory stockpile destruction by the international community is based on the assumption:   
 that if there is no ivory to sell or otherwise leak onto the market, there would be no   
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 trade to stimulate elephant poaching. This simplistic argument has a superficial logic 
 and emotional appeal, but it does not fit the empirical evidence or stand up to 
 economic analysis.” (p. 66)  
Opponents argue that ivory stockpile destruction increases poaching and the price of ivory 
(Bergstrom, 1990, as cited in, t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014). Destruction of ivory creates 
a scarcity effect leading to more poaching by criminals to replace loss product as well as leading 
to increased demand due to apparent scarcity of future availability of the product. This increased 
demand leads to higher prices for ivory. This then in turn increases demand for ivory and, 
further, increases the poaching of elephants to supply the increased demand, and so on.  
 Secondly, a more conjectural counterargument could exist in my opinion. Destruction of 
ivory results in the loss of a limited substance, only able to be produced by a declining elephant 
population. This is not like the destruction of illicit drugs or weapons, which are constantly 
replaced with new drugs or weapons being synthetically made. Continued ivory stockpile 
destruction could result in the near eradication of this substance from existence. The decision to 
destroy ivory is preemptive when it is still being debated whether or not destruction of ivory 
stockpiles can save the only producers of ivory from the impending threat of their extinction due 
to facing the highest rates of poaching recorded (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, & Stiles, 2014).  
 Finally, the last argument against destroying ivory stockpiles was presented by t’ Sas-
Rolfes, Moyle, and Stiles (2014). They suggested there might be a new trend of illegal ivory 
stockpiling by private individuals or ivory carving companies. They concluded this possibility 
after finding an increased amount of ivory entering China but no increase in illegal or legal sales 
of ivory; this implied that the illicit ivory was stockpiled rather than sold (t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, 
& Stiles, 2014). Overall, t’ Sas-Rolfes, Moyle, and Stiles (2014) reiterate the fact that the impact 
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of ivory destructions is inconclusive. Therefore, they argue destructions should not be conducted 
until they meet the precautionary principle criteria of having a known outcome. The opponents 
of ivory stockpile destruction alternatively argue for ivory stockpile sale as the most effective 
ivory stockpile management strategy; their arguments will now be discussed. 
 Arguments for ivory stockpile sale. Conrad (2012) notes that legal and managed trade 
based on sustainable use of species has been widely debated around its legality, management, 
and impact. Yet, it is often discounted or ruled out within the conservation community and by 
animal welfare organizations. She argues that it is necessary to determine the best strategy 
because a current “perfect storm” is causing the CITES trade ban to threaten rather than protect 
elephants. Therefore, she argues it is necessary to research and seriously consider an alternative 
solution, namely, outcompeting the illegal market with legal, regulated trade.  
 Proponents of legal regulated ivory trade range in their goals from calling for a full 
legalization of the entire ivory trade to supporting continued sale of ivory stockpiles. Currently, 
there is a legal, regulated quota system for international commercial trade of ivory that allows the 
CITES-authorized one-off ivory stockpile sales. The ivory stockpile sale strategy is argued by its 
proponents to conserve elephants through decreasing the illegal ivory trade and elephant 
poaching by: (a) funding conservation efforts and (b) the legal, regulated trade eliminating the 
illegal trade. After presenting these arguments, a summary of the counterarguments against ivory 
stockpile sale by African elephant range states will be discussed. 
 Funds conservation efforts. The first argument for ivory stockpile sale is that it funds the 
conservation of African elephants to protect them from the illegal ivory trade and poaching. Per 
the outlines of CITES, the revenue from one-off sales of ivory stockpiles must be exclusively 
used to fund elephant conservation or to increase community development and conservation 
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
100 
awareness by funding programs offered to communities within or adjacent to elephant ranges 
(CITES, 2007). Following the 2008 sale, CITES reported that over US $15 million was raised to 
fund conservation efforts in the four seller countries (CITES, 2008; UNEP et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, Bulte, Damania, and van Kooten (2007) discussed how the economic incentive of 
selling ivory stockpiles could encourage African elephant range states to increase their 
investment in elephant protection and conservation. Finally, Bulte, Damania, and van Kooten 
(2007) discussed a more speculative idea that by allowing highly regulated but limited ivory 
stockpile sales it increases CITES’ compliance by all African elephant range states. CITES is a 
voluntary convention and African elephant range states are not required to comply (CITES, n.d.). 
Bulte, Damania, and van Kooten (2007) argue that it may be best to allow the states disagreeing 
with the ban of all ivory trade to continue one-off ivory stockpile sales and gain limited 
economic revenue. This could be preventing a scenario of “African countries from going it alone 
by selling ivory, much as Norway, Iceland, and Japan circumvented the International Whaling 
Commission” (Bulte, Damania, and van Kooten, 2007, p. 617). If so, one-off ivory stockpile 
sales are a small cost for their appeasement and, more importantly, ensures the continued 
cooperation of all African elephant range states to conserve their African elephants. Overall, it is 
argued that ivory stockpile sale ensures the protection of African elephants by funding 
conservation efforts. 
 Legal, regulated ivory trade eliminates the illicit ivory trade. The second argument for 
ivory stockpile sale is that legal, regulated ivory trade outcompetes and eliminates illegal ivory 
trade markets. Proponents of CITES-authorized one-off ivory stockpile sales often argue for this 
strategy because it is a form of legal regulated trade and base their argument on what it could 
achieve if expanded to a global legal, regulated trade of ivory. For example, it is argued that 
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“legalization allows for more effective regulation and control of the trade as well as sales 
contribute to conservation by satisfying demand, thereby taking pressure off wild populations of 
the species” (Bennett, 2014, p. 55).  
 Also, it is argued that trade bans, specifically CITES, have failed to diminish the illegal 
ivory trade and poaching of elephants (Conrad, 2012; Lemieux & Clarke, 2009). CITES is 
unable to manage the national legislation and domestic trade of ivory within a country; therefore, 
many countries have unregulated domestic ivory trade markets (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009). These 
countries as well as countries bordering them, especially if further faced with high corruption or 
civil war, continue to also have decreasing elephant populations because their unregulated 
domestic trades facilitate the illicit trade of ivory. Since the trade ban has not effectively 
eliminated the illicit ivory trade nor is capable of regulating domestic ivory trade, it is argued 
that another approach is necessary. The other option is to regulate and legalize ivory trade in 
order to outcompete and eliminate illegal markets, including regulating the many existing 
domestic ivory markets (Conrad, 2012). This legalization could range from more systematic 
sales of ivory stockpiles per the CITES quota system to a fully, legalized ivory trade. Lemieux 
and Clarke (2009) studied unregulated and regulated ivory trade markets. They add to this 
argument stating:  
 Regulated and unregulated ivory markets play two distinct roles in elephant conservation. 
 Regulated markets reward countries for their continued protection of an endangered 
 species by funding conservation efforts and giving countries a reason to enforce the 
 international embargo. They can therefore be expected to have a positive effect on the 
 elephant population of Africa. Unregulated markets have the opposite effect because they 
 increase poaching incentives as well as the ability to trade ivory on a domestic and   
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 international level. (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009, p. 455) 
Therefore, ivory stockpile sale as a form of regulated sale offers better protection to African 
elephants than ivory stockpile destruction.  
 In additional support of an ivory stockpile sale strategy, research conducted to assess the 
impact of ivory stockpile sales on the African elephants has shown it has not decreased the total 
elephant population nor increased poaching; alternatively, it has positively decreased the illegal 
ivory trade. Bulte, Damania, and van Kooten (2007) conducted a study evaluating the 1999 
CITES-authorized one-off ivory stockpile sales impact on elephant mortality. When considering 
their findings as an aggregate level, they found no support for the sales significantly increasing 
poaching. To avoid the limitations of an aggregate level analysis, they conducted a panel 
regression analysis that showed no significant effect on mortality rates except for certain remote 
locations. However, the affect of these exceptions was relatively small in terms of the total 
elephant population. Similarly, CITES (2008) has monitored levels of poaching and illegal ivory 
trade activity since 1999. It has not wavered on its position that “the analysis of seizure data 
shows no correlation between the controlled ivory sales and an increase in poaching. In fact, 
levels of illegal ivory trade decreased in the two years following the first one-off sale” (CITES, 
2008, para. 4). Overall, proponents of ivory stockpile sale and regulated trade argue it creates a 
legal, controlled ivory market for interested consumers removing their demand for illicit ivory 
and, therefore, decreasing the illicit ivory trade and protecting the elephant population (Bennett, 
2014; Lemieux & Clarke, 2009).  
 Counterarguments against ivory stockpile sale. The counterarguments against the sale 
of ivory stockpiles questions its ability to actually increase conservation and eliminate the illegal 
ivory trade. First, the literature counter argued that ivory stockpile does not necessarily increase 
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conservation. Although its proponents claim ivory stockpile sales fund much needed 
conservation of elephants, the stipulations for selling an ivory stockpile prevent many countries 
(desperately needing to protect their elephant populations) from using this strategy to fund 
greater conservation efforts. African elephant range states must have a well-managed elephant 
population in order for them to receive an Appendix II status enabling them to sell their 
stockpiled ivory. As of the 2008 sale, range states cannot sell confiscated illegal ivory within 
their stockpiles. Therefore, countries that desperately need conservation funds to better protect 
their elephant populations from severe poaching will not be able to sell their ivory stockpiles 
because their elephant populations do not qualify for Appendix II status. Also, even if they were 
able to downlist their elephant population, their stockpiles are primarily supplied by confiscated 
illicit ivory that is unable to be sold.  
 Furthermore, in my opinion it could be speculated that ivory stockpile sales do not 
necessarily support an increase in conservation efforts. Although the funds raised may be put 
towards conservation efforts, these efforts inherently have to already be in place. Otherwise, the 
African elephant range state would not have a well-managed elephant population required to 
qualify their elephant population for its Appendix II listing. Therefore, ivory stockpile sales may 
instead simply allow a country to free up the state funds they had put towards conservation 
efforts by allocating the sale revenue towards their same existing conservation efforts. I am not 
arguing whether or not this is positive or negative rather it plausibly shows that sales do not 
necessarily increase conservation. The case simply becomes one in which elephants are paying 
for their own conservation.  
 Other researchers have also similarly questioned ivory stockpile sales ability to increase 
African elephant conservation. For example, for one-off ivory stockpile sales to occur it required 
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dividing the appendix status of a single species, African elephants (CITES, n.d.). Wasser et al. 
(2010) reiterates that even CITES recommends against split listings as it makes it more 
complicated to protect that species thereby threatening their conservation (African Elephant 
Coalition, 2015). Additionally, Harvey (2015) argues that the money from selling ivory 
stockpiles only appears to be a massive sum to fund conservation efforts. It has been found that 
the value of an alive elephant over its lifespan is much greater than selling the ivory of a dead 
elephant (Minerva and Woomer, 2013). Minerva and Woomer (2013) calculated that on average 
the tusks from an illegally killed elephant are worth US $21,000. Moreover, they argue an 
elephant is worth more alive than dead. They estimated the tourism value of a single elephant to 
be $1,607,624.83 over its lifetime or as valuable as 76 dead elephants (Minerva & Woomer, 
2013). Tourism revenue from an elephant across its lifespan significantly scales the sum from its 
ivory tusks thus potentially offering much greater funds for elephant conservation and other 
development efforts if kept alive (Harvey, 2015). Similarly, Wasser et al. (2010) estimated the: 
 proceeds of a sale of Tanzania’s 90 tons and Zambia’s 22 tons of ivory are likely to be on 
 the order of $14 million and $3.5 million, respectively, depending on ivory price at 
 auction [~$150/kg at average values achieved in 2008 sales]. This represents less than 1% 
 of annual tourism revenues for Tanzania. (p. 1332). 
They also argue that ivory stockpile sale could jeopardize tourism revenue. For example, sale 
could increase demand for ivory and, thereby, increase poaching. African elephant poaching 
poses a threat to the tourism industry.  
 Second, the literature presented the counterargument that ivory stockpile sale does not 
eliminate the illegal ivory trade. Opponents of ivory stockpile sale argue that in reality “legal 
sales (one-off or otherwise) facilitate the marketing of illegal ivory, thereby promoting demand 
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and encouraging poaching” (Bulte, Damania, & van Kooten, 2007, p. 613). Harvey (2015) 
presents the following two counterarguments against the legalization of the ivory trade, in 
general, as well as against authorized one-off sale of ivory stockpiles. Harvey (2015) argues that 
increased supply of legal ivory would not necessarily decrease price. It could actually increase 
demand from new consumers previously deterred from purchasing illicit ivory. This increased 
demand could raise the price of ivory. This reasoning is supported by the Environmental 
Investigation Agency’s study and findings that showed the 2008 one-off ivory stockpile sales 
failed to reduce demand or the price of ivory (EIA, 2012). Alternatively, the price of ivory was 
shown to have increased in China, implying greater demand. The EIA argues this was a direct 
result of the 2008 stockpile sales. Also, these new consumers may demand a supply unable to be 
met by the legal trade and thus fueling the illegal ivory trade. Harvey (2015) argues, “the 
conjecture that supply would easily match demand under free market conditions ignores the slow 
rate at which tusks grow, and that they are not regenerative” (p. 13).  
 Furthermore, Harvey (2015) argues that ivory is a durable substance with a price-elastic 
value. It has been shown to maintain its high value regardless of reduction in market demand 
(Harvey, 2015). This poses a greater threat to the argument that legalization of the trade will 
decrease the price of ivory. Furthermore, he argues that unregulated domestic trade and one-off 
sale of ivory stockpiles undermines demand reduction campaigns (Harvey, 2015). Consumers are 
not going to follow the instructive of a demand reduction campaign to not buy ivory while 
simultaneously legal ivory is being sold. This counters the argument by proponents of ivory 
stockpile sale that sale reduces consumer demand for ivory. Rather, he argues ivory stockpile 
sales cause confusion in the marketplace (Harvey, 2015; Wasser et al., 2010).   
  
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
106 
 Finally, Bennett (2014) argues, “in theory, such robust, transparent, well-governed 
management systems and enforcement could allow for a legal trade of high-value ivory. At 
present, that is not feasible due to one major factor: corruption” (p. 56). Corruption is a major 
development challenge faced by all African elephant range states, some worse than others (WWF 
& Dalberg, 2012). It is impossible to transparently and fully regulate a legalized trade of a 
durable, highly valuable substance like ivory because corruption will always enable illegal ivory 
to enter the legal market (Bennett, 2014, p. 56). Corruption may occur by the government 
officials responsible for implementing wildlife legislation, by the rangers meant to protect 
species on reserves, and by the organized criminal syndicates along the entire illegal ivory trade 
chain (Bennett, 2014). Similarly, EIA argues “that allowing any legal sale of ivory simply 
provides a means to launder illicit ivory and stimulates the market, resulting in an increase in the 
poaching of elephants” (EIA, 2012, p. 3). 
 Overall, the arguments and counterarguments presented for and against both ivory 
stockpile destruction and ivory stockpile sale are highly contentious. This debate has and 
continues to facilitate the use of dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies by African 
elephant range states. This is because both strategies are argued and at times shown to be 
effective means to combat the illegal ivory trade and conserve the African elephant population. 
However, I identified a gap in the literature and research. This became the catalyst for 
developing the research question of my master thesis. 
Gap in the Literature 
 My literature review showed a widely debated discussion on the effectiveness of the two 
ivory stockpile management strategies – (a) ivory stockpile destruction and (b) ivory stockpile 
sale. However, there were no research studies directly comparing these strategies against each 
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other to determine which was more effective. A study would focus on measuring the 
effectiveness (defined in variety of ways) of only one particular strategy to combat the illegal 
ivory trade. Thus, the impact of each strategy was individually evaluated on a variety of relevant 
variables, such as its association with poaching, price of ivory, consumer demand, or elephant 
mortality.  
 The results of the existing studies are contradictory. For example, CITES’ (2008) analysis 
of seizure data showed that ivory stockpile sale correlated with decreased illegal ivory trade 
activity. Whereas, the EIA’s (2012) study showed that ivory stockpile sale increased demand and 
the price of ivory, which would imply increased illicit ivory trade activity. Overall, the literature, 
although thoroughly debating and arguing for use of these two strategies, has inconclusively 
shown which strategy is more effective at combatting the illegal ivory trade. This is complicated 
by the fact that no research studies have directly compared the two strategies to determine which 
has a greater effect. The gap in the literature has left a need to explore which ivory stockpile 














 In summary, this chapter reviewed the history of the illegal wildlife trade in general as 
well as focused on the illicit trade of ivory. It is apparent that the illegal wildlife trade, 
particularly the illicit trade of ivory, has devastating global implications. Therefore, the 
international community must collectively act through united, cooperative strategies to most 
effectively combat the illegal trade of ivory and other wildlife products. The 2014 London 
Declaration [London Declaration] on the Illegal Wildlife Trade is the leading current collective 
action by the international community.  
 Specifically, one of the actions outlined by the London Declaration called for the 
international community to collectively manage their ivory stockpiles by using a strategy of 
ivory stockpile destruction. However, the international community contradicts itself. The 
international community’s Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora [CITES] continues to allow use of an alternative ivory stockpile management 
strategy of ivory stockpile sale by certain African elephant range states. The resulting use of 
dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies by African elephant range states became the 
focus of my master thesis.  
 Additionally, this chapter presented a thorough review of the literature on this dichotomy. 
It is accepted by the international community that united, cooperative strategies are the most 
effective way to combat the illegal wildlife trade. The use of dichotomous ivory stockpile 
management strategies by African elephant range states thus threatens the collective action 
needed to most effectively combat the illegal ivory trade. Additionally, the effectiveness of these 
two strategies is widely debated within the literature. Proponents of ivory stockpile destruction 
argue that it: (a) creates a zero-tolerance message against poaching and the illicit trade of ivory; 
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(b) prevents stockpiled ivory from entering the illicit trade; and (c) shows a consistent, collective 
effort to combat the illegal ivory trade. Whereas, proponents of ivory stockpile sale argue that it: 
(a) funds conservation efforts and (b) eliminates the illegal trade through its legal, regulated trade 
of ivory. Overall, my review of the literature found that it is inconclusive whether ivory stockpile 
destruction or ivory stockpile sale is more effective at combatting the illegal ivory trade. Also, 
my review of the literature showed a gap in the research. There were no direct comparisons of 
the two ivory stockpile management strategies, which is necessary to determine whether ivory 
stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale is more effective at combatting the illegal ivory 
trade.  
 Therefore, my research study seeks to bridge this gap. I will do so by inductively 
exploring and answering the following research question: which elephant ivory stockpile 
management strategy used by African elephant range states – (a) ivory stockpile destruction or 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Rationale for Chosen Research Design and Methods 
 A comprehensive review of the available literature (see Chapter 2) demonstrated that an 
important question had been left unanswered: which strategy for the management of elephant 
ivory stockpiles (used by African elephant range states) is more effective at combatting the 
illegal trade of ivory? To explore this question, I had to operationalize the construct, effective 
combatting of the illegal ivory trade. As such, the research question for my master thesis 
became: which elephant ivory stockpile management strategy used by African elephant range 
states – (a) ivory stockpile destruction or (b) ivory stockpile sale – correlates better with 
decreased behavioral intention to poach as well as decreased poaching behavior? 
 Before describing the exact design and methods of my research study in this chapter, an 
overview of the influences and theoretical framework that guided the development of my 
research question and methodology to answer it will be presented. In this section of the chapter, I 
will, first, describe the challenges of researching the illicit ivory trade. Secondly, I will explain 
the theoretical framework I used and the assumptions I made when designing my research study. 
Finally, I will summarize my rational for the chosen design and methods used.  
Challenges of Researching the Illicit Ivory Trade 
 Any illegal activity, by nature, is intended to avoid detection and quantitative assessment. 
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to directly and accurately measure the illegal ivory trade as 
well as the effectiveness of the efforts combatting it. For example, a direct measure of the illegal 
ivory trade requires measurement of all illicit ivory sales and amounts overtime. A perfect direct 
measure is not possible as the illicit ivory trade, by nature, is a black market that occurs in 
unknown locations with undocumented sales. Even a scaled-down direct measure within a 
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specific area is difficult to conduct, such as counting illegal sales or the number of products 
illegally available for sale overtime in one or more local markets or online auction websites (Gao 
& Clark, 2014; Hastie & McCrea-Steele, 2014). The challenges include feasibility, costs, time, 
and gaining the trust of vendors to report illicit activity or show the researcher the illicit 
products. Additionally, a scaled-down direct measure does not necessarily accurately reflect nor 
generalize to the total illicit ivory trade. The illicit ivory trade varies greatly across variables of 
time, location, ivory type (raw or worked), and ivory amount (many tons of ivory tusks to a 
single pair of ivory chopsticks).  
 Therefore, past research studies have primarily indirectly measured the illegal ivory trade 
and the effectiveness of the efforts combatting it. They have used variables including: (a) the 
portion of illegally killed elephants from CITES’ Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants 
[MIKE] Program (Bulte, Damania, & van Kooten, 2007; Wittemyer et al., 2014); (b) elephant 
population counts from the IUCN’s African and Asian Elephant Databases (de Boer et al., 2013; 
van Kooten, 2008); (c) illegal ivory confiscations reports and their amounts by organizations 
from CITES’ Elephant Trade Information System or TRAFFIC, the Wildlife Trade Monitoring 
Network (Milliken, 2014; Underwood, Burn, & Milliken, 2013); and (d) media or news stories 
reporting illegal wildlife seizures (Patel et al., 2015; Sonricker Hansen, Li, Joly, Mekaru, & 
Brownstein, 2012). These variables are correlated with the illicit ivory trade and, therefore, 
indirectly capture a measurement of the illegal ivory trade. For example, if there is a decrease in 
the poaching of African elephants for their ivory, there would be a decrease in the portion of 
illegally killed elephants. A decreased portion of illegally killed elephants indirectly shows a 
decrease in the illegal ivory trade. However, it should be noted that all of these variables are 
compounded by other influences and are not perfectly causal relationships.  
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 Overall, the challenges of studying the illicit ivory trade had to be considered and 
overcome in order for me to design my research study. Additionally before discussing how these 
challenges were overcome, an overview of my theoretical framework and assumptions for my 
research study will be explained.  
Theoretical Framework and Assumptions  
 Next, Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior, while assuming of the construct of 
deterrence, provided the theoretical framework for my research methods. I chose my theoretical 
framework after reading the master thesis of Tournier (2015). He related the construct of 
deterrence and applied Ajzen’s theory to his study of the illegal wildlife trade and deterring 
criminal behavior in Southeast Asia. In agreement with Tournier’s assumption of deterrence and 
the applicability of the theory of planned behavior to the illegal wildlife trade, I also chose to 
develop my research methods from the same theoretical framework. The similarity of our theses 
ended here.  
 It is necessary to overview Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior and my 
assumption of the impact of deterrence on criminal behavior to fully understand the application 
of my theoretical framework when operationalizing the variables within my study. Ajzen (1991) 
published The Theory of Planned Behavior as a way to understand and predict the decisional 
process of human behavior. His theory of planned behavior explains behavior as well as the 
intentions that increase the likelihood of acting upon that said behavior. The theory of planned 
behavior argues that human behavior is primarily a result of intention (behavioral intention). A 
high level of behavioral intention, or intent to perform a behavior, is required before an 
individual will actually perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Tournier, 2015).  
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 Further, the theory argues that there are three independent determinants of behavioral 
intention (Ajzen, 1991). The determinants of behavioral intention are: (a) attitude; (b) subjective 
norm; and (c) perceived behavioral control. Defined by Ajzen (1991), “the attitude toward the 
behavior refers to the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or 
appraisal of the behavior in question” (p. 188). For example, an impoverished individual with no 
alternative livelihood and limited education may have a positive attitude towards poaching as it 
is a successful way to support his or her family.  
 The second determinant of behavioral intention is subjective norm. It is a social factor 
referring “to the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 
1991, p. 188). For example, prioritization of African elephant conservation and management, 
such as development of safari tourism to protect African elephants and to fund local community 
development, create a social norm against illegal poaching. If the subjective norm is to conserve 
elephants because they are a necessary economic resource for the community through tourism, 
then perceived social pressure would be against poaching because it economically robs the 
community. 
 The third determinant of behavioral intention is perceived behavioral control. It is defined 
as the “perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior. [It] is assumed to reflect past 
experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). For 
example, a high corruption index and weak rule of law would imply ease in poaching as there is 
less risk of getting caught, weak punitive action, and higher ability to pay off officials that may 
otherwise prevent the illicit trade of ivory. The three determinants of behavioral intention are 
generally related such that a favorable attitude and positive subjective norm towards the behavior 
combined with easily perceived behavioral control would result in greater intention to exhibit the 
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behavior as well as greater likelihood for exhibiting the behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Tournier, 2015). 





Figure 10. Theory of planned behavior. The decisional process of human behavior from 
the three determinants of behavioral intention (right) to the intent to act to the physical 
action (left). (Sources: Ajzen, 1991; Tournier, 2015, p. 15). 
  
 Furthermore, my master thesis assumes that criminal behavior can be deterred. Nagin 
(2012) explains the construct of deterrence as “the notion that people consciously try to avoid 
pain and seek pleasure. It follows that by making a choice painful enough—such as the choice of 
crime—individuals will choose not to engage in the act” (p. 67). Therefore, it is assumed that 
greater enforcement and harsher punishment will deter criminal behavior. Nagin (2012) 
elaborates that to deter crime there must be “certainty of punishment [defined as] the probability 
that a criminal act will be followed by punishment” and “severity of punishment, [which] 
involves the level of punishment that is meted out” (2012, p. 71; Tournier, 2015). Although both 
elements deter criminal behavior, certainty of punishment has a greater impact (Tournier, 2015). 
With no certainty of punishment (a perceived low chance of being caught), criminals will not be 
significantly deterred by increased severity of punishment.  Related to my research study, 
Tournier (2015) applied the construct of deterrence specifically to the illegal wildlife trade in 
Southeast Asia. He argued for stronger regulations and penalties for perpetrators of illegal 
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with high profit for perpetrators. Therefore, he argues that stronger laws and enforcement are 
necessary to deter perpetrators of wildlife crimes.  
 Although there are criticisms of the effectiveness of deterrence on criminal behavior 
especially related to recidivism, I have chosen to assume deterrence and its ability to decrease 
criminal behavior within my master thesis (Nagin, 2012; Tournier, 2015). The decision to make 
this assumption was supported by my findings during my review of the literature (see Chapter 2). 
Weak governance, high corruption, and lax law enforcement are correlated with increased 
elephant poaching and the illegal ivory trade activity (Bennett, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013). 
Whereas, stronger governance, low corruption, and strong law enforcement are correlated with 
decreased poaching and illicit ivory trade activity (Bennett, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013). In other 
words, these factors deterred perpetrators from illegal poaching and the illegal ivory trade. With 
the necessary explanation of this theory and my assumptions, it is possible to understand my 
rationale and application of my theoretical framework.  
Summary of Rationale   
 In summary, my theoretical framework and methodology was rationally chosen in order 
to best answer my research question. The question unanswered within the current literature was: 
which elephant ivory stockpile management strategy used by African elephant range states is 
more effective at combatting the illegal trade of ivory? When considering this question, my 
chosen theoretical framework provided a way to operationalize the construct of “effective 
combatting of the illegal trade of ivory.” My theoretical framework and assumptions allowed me 
to define this construct as decreasing both the illicit activity (behavior) as well as decreasing the 
indirect factors that influence a criminal’s likelihood to participate in that illicit activity 
(behavioral intention).  
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 Additionally, my review of the literature showed that the illicit ivory trade is largely 
supplied by African elephant poaching, which is rapidly decreasing the total African elephant 
population (Gao & Clark, 2014; Milliken, 2015; Patel et al., 2015; Ratchford, Allgood, & Todd, 
2013; UNEP et al., 2013). Therefore, my study accepted reduction of poaching behavior and 
reduction of an individual’s behavioral intention to poach as being most indicative of effective 
combatting of the illegal ivory trade. As such, the construct of effective combatting of the illegal 
ivory trade was operationalized within my study as decreased behavioral intention to poach and 
decreased poaching behavior.   
 Next, I chose a very specific design and methodology that allowed me to overcome the 
challenges of researching an illicit trade and answer my research question. Related to the 
researcher’s location in the United States, the collection and quantitative secondary analysis of 
public online archival data sets was necessarily chosen as my method for researching the illicit 
ivory trade. However, through use of archival datasets and information from a variety of sources, 
my research study intended to capture a more expansive perspective rather than relying on a 
single archival dataset.  
 Furthermore, when considering how to best explore and answer my research question, I 
chose an inductive non-experimental research design. As the literature was inconclusive and 
divided as to which strategy is more effective, I chose to inductively explore my research 
question rather than deductively test a hypothesis or experimentally determine causal 
relationships. This design allows me to explore how the two different ivory stockpile 
management strategies used by African elephant range states comparatively correlated with 
decreased poaching behavior and decreased behavioral intention to poach. My necessary use of a 
secondary analysis of archival data was also supported by my inductive, non-experimental 




 Due to the non-experimental design of my study, I recognized that my study is unable to 
show any causal relationships. However, the analysis and identified trends from my inductive 
approach will provide valuable insights that can foundationally support and direct future 
research. It is recognized that a number of limitations exist due to the nature of studying an illicit 
trade, use of archival data, and using non-random methods of my study. These limitations will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of my master thesis. After full recognition and discussion 
of its limitations, the research design chosen for my master thesis, in my opinion, offered the best 
method for identifying correlations necessary to bridge the gap in the existing research. 
Additionally, this foundational research will support future research and statistical evidence 
necessary for the development of a united, collaborative approach of ivory stockpile 
management by African elephant range states to most effectively combat the illegal ivory trade. 
By initially reviewing my chosen theoretical framework and rationale for my choices, it provides 
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Research Design and Methods 
 The following is a description of the design and methods of the research study for my 
master thesis. This description includes: (a) the design of my research study; (b) 
operationalization of the variables within my study; (c) the population and sampling method of 
my study; (d) the data collection procedures of the archival data used within my study; and (e) 
the data processing and analysis procedures of my study. 
Design 
 Using an inductive approach, my exploratory research study conducted a quantitative, 
non-experimental secondary analysis of free, public online archival datasets and statistics from a 
variety of sources to answer my research question. My master thesis explores and seeks to 
answer its research question: which elephant ivory stockpile management strategy used by 
African elephant range states – (a) ivory stockpile destruction or (b) ivory stockpile sale – 
correlates better with more effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade, operationalized as 
decreased behavioral intention to poach as well as decreased poaching behavior? Using this 
approach, I made no hypotheses. Instead, I will use the findings from my study to identify 
correlations and answer my research question. 
 My research study used a non-probability sampling method to collect my sample from 
the population. My sample included all occurrences of ivory stockpile destruction or ivory 
stockpile sale by African elephant range states from 2008 through 2012. Six occurrences during 
this time frame, two destructions and four sales by African elephant range states, were identified 
and included in the sample of my research study. To compare the two strategies, the findings 
from my study were analyzed and compared the combined results from occurrences of ivory 
stockpile destruction to the combined results from the occurrences of ivory stockpile sale. The 
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methodology of my study measured archival data sets (referred to my study as indicators) which 
indicated whether each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale was 
associated with: (a) decreased or increased poaching behavior during a five-year period and (b) 
decreased or increased behavioral intention to poach during a five-year period. The five-year 
period included one year before the implemented strategy through three years after the 
implemented strategy. For example, if an occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale 
occurred in 2008, the five-year period was 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. For both 
strategies, I calculated the frequency of indications (increased or decreased) from the 
occurrences in my sample for both variables: (a) poaching behavior and (b) behavioral intention 
to poach. Using cross-tabulation analyses of my variables, I statistically analyzed for correlations 
between both: (a) strategy and poaching behavior and (b) strategy and behavioral intention to 
poach. The strategy found to be correlated better with decreased poaching behavior and 
behavioral intention to poach would be identified as the more effective strategy for African 
elephant range states to use.  
 To measure my variables of behavioral intention to poach and poaching behavior, I 
operationalized six indicators (archival data sets) of behavioral intention to poach and two 
indicators (archival data sets) of poaching behavior per my theoretical framework. Each indicator 
was selected based on the findings in my literature review or the archival data sets used in 
previous studies. For each indicator per its unique operationalization (see sections, Behavioral 
Intention to Poach Indicators and Poaching Behavior Indicators), I collected, measured, graphed, 
and coded the data from an online, public archival dataset source. The data was specific to the 
African elephant range state that had used the ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale 
occurrence included in the sample of my study. The findings from each indicator were coded to 
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indicate the directional change (increased or decreased) of either poaching behavior or 
behavioral intention to poach for every occurrence in the sample study over its applicable five-
year period. The indication (increased or decreased) findings from each indicator for every 
occurrence of destruction or sale within my study will be summarized and entered into my 
summary table (see Table 2).  
 
 
Elephant Ivory Stockpile Management Strategies                                                                                     
Used by African Elephant Range States 
Ivory Stockpile 
Destruction 
Ivory Stockpile                                                  
Sale 
Each indicator measured directional change for a five-year period, from 
the year before a destruction or sale through three years after (unless 
otherwise noted in the indicator's operationalization). The change 
indicated increased or decreased behavioral intention to poach or 
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Table 2. My research study design. The table shows each indicator (left column) which 
will be measured and coded to indicate either increased or decreased behavioral 
intention to poach or poaching behavior for each occurrence of either ivory stockpile 
destruction or sale within the sample of my study (top row). 




 The operationalization of each variable is described next. Each variable was thoroughly 
defined as well as its precise measurement for specific use within my research study.  
 Ivory stockpile. To operationalize ivory stockpile, my research study defines it as a 
collection of elephant ivory, raw or worked, owned by and managed by an African elephant 
range state.  
 Ivory stockpile destruction occurrence.  Ivory stockpile destruction occurrence is 
operationalized as a use of an ivory stockpile destruction strategy from 2008 through 2012 by an 
African elephant range state to manage its elephant ivory stockpile and results in a publicized 
event where the country destroys all or a portion of its ivory stockpile through burning or 
crushing the illicit ivory. 
 Ivory stockpile sale occurrence. Ivory stockpile sale occurrence is operationalized as a 
use of an ivory stockpile management sale strategy from 2008 through 2012 by an African 
elephant range state to manage its elephant ivory stockpile and results in CITES listing the 
country’s African elephant population as Appendix II and then the country sells a portion of its 
ivory stockpile in a CITES-authorized one-off sale. 
 Effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade. Effective combatting of the illegal ivory 
trade was operationalized as indication of decreased behavioral intention to poach and decreased 
poaching behavior of African elephants during a five-year period. The five-year period was 
determined by the year of the occurrence of either an ivory stockpile destruction or sale. The 
five-year period included collected data from the year before the elephant ivory stockpile 
management strategy was implemented, from the year the strategy was implemented, and from 
the three years after the strategy was implemented. As previously noted, effective combatting of 
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the illegal ivory trade was operationalized based on Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior.  
 Indicator. An indicator is an online, public archival data set. Its measurement during a 
five-year period indicates the directional change (increase or decrease) of either behavioral 
intention to poach or poaching behavior during that period for each occurrence in the sample of 
my population. Each indicator is precisely operationalized (see sections, Behavioral Intention to 
Poach Indicators and Poaching Behavior Indicators). The selected indicators were chosen due to 
their use in previous research studies or from the findings of my review of the literature.  
 Considering the difficultly of measuring illicit activity, I chose to not measure the 
changed amount of behavioral intention to poach or poaching behavior. Rather, I chose to 
measure directional change, whether behavioral intention to poach or poaching behavior had 
increased or decreased, during the evaluated five-year period for each occurrence. Also, the 
countries that have elephant populations ranked as Appendix II by CITES inherently have less 
poaching, or, otherwise, their elephant populations would not have been downlisted. By not 
measuring the amount of change and only measuring the direction of change, I was able to 
equally compare all occurrences within the sample of my study. As a caveat, this study makes 
the assumption that any amount of decreased or increased poaching behavior and behavioral 
intention to poach is important because it is indicative of trends. As such, this study equally 
values similar directional change regardless of the amount of those changes.  
 Behavioral intention to poach indicators. The behavioral intention to poach indicators 
measured archival data sets that influence an individual’s perceived likelihood or intent to 
engage in African elephant poaching. Each indicator was operationalized, such that its collected 
archival data set could be measured and its measurement would indicate either increased or 
decreased behavioral intention to poach during the applicable five-year period for every 
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occurrence within the sample of my study. As outlined by the theory of planned behavior, the 
determinants of behavioral intention are attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral 
control (Ajzen, 1991). Six indicators were chosen and each one is associated with one of the 
determinants of behavioral intention. Each of the behavioral intention to poach indicators, their 
indication, and source are listed in Table 3. 
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World 
Bank 
Rule of Law Index 
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Table 3. Indicators of behavioral intention to poach. This table lists each indicator of 
behavioral intention to poach, its associated determinant, its indication, and its source. 
  
 Next, the six indicators of behavioral intention are summarized. The summary describes 
its archival data source, its operationalization, and the rationale for its use by my study. The first 
two indicators of behavioral intention to poach correspond to the determinant of attitude and are 
factors that influence an individual’s favorable or unfavorable evaluation of poaching behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991). Applying the theory of planned behavior, the more favorable the evaluation of 
poaching behavior the more likely an individual is to behave in that way, and, therefore, their 
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behavioral intention to poach is increased. The two behavioral intention to poach indicators 
associated with the determinant of attitude are adult literacy rate and per capita gross domestic 
product.  
 Adult literacy rate indicator. The adult literacy rate indicator collected and measured an 
archival data set for each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale in the sample of my 
study to indicate behavioral intention to poach. The collected archival data set was the reported 
percentage of literate adults (aged 15 years or older, including both sexes within the total 
country’s population) in each applicable year for the African elephant range state that had used 
each occurred strategy.  
 Source and operationalization. The archival data source used for this indicator was the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s [UNESCO] Institute for 
Statistics from their online website, http://data.uis.unesco.org/. The data was collected using their 
“create a dataset” tool. The data was generated through selection of their variable of “adult 
literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (percent)” and the African elephant range states 
that had used each occurred strategy within my sample for their applicable years.  
 Due to sporadic data reported to UNESCO from many countries, I opted to collect the 
data uniquely for this indicator instead of only during the five-year period. I collected any 
available annual percentage of literature adults from 2007 through 2015 for each African 
elephant range state that had used each occurred strategy. Due to missing data, this allowed me 
to better measure the change in literacy rate from prior to the occurrences of sale or destruction 
of the ivory stockpiles through the years following. I then plotted all data points (year, 
percentage of literature adults) for each country on an Excel line graph with each line 
representing a different occurrence within my sample. A linear trend line and its equation were 
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assigned to the data of each occurrence. Using the findings from the indicator, behavioral 
intention to poach was coded as increased or decreased for each occurrence. If the linear trend 
line and its equation were an increasing line, it indicated an increase in adult literacy rate and 
behavioral intention to poach was coded as decreased for that occurrence. If the linear trend line 
and its equation were a decreasing or no change line, it indicated a decrease in adult literacy rate 
and behavioral intention to poach was coded as increased. An asterisk next to the findings would 
indicate that there was missing data points from the archival data source. Two asterisks next to 
the findings would indicate that archival data was not yet available for 2015. 
 Rationale. A research study by Boer et al. (2013) found that increased adult literacy rate 
was positively correlated with higher elephant densities. Prior research by Vanclary (2001) and 
Kideghesho et al. (2007) showed “a population’s educational background is positively correlated 
with attitudes towards conservation” (as cited in Boer et al., 2013, p. 470). This is important for 
my study as it suggests that areas with higher literacy rates would also have a more unfavorable 
attitude towards elephant poaching. Thus, increased literacy rates cause an unfavorable attitude 
towards poaching (individuals would be less likely to poach), which indicates decreased 
behavioral intention to poach. Therefore, I chose to use adult literacy rate as an indicator of 
behavioral intention to poach associated with its determinant of attitude, despite the weaker 
nature of its data. In 2015, all countries had a reported percentage of adult literacy. Therefore, it 
was chosen to create a trend line, including any available data from 2007 through 2015, to better 
capture the change that occurred from prior to sale or destruction occurrences through the years 
following them. By collecting more data over a longer period, it strengthened the limited data 
available and indication provided by this indicator.  
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 Per capita gross domestic product indicator. The per capita gross domestic product 
[GDP] indicator collected and measured an archival data set for each occurrence of ivory 
stockpile destruction or sale in the sample of my study to indicate behavioral intention to poach. 
The collected archival data set was the reported per capita GDP (in current US dollars) in each 
applicable year for the African elephant range state that had used each occurred strategy. 
 Source and operationalization. The archival data source used for this indicator was the 
International Monetary Fund’s [IMF] World Economic Outlook Database from their online 
website, http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ ft/weo/ 2015/02/weodata/index.aspx. The data was 
collected using their “World Economic Outlook Database” tool. The data was generated through 
the selection of their variable of “gross domestic product per capita, current prices (U.S. dollars)” 
and the African elephant range states that had used each occurred strategy within my sample for 
their applicable years.  
 I collected the available per capita GDP amounts for the applicable five-year period for 
each African elephant range state that had used an occurred strategy. It was collected between 
the years of 2007 through 2011 for an occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale in 2008, 
between 2010 through 2014 for an occurrence in 2011, and between 2011 through 2015 for an 
occurrence in 2012. I then plotted all data points (year, per capita GDP) for each country on an 
Excel line graph with each line representing a different occurrence in my sample. A linear trend 
line and its equation were assigned to the data of each occurrence. Using the findings from the 
indicator, behavioral intention to poach was coded as increased or decreased for each occurrence. 
If the linear trend line and its equation were an increasing line, it indicated an increase in per 
capita GDP and behavioral intention to poach was coded as decreased for that occurrence. If the 
linear trend line and its equation were a decreasing or no change line, it indicated a decrease in 
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per capita GDP and behavioral intention to poach was coded as increased. An asterisk next to the 
findings would indicate that there was missing data points from the archival data source. Two 
asterisks next to the findings would indicate that archival data was not yet available for 2015.
 Rationale. A research study by Boer et al. (2013) found that increased per capita gross 
domestic product was positively correlated with higher elephant densities. They chose to study 
per capita GDP because Teel et al. (2007) and Burn et al. (2011) had found that “differences 
between countries in human welfare, such as reflected in differences in GDP/cap or life 
expectancy (LEI), are known positively to influence attitudes towards conservation” (as cited in 
Boer et al., 2013, p. 470). This is relevant to my research study as it suggests that in areas with 
increased per capita GDP there would also be a more unfavorable attitude towards elephant 
poaching. Thus, increased per capita GDP causes an unfavorable attitude of poaching 
(individuals are less likely to poach), which indicates decreased behavioral intention to poach. 
Therefore, I chose per capita GDP as an indicator of behavioral intention to poach associated 
with its determinant of attitude. It is additionally important to note that the per capita GDP data 
sets from International Monetary Fund were chosen over the datasets from the World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/) because IMF had more complete data. 
 The third behavioral intention to poach indicator corresponds to the determinant, 
subjective norm. Considering the theory of planned behavior, this indicator is defined as a factor 
influencing an individual’s perceived social pressure to either poach or not poach African 
elephants. A greater social pressure to not poach (individuals are less likely to poach) indicates 
decreased behavioral intention to poach (Ajzen, 1991). The behavioral intention to poach 
indicator chosen to measure the determinant of subjective norm was the national African 
elephant management and planning strategy. 
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 National African elephant management and planning strategy indicator. The national 
African elephant management and planning strategy indicator collected and measured an 
archival data set for each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale in my sample to 
indicate behavioral intention to poach. The collected archival data set determined for each 
African elephant range state, which had used each occurred strategy in my sample, whether or 
not it had a country specific National African Elephant Management and Planning Strategy 
updated in or after 2007.  
 Source and operationalization. The African Elephant Specialist Group, an entity of the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, encourages and assists African elephant range 
states to develop national, subregional, and continental strategies and plans to conserve and 
protect African elephants (IUCN/AfESG, 2016). One of the national strategies encouraged for all 
African elephant range states to create is a national African elephant management and planning 
strategy to prioritize and outline steps to conserve the African elephants within their state 
(IUCN/AfESG, 2016). The archival data source used for this indicator was the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature from their online website, https://www.iucn.org/ 
about/work/programmes/species/who_we_are/ssc_specialist_groups_and_red_list_authorities_di
rectory/mammals/african_elephant/strategies_plans/. The website and its linked pages were last 
updated in 2015. The data was collected by selecting a webpage link for each geographical 
region of Africa. On each linked webpage, there was the list of the African countries in that 
region who had a strategy, the year it was updated, and, if available, a pdf copy of the strategy. 
For every African elephant range state that had used each occurred strategy in my sample, I 
recorded if the country had a national African elephant management and planning strategy as 
well as the year the strategy was last updated. 
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 This indicator, due to the type of data collected, was another exception to the five-year 
period. For this indicator, I conducted a single evaluation of the recorded data to code behavioral 
intention to poach as increased or decreased for each occurrence. To capture the directional 
change of behavioral intention to poach, I determined if the African elephant range state had a 
national strategy, updated in or after 2007. If so, it indicated a subjective norm of protecting and 
conserving African elephants and, as such, a social pressure to not poach African elephants. 
Therefore, the behavioral intention to poach was coded as decreased for that occurrence. 
However, if the African elephant range state had an outdated national strategy (not updated since 
2007) or did not have a national strategy, it indicated a lacking subjective norm of protecting and 
conserving African elephants and, therefore, a lacking social pressure to not poach. In this case, 
the behavioral intention to poach for that occurrence was coded as increased. An asterisk next to 
the findings would indicate that there was missing data points from the archival data source. Two 
asterisks next to the findings would indicate that archival data was not yet available for 2015. 
 Rationale. The review of the literature did not show an association between any particular 
variable and social pressure deterring poaching. IUCN’s African Elephant Specialist Group 
argue that a national African elephant management and planning strategy is an important tool for 
effective elephant conservation (IUCN/AfESG, 2016). Thus, in my opinion, presence of a 
national strategy causes a greater national priority of African elephant conservation. If the 
subjective norm is to conserve and protect African elephants (individuals are less likely to 
poach), then it indicates decreased behavioral intention to poach. Therefore, I chose presence of 
an updated national African elephant management and planning strategy as an indicator of 
behavioral intention to poach associated with its determinant of subjective norm.   
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 Similarly, some African elephant range states have national ivory action plans that are 
strongly encouraged by CITES to address the illegal trade of ivory directly (CITES, n.d.). 
However, I chose not to use this as an indicator because only countries most heavily implicated 
in the illegal ivory trade are strongly encouraged to have an ivory action plan. Therefore, not all 
African elephant range states have this plan. Alternatively, a national African elephant 
management and planning strategy focuses on preserving and conserving African elephants. 
Therefore, it is an encouraged priority for all African elephant range states to implement such a 
strategy and was chosen as my indicator.  
 The final three indicators of behavioral intention to poach correspond to the determinant 
of perceived behavioral control. Applying the theory of planned behavior, an indicator of 
behavioral intention associated with perceived behavioral control was defined as a factor that 
influences an individual’s perception of the ease or difficulty to poach African elephants. A more 
difficult perception of poaching (individuals are less likely to poach) indicates decreased 
behavioral intention to poach (Ajzen, 1991). When considering the determinant of perceived 
behavioral control on the behavioral intention to poach, the following three indicators were 
chosen: (a) national legislation meeting requirements for implementation of CITES; (b) control 
of corruption index; and (c) rule of law index. Each indicator will now be discussed. 
 National legislation meeting requirements for implementation of CITES indicator. The 
national legislation meeting requirements for implementation of CITES indicator collected and 
measured an archival data set for each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale in my 
sample to indicate behavioral intention to poach. The collected archival data set determined 
whether or not the African elephant range state, which had used an occurred strategy within my 
sample, had national legislation meeting the requirements for the Convention on International 
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Trade of Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora [CITES] to be implemented as of 2014. 
 Source and operationalization. The CITES National Legislation Project conducted and 
published a report in 2014. The report evaluated each country’s national legislation to determine 
if it met the requirements for implementation of the Convention on International Trade of 
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora. Upon evaluation, each country was ranked by the report 
into one of three designated categories. The categories are as follows: (a) Category 1: legislation 
that is believed generally to meet the requirements for implementation of CITES; (b) Category 2: 
legislation that is believed generally not to meet all of the requirements for the implementation of 
CITES; and (c) Category 3: legislation that is believed generally not to meet the requirements for 
the implementation of CITES (CITES, n.d.). The archival data source used for this indicator thus 
was this 2014 report from the CITES National Legislation Project, which is available on their 
online website, https://cites.org/eng/legislation. The data was collected from pdf links on their 
webpage. Each pdf link was a list of all the countries within a particular category. Using each of 
the pdf links, I recorded the ranked category of each African elephant range state that had used 
each occurred strategy within my sample.  
 This indicator, due to the type of data collected, was another exception to the five-year 
period. For this indicator, I conducted a single evaluation of the recorded data to code behavioral 
intention to poach as increased or decreased for each occurrence in my sample. If the African 
elephant range state had a category 1 ranking, it indicated its national legislation met the 
requirements for implementation of CITES and poaching would be perceived as more difficult. 
For example, with CITES fully implemented into national legislation, the country does not have 
an unregulated, legal domestic ivory trade. This means that criminals do not have a legal conduit 
for which illegal ivory could be traded and causes poaching to be perceived as more difficult. 
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Therefore, the behavioral intention to poach was coded as decreased for that occurrence. 
However, if the African elephant range state had a category 2 or category 3 ranking, it indicated 
that the national legislation failed to fully meet the requirements for implementation of CITES. 
Therefore, poaching would be perceived as comparatively easier. In this case, the behavioral 
intention to poach was coded as increased for that occurrence. An asterisk next to the findings 
would indicate that there was missing data points from the archival data source. Two asterisks 
next to the findings would indicate that archival data was not yet available for 2015.  
 Rationale. CITES uses this report to determine the compliance of a country’s national 
legislation with its regulation of the trade of endangered species, including banning the 
commercial trade of ivory (CITES, n.d.). Additionally, it was found that African elephant range 
states with unregulated illegal or legal domestic trades of ivory had more rapidly declining 
elephant populations than those without, indicating more poaching to supply these domestic 
trades (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009). This suggests that poor implementation of CITES into national 
legislation, such as the failure to ban legal domestic trade of ivory, is indicative of increased 
poaching and illegal ivory trade. Also, my master thesis assumes that criminals can be deterred 
from illicit activity, specifically illegal poaching of African elephants. Therefore, I assume that 
national legislation meeting the requirements for implementation of CITES would deter 
criminals from poaching because its presence causes poaching to be perceived as more difficult 
(individuals are less likely to poach) and this then would indicate a decrease in behavioral 
intention to poach. Therefore, I chose national legislation meeting the requirements for 
implementation of CITES as an indicator of behavioral intention to poach associated with the 
determinant of perceived behavioral control. 
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 Additionally, it should be expected that all four countries with Appendix II elephant 
populations should be ranked as category one and indicated as having decreased behavioral 
intention to poach. In order for them to be authorized by CITES to downlist their elephant 
population and sell their ivory stockpiles, it would be assumed that their elephant populations are 
less endangered, properly managed, and protective national legislation is in place, including 
meeting the requirements for implementation of CITES.  
 Control of corruption index indicator. The control of corruption index indicator 
collected and measured an archival data set for each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or 
sale in the sample of my study to indicate behavioral intention to poach. The collected archival 
data set was the control of corruption index score in each applicable year for the African elephant 
range state that had used each occurred strategy.  
 Source and operationalization. The control of corruption index scores range from -2.5 
weak control of corruption (or highly corrupt country) to 2.5 strong control of corruption (or 
highly uncorrupt country) with each country receiving a single score per year. The archival data 
source used for this indicator was the World Bank using their online website, http://info.world 
bank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports. Data was collected using their “Worldwide 
Governance Indicators” tool. The tool generated the data through the selection of their variable 
of “Control of Corruption” and the African elephant range states that had used each occurred 
strategy within my sample for their applicable years.   
 I collected the available control of corruption index scores for the applicable five-year 
period for each African elephant range state that had used each occurred strategy. It was 
collected between the years of 2007 through 2011 for an occurrence of ivory stockpile 
destruction or sale in 2008, between 2010 through 2014 for an occurrence in 2011, and between 
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2011 through 2015 for an occurrence in 2012. I then plotted all data points (year, control of 
corruption index score) for each country on an Excel line graph with each line representing a 
different occurrence within my sample. A linear trend line and its equation were assigned to the 
data of each occurrence. Using the findings from the indicator, behavioral intention to poach was 
coded as increased or decreased for each occurrence. If the linear trend line and its equation were 
an increasing line, it indicated an increase in control of corruption (decreased corruption) and 
behavioral intention to poach was coded as decreased for that occurrence. If the linear trend line 
and its equation were a decreasing or no change line, it indicated a decrease in control of 
corruption (increased corruption) and behavioral intention to poach was coded as increased for 
that occurrence. An asterisk next to the findings would indicate that there was missing data 
points from the archival data source. Two asterisks next to the findings would indicate that 
archival data was not yet available for 2015. 
 Rationale. My literature review showed a consensus within the research that corruption 
and African elephant poaching are positively correlated and are threatening African elephant 
populations (Bennett, 2014; UNEP et al., 2013). Corruption makes poaching of African 
elephants and the illegal ivory trade easier. For example, corruption allows poachers to be able to 
pay-off wildlife protection officers and officials (Bennett, 2014). Additionally, it has been shown 
through analyses by Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants Program [MIKE] that indicators 
of corruption and weak governance are more strongly correlated with poaching levels than any 
other national-level indicator (UNEP et al., 2013). Thus, increased control of corruption index 
scores (less corruption) causes poaching to be perceived as more difficult (individuals are less 
likely to poach), which indicates decreased behavioral intention to poach. Therefore, I chose 
control of corruption index as an indicator of behavioral intention to poach associated with the 
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determinant of perceived behavioral control.   
 Additionally, the control of corruption index from World Bank was chosen over 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (http://www.transparency.org/ 
research/cpi/overview). I made this choice because the corruption perceptions index, as 
explained by Transparency International, cannot be compared across time prior to 2012. Before 
then, Transparency International ranked countries and scores against other countries in each of 
their annual reports. This means that Country A’s ranking could decrease from one year to the 
next but not because Country A became more corrupt. Instead, Country B decreased its 
corruption and moved higher on the scale than Country A, causing Country A to be ranked lower 
the following year. For my study it was necessary to compare indexes across time with data prior 
to 2012. This resulted in my choice to use the archival data from World Bank. 
 Rule of law index indicator. The rule of law index indicator collected and measured an 
archival data set for each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale in the sample of my 
study to indicate behavioral intention to poach. The collected archival data set was the rule of 
law index score in each applicable year for the African elephant range state that had used each 
occurred strategy within the sample of my study.  
 Source and operationalization. The rule of law index scores range from -2.5 weak rule of 
law (or poor law enforcement) to strong 2.5 rule of law (or strong law enforcement) with each 
country receiving a single score per year. The archival data source used for this indicator was the 
World Bank using their website, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports. 
Data was collected using their “Worldwide Governance Indicators” tool. The tool generated the 
data through the selection of their variable of “Rule of Law” and the African elephant range 
states that had used each occurred strategy within my sample for their applicable years. 
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 I collected the available rule of law index scores for the applicable five-year period for 
each African elephant range state that had used each occurred strategy. It was collected between 
the years of 2007 through 2011 for an occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale in 2008, 
between 2010 through 2014 for an occurrence in 2011, and between 2011 through 2015 for an 
occurrence in 2012. I then plotted all data points (year, rule of law index score) for each country 
on an Excel line graph with each line representing a different occurrence within my sample. A 
linear trend line and its equation were assigned to the data of each occurrence. Using the findings 
from the indicator, behavioral intention to poach was coded as increased or decreased for each 
occurrence. If the linear trend line and its equation were an increasing line, it indicated an 
increase in rule of law (increased law enforcement) and behavioral intention to poach was coded 
as decreased for that occurrence. If the linear trend line and its equation were a decreasing or no 
change line, it indicated a decrease in rule of law (decreased law enforcement) and behavioral 
intention to poach was coded as increased for that occurrence. An asterisk next to the findings 
would indicate that there was missing data points from the archival data source. Two asterisks 
next to the findings would indicate that archival data was not yet available for 2015.
 Rationale. Wyler and Sheikh (2013) reported that weak governance facilitates the illegal 
wildlife trade. A research study by Underwood, Burn, and Milliken (2013) found that increased 
rule of law index is positively correlated with the seizure rate of illicitly traded ivory. Stronger 
governance and rule of law indicate greater enforcement of the illegal ivory trade. These research 
findings suggest that weak rule of law makes poaching of African elephants and the illegal ivory 
trade easier for criminals because there is low risk of getting caught and minimal punitive action. 
Thus, increased rule of law index scores causes poaching to be perceived as more difficult 
(individuals are less likely to poach), which indicates decreased behavioral intention to poach. 
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 Therefore, I chose rule of law index as an indicator of behavioral intention to poach 
associated with the determinant of perceived behavioral control. Although there may be other 
variables for measurement of governance and enforcement, my study chose to use the rule of law 
index because it was a previously used statistically significant measurement. Analyses by the 
Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants Program [MIKE] have consistently shown that 
indicators of corruption and poor governance, such as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
indicators including control of corruption and rule of law indexes, are more strongly correlated 
with poaching levels than any other national-level indicator (UNEP et al., 2013).  
 Poaching behavior indicators. The poaching behavior indicators measured archival data 
sets that indirectly indicate African elephant poaching. Each indicator was operationalized, such 
that its collected archival data set could be measured and its measurement would indicate either 
increased or decreased poaching behavior during the applicable five-year period for every 
occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale within the sample of my study. Percentage of 
illegally killed African elephants and the total African elephant population were chosen as the 
two indicators of poaching behavior. The poaching behavior indicators, their indication of 
poaching behavior, and source are listed in Table 4.   
 
 Indicator Indication Source 
Poaching 
Behavior 
Percentage of Illegally Killed African 
Elephants  
Decreased Percentage of 
Illegally Killed African 
Elephants = Decreased 
Poaching Behavior 
CITES’ MIKE 
African Elephant Population 
Increased or Conserved 
Elephant Population = 





Table 4. Indicators of poaching behavior. The table lists each indicator of poaching 
behavior, its indication, and its source. 
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 Next, the two poaching behavior indicators are summarized describing their 
operationalization, their archival data source, and the rationale for their use.  
 Percentage of illegally killed African elephants indicator. The percentage of illegally 
killed African elephants indicator collected and measured an archival data set for each 
occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale in the sample of my study to indicate poaching 
behavior. The collected archival data set was the total percentage of illegally killed African 
elephants (out of the total deceased elephants in monitored African elephant populations) in the 
applicable years for the African elephant range state that had used each occurred strategy. 
 Source and operationalization. The archival data source used for this indicator was the 
Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants [MIKE], an operation of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (UNEP et al., 2013). Established 
in 1997, MIKE is a standardized monitoring system that collects data from one or more 
monitoring sites, which are primarily protected elephant ranges, in most African and Asian 
elephant range states. Its monitoring sites collect and report the number of elephant carcasses 
found during the year as well as their assessed cause of death (illegal or natural). This allows for 
an annual calculation of the portion of illegally killed elephants. The MIKE’s findings identify 
trends of illegally killed elephants to help to inform decisions regarding elephant populations and 
their protection.   
 The archival data was collected from their online website, https://www.google.com/ 
fusiontables/DataSource?docid =1juiqNCOU wqperYcoq_uCWaZ5lEs8t09hfRry_I37. Their 
data set can be sorted by country code, which then lists the annual report from each monitoring 
site of total elephant carcasses and total illegally killed elephant carcasses. For each African 
elephant range state that had used each occurred strategy, I collected in the applicable five year 
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period both: (a) the total number of carcasses, including illegally and non-illegally killed 
elephant carcasses, from all reporting sites within that African elephant range state; and (b) the 
number of illegally killed elephant carcasses found from all reporting sites within that African 
elephant range state. Furthermore, this indicator was operationalized as the percentage of 
illegally killed African elephants. I had to calculate the annual percentage of illegally killed 
elephants. To do so, I divided the (sum of the total number of illegally killed elephant carcasses 
from every reporting site located in an African elephant range state for a chosen year) by the 
(sum of the total number of illegally and non-illegally killed elephant carcasses from every 
reporting site located in an African elephant range state for that chosen year) which equaled the 
percentage of illegally killed African elephants for that African elephant range state in that 
chosen year.  
 I used the collected data to calculate the percentages of illegally killed African elephants 
for the applicable five-year period for each African elephant range state that had used each 
occurred strategy within the sample of my study. For example, a percent was calculated for each 
of the years from 2007 through 2011 for an occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale in 
2008, for each of the years from 2010 through 2014 for an occurrence in 2011, and for each of 
the years from 2011 through 2015 for an occurrence in 2012. I then plotted all data points (year, 
percent of illegally killed African elephants) for each country on an Excel line graph with each 
line representing a different occurrence within my sample. A linear trend line and its equation 
were assigned to the data of each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale within the 
sample of my study. Using the findings from the indicator, poaching behavior was coded as 
increased or decreased for each occurrence. If the linear trend line and its equation were a 
decreasing or no change line, it indicated a decreased percentage of illegally killed African 
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
140 
elephants and poaching behavior was coded as decreased for that occurrence. If the linear trend 
line and its equation were an increasing line, it indicated an increased percentage of illegally 
killed African elephants and poaching behavior was coded as increased for that occurrence. An 
asterisk next to the findings would indicate that there was missing data points from the archival 
data source. Two asterisks next to the findings would indicate that archival data was not yet 
available for 2015.  
 Rationale. As previously discussed, there are multiple variables to indirectly measure the 
illegal ivory trade and the efforts to combat it. I chose the percentage of illegally killed African 
elephants as my indirect indicator of poaching behavior similar to the studies by Bulte, Damania, 
and van Kooten (2007) and Wittemyer et al. (2014). However, this percentage is skewed by the 
fact that it is limited to reports from selective African elephant populations that are closely 
monitored. Therefore, I chose my second indicator of poaching behavior to strengthen my 
findings by measuring the African elephant population. My two chosen indicators of poaching 
behavior are complementary. For example, if there is a decrease in the percentage of illegally 
killed African elephants within monitored areas of a country as well as an increase in the total 
elephant population of that country, it would be much more likely that poaching has decreased 
within that entire African elephant range state. Therefore, my research study chose to use the 
percentage of illegally killed elephants as well as the African elephant population as the 
indicators of poaching behavior. 
 African elephant population indicator. The African elephant population indicator 
collected and measured an archival data set for each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or 
sale in the sample of my study to indicate poaching behavior. The collected archival data set was 
the total African elephant population (including definite and probable numbers, excluding 
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possible and speculative numbers) in 2007 and 2013 for the African elephant range state that had 
used each occurred strategy in my sample.   
 Source and operationalization. The archival data source used for this indicator was the 
African Elephant Database, an operation of the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s 
[IUCN] African Elephant Specialist Group. The group reports the total estimated number and 
location of the African elephant population every three to five years on its African Elephant 
Database (IUCN/AfESG, 2016; UNEP, CITES, IUCN, & TRAFFIC, 2013). It collects data on 
the elephant population from a variety of conservation agencies and researchers across many of 
the African elephant range states (IUCN/AfESG, 2016). Further, the African elephant population 
estimate is a sum total of: (a) the definite number of elephants within the population (physically 
counted animals during aerial surveys); (b) the probable number of elephants within the 
population (animals counted by dung or other samples), and (c) the possible and speculative 
numbers of elephants within the population (two calculated estimations with the possible number 
being more assured). The archival data sets used were from the two most recent African elephant 
population estimates in 2007 and 2013. Their data sets are available on their online website, 
http://www.elephantdatabase.org/preview_report/2013_africa_final/Loxodonta_ africana/2013/ 
Africa. The data is organized by year and region of Africa. It required accessing additional 
linked pages to collect the African elephant population numbers and breakdown for each 
country. For my study, I chose to operationalize the African elephant population as the sum of 
the definite number and the probable number of elephants.  
 This indicator, due to the type of data collected, was another exception to the five-year 
period. For every African elephant range state that had used each occurred strategy in my 
sample, I calculated their total African elephant population (using definite and probable counts, 
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excluding possible and speculative counts) for the years of 2007 and 2013. I then plotted the set 
of data points (year, total number of African elephants) for each country on an Excel line graph 
with each line representing a different occurrence within my sample. Using the linear line and its 
equation, poaching behavior was coded as increased or decreased for each occurrence of ivory 
stockpile destruction or sale within the sample of my study and reflected the directional change 
during the applicable five-year period. If the linear line and its equation were an increasing or no 
change line, it indicated an increased or conserved African elephant population (implying 
decreased poaching) and the indicator was coded as decreased poaching behavior for that 
occurrence. However, if the linear line and its equation were a decreasing line, it indicated a 
decreased African elephant population (implying increased poaching) and the indicator was 
coded as increased poaching for that occurrence. An asterisk next to the findings would indicate 
that there was missing data points from the archival data source. Two asterisks next to the 
findings would indicate that archival data was not yet available for 2015.  
 Rationale. Refer to the rationale explained under the indicator, percentage of illegally 
killed African elephants. The rational for use of my African elephant population indicator is 
described there as the two indicators are complementary and used together to provide the best 
indication of poaching behavior.   
Population and Sampling Method  
 The sample of my study was collected using non-probability purposive sampling. The 
population for my study was all occurrences of ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale 
from 1989 (ban on transnational commercial trade of ivory) through 2015 by African elephant 
range states. I found 17 total occurrences using a list of all ivory stockpile destructions from  
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Welch (2015) and a list of all ivory stockpile sales reported by CITES (CITES, n.d.; CITES, 
2007; CITES, 2008). 
 The design of my study required being able to evaluate each occurrence in my sample for 
a five-year period meaning I needed there to be archival data sets available during that period. 
Therefore, I used purposive sampling to take a sample from my total population that met this 
criterion. For my population, I found 17 total occurrences including: 6 occurrences that 
transpired from 1989 through 1992; 0 occurrences that transpired from 1993 through 2007; 6 
occurrences that transpired from 2008 through 2012 and 5 occurrences that transpired from 2014 
through 2015. I was unable to include the occurrences from 1989 through 1992 because the 
archival datasets used for my indicators had insufficient data or were not collected then. 
Additionally, I was unable to include the occurrences from 2014 through 2015. To be able to 
evaluate the occurrence for a five-year period, it had to have occurred in 2012 or before. For 
example, an occurrence in 2012 had data collected from one year before the occurrence, 2011, 
through three years after the occurrence, 2015. As no archival data would be available for 2016 
until the year is over, I could not use any occurrences in or after 2013. Furthermore, there was 
unreported archival data for 2015 for some of my indicators. However, I chose to include 2012 
occurrences and evaluate any available archival data. I made a notation if there was missing data. 
In my opinion, it was better to expand my already limited sample to include any 2012 
occurrences rather than exclude it due to a few missing data points.  
 Therefore, my research study used purposive sampling from the total population of all 
occurrences of ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale by African elephant range 
states to select any occurrences from 2008 through 2012. Using my sampling method, the sample 
of my research study became: 
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1. An Ivory Stockpile Destruction by Kenya in 2011 
2. An Ivory Stockpile Destruction by Gabon in 2012 
3. An Ivory Stockpile Sale by Botswana in 2008 
4. An Ivory Stockpile Sale by Namibia in 2008 
5. An Ivory Stockpile Sale by South Africa in 2008 
6. An Ivory Stockpile Sale by Zimbabwe in 2008 
Data Collection Procedures  
 After using my sampling method to determine the sample of my research study, I used 
the following data collection procedures. First, I collected the archival data for each of the eight 
indicators from their online sources per its operationalization (see section, Operationalization). 
Each indicator had six collected data sets, one for each of the six occurrences within the sample 
of my study. Second, per the directive of each indicator’s operationalization, I created any 
necessary graphs. Third, I measured and coded the findings of each indicator (per its 
operationalization) for each occurrence in my study. This resulted in each occurrence having six 
indications (either increased or decreased) of behavioral intention to poach and two indications 
(either increased or decreased) of poaching behavior for its applicable five-year period. I, then, 
created a summary table (see Table 2 on page 120). All the occurrences in my sample were 
placed along the top of the table and each indicator was listed along the left side of the table. For 
each indicator, its found indications for all occurrences in my sample were recorded within the 
summary table.  
Data Processing and Analysis Procedures 
 Before discussing my data processing and analysis procedures, it is necessary to recall 
my research question: which elephant ivory stockpile management strategy used by African 
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elephant range states – (a) ivory stockpile destruction or (b) ivory stockpile sale – correlates 
better with decreased behavioral intention to poach as well as decreased poaching behavior? 
 In order to explore and answer my research question, I analyzed the correlation between 
my nominal variables. I analyzed if ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale correlated 
better with decreased or increased behavioral intention to poach. I also analyzed if ivory 
stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale is correlated better with decreased or increased 
poaching behavior.  
 Specifically in order to process my data and analyze it, I chose to do two cross-tabulation 
analyses of the found frequencies for my nominal variables. First, I conducted a cross-tabulation 
analysis to determine the correlation between ivory stockpile management strategies (ivory 
stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale) and behavioral intention to poach indications 




Behavioral Intention to Poach Indications 
  
 







For occurrences of 
destruction, the frequency 
of “increased” indications 
For occurrences of 
destruction, the frequency 
of “decreased” indications 
(Total # of 
frequencies 
in this row) 
Sale 
For occurrences of sale, 
the frequency of 
“increased” 
Indications 
For occurrences of sale, 
the frequency of 
“decreased” 
Indications 
(Total # of 
frequencies 
in this row) 
 
 
(Total # of frequencies in 
this column) 
 (Total # of frequencies in 
this column)  (Total #) 
 
Table 5. Method for cross-tabulation analysis of strategy and behavioral intention to 
poach. The table shows the method for conducting the cross-tabulation analysis of the 
correlation between ivory stockpile management strategies and the indications of 
behavioral intention to poach. 
 
 Second, I conducted a cross-tabulation analysis to determine the correlation between 
ivory stockpile management strategies (ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale) and 
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poaching behavior indications (increased or decreased). The method for setting up the analysis is 
shown in Table 6.   
 
 
 Poaching Behavior Indications  
 







For occurrences of 
destruction, the frequency 
of “increased” indications 
For occurrences of 
destruction, the frequency 
of “decreased” indications 
(Total # of 
frequencies 
in this row) 
Sale 
For occurrences of sale, 
the frequency of 
“increased” indications 
For occurrences of sale, 
the frequency of 
“decreased” indications 
(Total # of 
frequencies 
in this row) 
 
 
(Total # of frequencies in 
this column) 
 (Total # of frequencies in 
this column)  (Total #) 
 
Table 6. Method for cross-tabulation analysis of strategy and poaching behavior. The 
table shows the method for conducting the cross-tabulation analysis of the correlation 
between ivory stockpile management strategies and the indications of poaching behavior. 
 
 To analyze the findings of my cross tabulation analyses, I used a Fisher’s exact test 
statistic to determine the Fisher’s exact probability score (or p score) for each analysis. It 
assumes a null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the two variables rather the 
frequencies occurred by chance, unless the results are shown to be statistically significant 
(Babbie, 2010). I chose not to analyze my frequency tables using the more common and similar 
chi-squared statistical test because it is not as accurate for a 2x2 analysis (GraphPad, 2015). 
Fisher’s exact test statistic was designed for a 2x2 analysis of nominal variables with small 
populations (GraphPad, 2015). Therefore, I chose this statistical test as the best fit for analyzing 
my findings.  
 Using a free online statistical calculator at www.graphpad.com, I calculated the Fisher’s 
exact probability score for each of my two cross tabulation analyses. The frequencies of my 
nominal variables in each analysis will be analyzed to determine the Fisher’s exact probability 
score. If the p score has a value of p < 0.05, the correlation will be determined statistically 
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significant. Therefore, I can accept a correlation does exist between the two variables. Also, I can 
with statistical certainty answer my research question of which strategy is correlated better with 
decreased behavioral intention to poach and decreased poaching behavior. However, if the p 
score value is p > 0.05, then my results will be determined statistically non-significant. Without 
statistical certainty, I cannot assume a correlation between the two variables because it is too 
probable that the found frequencies may have occurred simply by chance.  
 In summary, this chapter has thoroughly described the methodology of my research 
study. Furthermore, this chapter has explained the theoretical framework and rationale for my 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 The results of my conducted research study are overviewed in this chapter. First, I present 
my results. Secondly, I analyze my findings. Finally, I summarize the results of my research 
study. Although relevant to this chapter, I will discuss the importance of my research study and 
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Presentation of Results 
 In order to compare the two ivory stockpile management strategies – (a) ivory stockpile 
destruction and (b) ivory stockpile sale – used by African elephant range states, my findings will 
determine which strategy is correlated better with decreased behavioral intention to poach and 
decreased poaching behavior. The sample of my study had two occurrences of ivory stockpile 
destruction and four occurrences of ivory stockpile sale. I compared the combined findings from 
occurrences of ivory stockpile destruction to the combined findings from occurrences of ivory 
stockpile sale (accounting for the increased amount of ivory stockpile sale occurrences) to 
answer my research question.  
 Before discussing the comparison of the two strategies, I will present the findings of each 
indicator. I selected six indicators of behavioral intention to poach and two indicators of 
poaching behavior within my study. The indication (either increased or decreased behavioral 
intention to poach or poaching behavior) by each indicator, per its operationalization, during the 
applicable five-year period for every sampled occurrence of either an ivory stockpile destruction 
or sale is presented. Each indicator’s findings are graphically presented and summarized in this 
section of the chapter. Then, a summary table of all found indications will be presented. 
 First, the six graphs of the collected data for each of the six indicators of behavioral 
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Results of Adult Literacy Rate Indicator 
 For this indicator, the collected data and their trend lines were graphed (see Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11. Adult literacy rate. For this indicator, the figure shows the data collected, 
graphed, and coded to indicate behavioral intention to poach for each occurrence. 
  
 For this indicator, an increasing linear trend line (positive value before the “x” in the 
equation) of adult literacy rate indicated decreased behavioral intention to poach. Whereas, a 
decreasing linear trend line (negative value before the “x” in the equation) of adult literacy rate 
indicated increased behavioral intention to poach. Using the data collected and presented in the 
graph (see Figure 11), I found that adult literacy rate indicated decreased behavioral intention to 
poach for all six occurrences, regardless of the type of ivory stockpile management strategy used. 
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Results of Per Capita Gross Domestic Product Indicator  
 For this indicator, the collected data and their trend lines were graphed (see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12. Per capita gross domestic product. For this indicator, the figure shows the data 
collected, graphed, and coded to indicate behavioral intention to poach for each occurrence. 
  
 For this indicator, an increasing linear trend line (positive value before the “x” in the 
equation) of per capita gross domestic product indicated decreased behavioral intention to poach. 
Whereas, a decreasing linear trend line (negative value before the “x” in the equation) of per 
capita gross domestic product indicated increased behavioral intention to poach. Using the data 
collected and presented in the graph (see Figure 12), I found that per capita gross domestic 
product indicated decreased behavioral intention to poach for one occurrence of ivory stockpile 
destruction and for all four occurrences of ivory stockpile sale. Additionally, I found that it 
indicated increased behavioral intention to poach for one occurrence of ivory stockpile 
destruction. 
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 Results of National African Elephant Management and Planning Strategy Indicator 
 The collected data for this indicator was graphed, as shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. National African elephant management and planning strategy. For this 
indicator, the figure shows the data collected, graphed, and coded to indicate behavioral 
intention to poach for each occurrence in the sample of my study.   
  
 For this indicator, a “yes” (meaning the African elephant range state had a national 
African elephant management and planning strategy updated in or after 2007) indicated 
decreased behavioral intention to poach. Whereas, a “no” (meaning the African elephant range 
state did not have a national African elephant management and planning strategy or that it was 
last updated prior to 2007) indicated increased behavioral intention to poach. Using the data 
collected and presented in the graph (see Figure 13) for this indicator, I found that it indicated 
decreased behavioral intention to poach for one occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction and for 
one occurrence of ivory stockpile sale. Additionally, I found that it indicated increased 
behavioral intention to poach for one occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction and three 
occurrences of ivory stockpile sale. 
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Results of National Legislation Meeting Requirements for Implementation of CITES 
Indicator 
 The collected data for this indicator was graphed, as shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. National legislation meeting requirements for implementation of CITES.           
For this indicator, the figure shows the data collected, graphed, and coded to indicate 
behavioral intention to poach for each occurrence in the sample of my study.   
 
 For this indicator, a “yes” (meaning the African elephant range state has national 
legislation meeting requirements for implementation of CITES) indicated decreased behavioral 
intention to poach. Whereas, a “no” (meaning the African elephant range state does not have 
national legislation meeting requirements for implementation of CITES) indicated increased 
behavioral intention to poach. Using the data collected and presented in the graph (see Figure 
14) for this indicator, I found that it indicated decreased behavioral intention to poach for three 
occurrences of ivory stockpile sale. Additionally, I found that it indicated increased behavioral 
intention to poach for both occurrences of ivory stockpile destruction and one occurrence of 
ivory stockpile sale. 
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Results of Control of Corruption Index Indicator 
 For this indicator, the collected data and their trend lines were graphed (see Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15. Control of corruption index. For this indicator, the figure shows the data collected, 
graphed, and coded to indicate behavioral intention to poach for each occurrence.   
  
 For this indicator, an increasing linear trend line (positive value before the “x” in the 
equation) of control of corruption index scores indicated decreased behavioral intention to poach. 
Whereas, a decreasing linear trend line (negative value before the “x” in the equation) of control 
of corruption index scores indicated increased behavioral intention to poach. Using the data 
collected and presented in the graph (see Figure 15), I found that it indicated decreased 
behavioral intention to poach for one destruction occurrence and one sale occurrence. 
Additionally, I found that it indicated increased behavioral intention to poach for one destruction 
occurrence and three sale occurrences.  
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Results of Rule of Law Index Indicator 
For this indicator, the collected data and their trend lines were graphed (see Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16. Rule of law index. For this indicator, the figure shows the data collected, 
graphed, and coded to indicate behavioral intention to poach for each occurrence. 
  
 For this indicator, an increasing linear trend line (positive value before the “x” in the 
equation) of rule of law index scores indicated decreased behavioral intention to poach. Whereas, 
a decreasing linear trend line (negative value before the “x” in the equation) of rule of law index 
scores indicated increased behavioral intention to poach. Using the data collected and presented 
in the graph (see Figure 16), I found that rule of law index indicated decreased behavioral 
intention to poach for one destruction occurrence and two sale occurrences. Additionally, I found 
that it indicated increased behavioral intention to poach for one destruction occurrence and two 
sale occurrences. 
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 Second, the two graphs of the poaching behavior indicators as well as a summary of my 
results for each of these indicators are presented. 
Results of Percentage of Illegally Killed African Elephants Indicator 
 For this indicator, the collected data and their trend lines were graphed (see Figure 17). 
 
 
Figure 17. Percentage of illegally killed African elephants. For this indicator, the figure 
shows the data collected, graphed, and coded to indicate poaching behavior for each 
occurrence in the sample of my study. 
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 For this indicator, a decreasing linear trend line (negative value before the “x” in the 
equation) of the percentage of illegally killed African elephants indicated decreased poaching 
behavior. Whereas, an increasing linear trend line (positive value before the “x” in the equation) 
of the percentage of illegally killed African elephants indicated increased poaching behavior. 
Using the data collected and presented in the graph (see Figure 17 on previous page), I found 
that the percentage of illegally killed African elephants indicated decreased poaching behavior 
for both occurrences of ivory stockpile destruction and for one occurrence of ivory stockpile 
sale. Additionally, I found that it indicated increased poaching behavior for three occurrences of 
ivory stockpile sale. 
Results of African Elephant Population Indicator 
 For this indicator, the collected data and their trend lines were graphed (see Figure 18 on 
next page). An increasing linear trend line (positive value before the “x” in the equation) of the 
African elephant population indicated decreased poaching behavior. Whereas, a decreasing linear 
trend line (negative value before the “x” in the equation) of the African elephant population 
indicated increased poaching behavior. Using the data collected and presented in the graph (see 
Figure 18 on next page), I found that the African elephant population indicated decreased 
poaching behavior for one occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction and two occurrences of 
ivory stockpile sale. Additionally, I found that it indicated increased poaching behavior for one 









Figure 18. African elephant population. For this indicator, the figure shows the data 
collected, graphed, and coded to indicate poaching behavior for each occurrence. 
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 Third, I created a summary table (see Table 7) of all found indications from each 
indicator for each occurrence in the sample of my study. Each behavioral intention to poach 
indicator and its indication of either increased or decreased behavioral intention to poach for 
each occurrence of ivory stockpile destruction or sale is included in the table. Similarly, each 
poaching behavior indicator and its indication for each ivory stockpile destruction or sale 
occurrence is, also, listed in the table. 
 
 
Elephant Ivory Stockpile Management Strategies                                                                                     





*Missing data points due to an incomplete archival data set. 
** Missing 2015 data point due to an unavailable archival data set. 
Indicators 
Destruction 






Botswana          
2008 
Sale by                 
Namibia    
2008 





Zimbabwe                                    
2008 
Behavioral 
Intention to Poach 
Indicators 
The Indicator Indicated Behavioral Intention to Poach had: 
Adult Literacy Rate Decreased* Decreased* Decreased* Decreased* Decreased* Decreased* 
Per Capita Gross 
Domestic Product Decreased Increased Decreased Decreased Decreased Decreased 
National African 
Elephant Management 
and Planning Strategy 
Decreased Increased Increased Decreased Increased Increased 
National Legislation 
Meeting Requirements 
for Implementation of 
CITES 
Increased Increased Increased Decreased Decreased Decreased 
Control of Corruption 
Index Increased Decreased** Decreased Increased Increased Increased 
Rule of Law Index Decreased Increased** Decreased Increased Decreased Increased 
Poaching Behavior 
Indicators The Indicator Indicated Poaching Behavior had: 
Percentage of Illegally 
Killed African Elephants Decreased Decreased** Increased Increased Increased Decreased 
African Elephant 
Population Decreased Increased Increased Decreased Decreased Increased 
 
Table 7. Results of my research study. The table shows the indication (either increased 
or decreased behavioral intention to poach or poaching behavior) from each indicator for 
each occurrence in the sample of my study is shown. 
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Analysis of Results 
 This section of the chapter summarizes the analysis of my findings and my discovered 
results. First, I conducted a cross-tabulation analysis of the correlation between ivory stockpile 
management strategies (ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale) and behavioral 
intention to poach indications (increased or decreased) (see Table 8). It analyzed the frequencies 
of increased and decreased behavioral intention to poach indications for the occurrences of both 
ivory stockpile destruction and ivory stockpile sale. Significant results from the analysis would 
determine which stockpile management strategy correlated better with decreased behavioral 




Behavioral Intention to Poach 
Indications   
 





Destruction 6 6 12 
Sale 9 15 24 
 
 15 (Total) 21 (Total) 36 (Total) 
 
Table 8. Completed cross-tabulation analysis of strategy and behavioral intention to 
poach. This table is the 2x2 analysis of my measured frequencies for each combination 
of the variables. 
 
 Similarly, I conducted a cross-tabulation analysis of the correlation between ivory 
stockpile management strategies (ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale) and 
poaching behavior indications (increased or decreased) (see Table 9 on next page). It analyzed 
the frequencies of increased and decreased poaching behavior indications for the occurrences of 
both ivory stockpile destruction and ivory stockpile sale. Significant results from the analysis 
would determine which stockpile management strategy correlated better with decreased poaching 
behavior. 




Poaching Behavior Indications  
 





Destruction 1 3 4 
Sale 5 3 8 
  
6 (Total) 6 (Total) 12 (Total) 
 
Table 9. Completed cross-tabulation analysis of strategy and poaching behavior. This 
table is the 2x2 analysis of my measured frequencies for each combination of the 
variables. 
 
 For each cross-tabulation analysis, I calculated the Fisher’s exact test statistic to 
determine if the found correlations were significant. The Fisher’s exact probability score for the 
cross-tabulation analysis of behavioral intention to poach and ivory stockpile management 
strategies was p = 0.49911, meaning it was statistically non-significant because it was not p < 
0.05. The Fisher’s exact probability for the cross-tabulation analysis of poaching behavior and 
ivory stockpile management strategies was p = 0.545455, meaning this, too, was statistically 
non-significant because it was not p < 0.05.   
 A cross-tabulation analysis assumes the null hypothesis of no correlation existing 
between the two variables (Babbie, 2010). In general, to reject the null hypothesis, the p value 
must be statistically significant at p < 0.05 meaning it is 95% certain that the findings were not 
due to chance (Babbie, 2010). The Fisher’s exact probability score values for both of my cross-
tabulation analyses were approximately 0.5. This means that I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
because there is an approximately 50% possibility in both cases that the frequencies in my tables 
occurred by chance. I could not find with statistical certainty which or, if at all, ivory stockpile 
management strategy – (a) ivory stockpile destruction or (b) ivory stockpile sale – is correlated 
better with decreased behavioral intention to poach and decreased poaching behavior. Therefore, 
I am unable to answer my research question with statistical certainty.  
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Summary of Results 
 Overall, the findings of my study were inconclusive and statistically non-significant. I am 
unable to directly answer my research question: which elephant ivory stockpile management 
strategy used by African elephant range states – (a) ivory stockpile destruction or (b) ivory 
stockpile sale – correlates better with decreased behavioral intention to poach as well as 
decreased poaching behavior? However, this does not nullify the value of my research study, its 
methods, and its findings. My research study is able to still contribute to the research field on this 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the importance of my research study and its results. My research 
study sought to explore and answer my research question: which elephant ivory stockpile 
management strategy used by African elephant range states correlates better with more effective 
combatting of the illegal ivory trade, operationalized as decreased behavioral intention to poach 
as well as decreased poaching behavior? The analysis of my findings revealed that my results 
were statistically non-significant and inconclusive. I was unable to answer my research question 
with statistical certainty. However, my study still valuably contributed to the research on this 
topic.  
First, the major contributions of my research study and its results will be discussed within 
this chapter. My research study offers a way to bridge the current gap in the literature while my 
results direct the focus of future research within this field. Also, my study and its results provide 
foundational research supporting the use of a united, cooperative ivory stockpile management 
strategy by all African elephant range states. Secondly, the limitations of my research study are 
overviewed in this chapter. I was willing to recognize and accept these limitations because, 
despite the risks of conducting my research study, it offered important contributions to the 
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Discussion of Results 
My research study and its results offer three major contributions to the literature within 
this field. The first contribution is that I designed a new research methodology providing results 
able to bridge the current gap (no direct comparison of the strategies determining which is more 
effective) in the literature on ivory stockpile management strategies. The second contribution is 
that my results direct the focus of future research on this topic. Although I found non-significant 
results, I observed important trends requiring further research by future studies. The third 
contribution is that my methodology and results provide foundational research for future studies 
to provide statistical evidence of the most effective ivory stockpile management strategy. This 
evidence is crucial in order for African elephant range states to change their governmental 
policies to the use of a united, cooperative ivory stockpile management strategy. This collective 
action is necessary in order to most effectively combat the illegal ivory trade and eradicate its 
devastating implications. Next, each of these contributions will be discussed in detail. 
Designed a New Methodology to Bridge the Gap in the Literature 
 The first major contribution of my study is its uniquely designed methodology. My 
methods were designed to provide results able to bridge the current gap in the literature. After 
reviewing the literature, I found that most studies had independently researched ivory stockpile 
strategies. Research studies either evaluated the impact of ivory stockpile sales or evaluated the 
impact of ivory stockpile destructions. Direct comparisons of the two strategies in order to 
determine which is more effective had not been made leaving a gap in the current literature. 
Harvey (2015) was the only potential exception to this as he used a game theory model to 
determine the best way for African elephant range states to combat the illegal ivory trade. One of 
the many issues addressed within his model was ivory stockpile management by African 
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elephant range states. His model determined that they should collectively use an ivory stockpile 
destruction strategy instead of ivory stockpile sale. However, his determination was based on a 
model and ideal reality. Therefore, my research study contributes to the literature by providing a 
new methodology to make actual direct comparisons of the two ivory stockpile management 
strategies and determine which strategy is more effective. 
 In order to make this comparison and determination, my methodology was uniquely 
designed. Although my methodology is unable to show causal relationships, it determines which 
strategy is correlated better with effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade. To ensure my 
new methodology accurately determines which strategy is more effective, my design provided an 
exhaustive operationalization and thorough measurement of my construct – effective combatting 
of the illegal ivory trade. My application of Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior allowed 
me to create an exhaustive operationalization of this construct. The most effective strategy was 
determined by my study to be the one correlated better with addressing the root causes of 
poaching thereby preventing future poachers from poaching (decreased behavioral intention to 
poach) as well as addressing the immediate need to stop the illicit activities of current poachers 
(decreased poaching behavior).  
 Additionally, my methodology used a thorough measurement of this construct – effective 
combatting of the illegal ivory trade – which was operationalized by my study as decreased 
behavioral intention to poach and decreased poaching behavior. My methodology measured 
multiple indicators (archival data sets from various sources) to determine the directional change 
(increased or decreased) of behavioral intention to poach and poaching behavior correlated with 
each occurrence of either ivory stockpile destruction or ivory stockpile sale in the sample of my 
study over a five-year period. Then, my methodology used the combined indications (either 
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increased or decreased behavioral intention to poach or poaching behavior) from all occurrences 
of ivory stockpile destruction compared to the combined indications from all occurrences of 
ivory stockpile sale (accounting for the increased number of sale occurrences in my sample) to 
determine which strategy was correlated better with more effective combatting of the illegal 
ivory trade. 
 My new methodology captures a more accurate measurement of the directional change of 
my variables (behavioral intention to poach and poaching behavior) during the applicable five-
year period for each occurrence of an ivory stockpile management strategy in my sample by 
having multiple indicators from various archival data sets sources collectively indicate the 
change in my variables. Alternatively, I found that many studies during my review of the 
literature had previously evaluated only a single indicator to determine the correlation or 
relationship between a specific ivory stockpile management strategy and effective combatting of 
the illegal ivory trade. For example, EIA (2012) evaluated only the price of ivory in Chinese 
markets to indicate the impact of ivory stockpile sale as either increasing or decreasing demand 
for ivory. Thus, price of ivory was used to indirectly show the impact of ivory stockpile sale on 
the illegal ivory trade. Also, CITES (2008) analyzed only the ivory seizure data reported by 
ETIS to determine the impact of its ivory stockpile sales on illegal ivory trade activity.  
 Overall, my methodology valuably allows direct comparison of the two ivory stockpile 
management strategies to determine which strategy is correlated better with my exhaustively 
defined and thoroughly measured construct – effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade. 
Related to the next contribution, the design and methods of my research study is available for 
future researchers to use and improve. Therefore, my contribution of a new methodology is 
greater than simply producing valuable results within my study. 
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Directs the Focus of Future Research   
The second major contribution is that my results direct the focus of future research within 
this field. The trends (statistically non-significant correlations between my studied variables) I 
observed within my results contribute to the literature by identifying specific areas that require 
further research. I was unable to show if these trends were statistically significant due to my 
small sample size. Therefore, I was unable to reject the null hypothesis or, in other words, I was 
unable to rule out with significant certainty that my results did not simply occur by chance. 
Therefore, further research of these observed trends is important. 
Although I was limited to a small sample size, it will be possible for a research study in 
the near future to repeat my methodology with a larger sample. For example, in the near future 
the sample size of my study could be nearly doubled. There are five occurrences of ivory 
stockpile destruction by African elephant range states that occurred in 2014 and 2015. The 
archival data necessary for them to be evaluated by my study’s methodology will be available in 
the near future. A research study repeating my methodology with a larger sample size will 
provide better statistical determination of my results and be able to show if any of the trends I 
observed are, in fact, statistically significant correlations between my variables. Additionally, 
future research should not be limited to using only my methodology to further explore these 
observed trends. To best explore these trends, researchers should also develop alternative ways 
to evaluate them and determine whether they are statistically significant correlations and causal 
relationships of importance. Therefore, my study and its results positively direct future research 
to focus on specific areas of interest I observed. 
Each of the trends I observed will now be discussed. To reiterate, these trends are 
statistically non-significant correlations between my studied variables. My study’s results were 
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inconclusive and could not determine whether ivory stockpile destruction, ivory stockpile sale, or 
neither is correlated better with more effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade, 
operationalized as decreased behavioral intention to poach and poaching behavior. These 
observed trends could be from randomly occurred results. However, I strongly recommend 
further research be conducted to study the trends I observed because it appears important 
correlations may exist and need understood. 
 Potentially neither strategy is correlated with decrease behavioral intention to 
poach. The first trend I observed was that potentially neither ivory stockpile destruction nor 
ivory stockpile sale correlates with decreased behavioral intention to poach. For my cross-
tabulation analysis of the correlation between ivory stockpile management strategies (destruction 
or sale) and intentional behavior to poach indications (increased or decreased) (see Table 8 in 
Chapter 4 on page 160), I did not observe any apparent trend when visually comparing the 
results. This could be due to another limitation of my study, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter, of my indicators not accurately measuring the variable. 
 Alternatively, this observed trend could suggest that neither strategy is associated with 
decreased behavioral intention to poach. This is concerning because it is important for an 
effective strategy to be not only associated with decreasing poaching behavior but, also, be 
associated with decreasing the factors that encourage or facilitate poaching behavior (behavioral 
intention to poach). These factors include poverty, weak governance, corruption, poor 
implementation of CITES into national legislation, and subjective norms competing with 
elephant conservation. It is important for implementation of an ivory stockpile management 
strategy to correlate with reduction of these root issues that are facilitating poaching of African 
elephants (the main supply of ivory within the illicit ivory trade). It would be beneficial for 
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future research to further explore the construct of behavioral intention, effective measurement of 
it, and its correlation with ivory stockpile management strategies.   
 Potentially ivory stockpile destruction is correlated better with decreased poaching 
behavior. The second trend I observed was that ivory stockpile destruction is potentially 
correlated better with decreased poaching behavior than ivory stockpile sale. This trend was 
observed in multiple ways throughout the results of my study. For example, my other cross-
tabulation analysis was of the correlation between ivory stockpile management strategies 
(destruction or sale) and poaching behavior indications (increased or decreased) (see Table 9 in 
Chapter 4 on page 161). When visually analyzing the frequency table for this analysis, I 
observed a potential trend of occurrences of ivory stockpile destruction correlated better with 
decreased poaching behavior than occurrences of ivory stockpile sale. For occurrences of ivory 
stockpile destruction, 75% of the indications found by my two poaching behavior indicators were 
“decreased poaching behavior” (see Table 10 on next page). Alternatively, for occurrences of 
ivory stockpile sale, 37.5% of the indications found by my two poaching behavior indicators 
were “decreased poaching behavior” (see Table 10 on next page).  
  Additionally, this trend was observed when visually comparing all occurrences within in 
my sample and my found indications for them by my indicators (see Table 7 in Chapter 4 on 
page 159). In my opinion, one occurrence stood out compared to the rest. This occurrence was 
the only one to have decreased indicated by both of my poaching behavior indicators as well as 
to have decreased indicated by four out of my six behavioral intention to poach indicators. The 
other occurrences, including the other destruction occurrence, had one or no indication of 
decreased poaching behavior and had three or less indications of decreased of behavioral 
intention to poach. The occurrence of interest was the 2011 ivory stockpile destruction by Kenya. 
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Table 10. Percentage of indications found comparing strategy and poaching behavior. 
The table shows the frequency as well as the percentage of the indications found for 
each combination of the variables, strategy and poaching behavior.  
  
 Related to this observed trend, Harvey’s (2015) game theory model determined the most 
effective ivory stockpile management strategy to combat the illegal ivory trade for African 
elephant range states is collective action to destroy their ivory stockpiles or at least put their 
stockpiles beyond commercial use. Yet as shown by my literature review, there are many 
opponents of ivory stockpile destruction arguing it is an ineffective strategy while there are many 
proponents of ivory stockpile sale arguing it is the most effective strategy. Thus, it is important 
to reiterate that this observed trend is based on statistically non-significant and inconclusive 
results. Also, there may be other confounding variables that influenced this observed trend 
instead of an existing correlation between my measured variables. Considering the research 
findings of Harvey’s (2015) study, I strongly advise further research to determine which ivory 
stockpile management strategy is correlated better with decreased poaching behavior. That is the 
only way to determine if the observed trend of ivory stockpile destruction correlated better with 
decreased poaching behavior is or is not a significant correlation. Thus, future research is 
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necessary and very important, specifically a study repeating my methodology with a larger 
available sample size to better determine if my observed trend is statistically significant or not. 
 Potentially the Appendix II listings for African elephant populations are outdated. 
The third trend I observed was that the Appendix II listing of the four African elephant 
populations is potentially outdated. Four occurrences of ivory stockpile sale were included in the 
sample of my study. These sales were authorized by CITES because the elephant populations of 
these African elephant range states are listed as Appendix II. However, the downlisting of these 
elephant populations to Appendix II was based on assessments by CITES made nearly two 
decades ago in either 1997 or 2000. At that time, it was determined that these countries had well 
managed and protected elephant populations. I believe that the findings from some of my 
indicators for these four occurrences of ivory stockpile sales in 2008 suggest that this 
assessment, and thereby the appendix listing, is outdated. If so, a reassessment of the status of 
these populations should be conducted to ensure that the Appendix II listing by CITES is 
sufficiently protecting all four of these African elephant populations.  
 For example, two of my indicators measured the directional change of poaching behavior 
during the five-year period for each occurrence in my sample. My results for none of the four 
occurrences of ivory stockpile sale had both poaching behavior indicators find decreased 
directional change during their applicable five-year periods (see Table 7 in Chapter 4 on page 
159). Each occurrence of ivory stockpile sale was found by an indicator to have either: (a) 
increased percentage of illegally killed African elephants (indicated by my findings showing an 
increasing trend line of the percentage of illegally killed African elephants in their county over 
the five-year period) or (b) decreased elephant population (indicated by my findings showing a 
decreasing trend line from the 2007 African elephant population count in their country to their 
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2013 count). Most alarmingly, the occurrence of the 2008 ivory stockpile sale by Botswana was 
found to have increased percentage of illegally killed elephants (see Figure 17 in Chapter 4 on 
page 156) and a decreased elephant population (see Figure 18 in Chapter 4 on page 158). 
 Additionally, another one of my indicators (national legislation meeting the requirements 
for implementation of CITES) found that Botswana did not, as of 2014, meet the requirements 
for full implementation of CITES into their national legislation (see Figure 14 in Chapter 4 on 
page 153). In my opinion, this observed trend suggests that Botswana’s African elephant 
population is no longer securely protected, and, therefore, the Appendix II listing of Botswana’s 
African elephant population by CITES should be reevaluated. Positively, Botswana may be 
addressing this concern. The country recently agreed to the 2014 Elephant Protection Initiative 
meaning it has stated it will not sell its stockpiled ivory for ten years (Harvey, 2015). I recognize 
that my findings are inconclusive, and, therefore, these trends may be based on frequencies 
collected by chance or influenced by confounding variables. However, I strongly encourage 
further research on the status of Appendix II African elephant populations. If this trend I 
observed is accurate, then these elephants populations are no longer well protected and that must 
be addressed.  
 Furthermore, the trend I observed suggesting that the Appendix II listings of African 
elephant populations needs to be reassessed is supported by current concerns and actions 
expressed in the literature, specifically by Harvey (2015) and the African Elephant Coalition 
(2015). Harvey (2015) argued that the elephant population in Zimbabwe is no longer as well 
managed and protected as it was in 1997, when the population was downlisted to Appendix II. 
He also calls for a reassessment of the statuses of all four Appendix II elephant populations.   
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 Similarly, this trend has been expressed as a concern of the African Elephant Coalition 
[AEC] (2015). This coalition works to protect African elephants through the collective action of 
its member and observer states, which are twenty-five African elephant range states (African 
Elephant Coalition [AEC], 2015). None of the four countries with elephant populations listed as 
Appendix II are member or observer states. In November 2015, the twenty-five African elephant 
range states of the AEC met and agreed to the Cotonou Declaration (AEC, 2015). A main 
agreement of the Cotonou Declaration was support for a submitted proposal to CITES for the 
return of all African elephants to Appendix I status because the current poaching crisis is now 
threatening all populations of African elephants regardless of whether the population was 
previously secured and well-managed (AEC, 2015). The next meeting of CITES, where such a 
proposal for amendment of appendices would be considered, is in September of 2016 (CITES, 
n.d.).  
 Conclusively, my results valuably contributed by directing future research to focus on 
areas of particular interest within the field to determine if they are or are not significant 
correlations. I observed the following trends requiring further research: (a) potentially neither 
strategy is correlated with decreased behavioral intention to poach; (b) potentially ivory stockpile 
destruction is correlated better with decreased poaching behavior; and (c) potentially the 
Appendix II listing of some African elephant populations is outdated. Related to the next 
contribution of my study, my methodology and its results most importantly direct future research 
to focus on identifying the most effective ivory stockpile management strategy for combatting 
the illegal ivory trade. 
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Foundational Research Supporting the Use of a United, Cooperative Ivory Stockpile 
Management Strategy 
The third major contribution is that my methodology and results provide foundational 
research for future studies to provide statistical evidence of the most effective ivory stockpile 
management strategy. My review of the literature clearly shows the effectiveness of these two 
different ivory stockpile management strategies is widely contested within the literature. This has 
resulted in the use of dichotomous strategies by African elephant range states. This is a problem 
as it is widely accepted that the most effective way to combat the illegal ivory and other wildlife 
trades is through united, cooperative approaches (Duffy & Humphreys, 2014; Harvey, 2015; 
Lawson & Vines, 2014; London Conference, 2014). Therefore, more research with conclusive 
results is necessary to end this long-held debate and move towards necessary collective action. 
My methodology and its results, with a greater sample size, will be able to concretely show 
which strategy is correlated with more effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade. By doing 
this, it directs future research efforts to explore my found correlations and further advance the 
research within this field.  
The ultimate goal is through further research to provide statistical evidence for 
unanimous use of a united, collaborative strategy of ivory stockpile management by African 
elephant range states. There must be evidence showing which strategy is most effective at 
combatting the illegal ivory trade. Additionally, my review of the literature identified other areas 
that were beyond the scope of my research study but required further research. Specifically, 
future research needs to identify with statistical evidence how to incentivize collective action and 
have African elephant range states successfully implement a unanimous strategy to manage their 
ivory stockpiles. Only through further research and substantial evidence will African elephant 
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range states change their governmental policies dictating the management of their ivory 
stockpiles to a policy of united, cooperative ivory stockpile management. Most importantly, it is 
through this necessary collective action that the illegal ivory trade and its devastating global 
implications will then be most effectively combatted (Duffy & Humphreys, 2014; Harvey, 2015; 
Lawson & Vines, 2014; London Conference, 2014). In summary, my study and its results 
valuably contributed to advancing the research within this field while fully recognizing and 





















 I conducted an inductive, exploratory research study on the management of ivory 
stockpiles owned by African elephant range states used to combat the illegal ivory trade. I used a 
non-experimental design with a purposive sampling method. Therefore, I accepted numerous 
risks associated with my chosen design, particularly in regards to internal validity. While 
recognizing and accepting these limitations, I still chose to conduct my research study because it 
valuably offered foundational results that direct and support future research. The risks I accepted 
included: (a) measuring an illicit trade; (b) non-probability sampling method; and (c) my chosen 
indicators being unproven to indicate my intended constructs. Following is a discussion of each 
of these limitations and the steps I took to safeguard my study from these risks.  
Measuring an Illicit Trade  
 First, I accepted the limitation of measuring an illicit trade. An illicit trade, including the 
illegal ivory trade, is by nature intended to avoid detection and quantitative assessment. My 
research study therefore accepts that it is extremely difficult to directly and accurately measure 
the illegal ivory trade. Furthermore, it is also difficult to indirectly measure the illegal ivory 
trade, such as measuring the percentage of illegally killed African elephants. It is difficult to 
accurately measure because it is: measuring an intangible construct; based on sparsely available 
data; requires the necessary use of extrapolation; and complicated by many confounding 
variables (Underwood, Burn, & Milliken, 2013; Wittemyer et al., 2014). However, the free, 
public online archival data sets that have measured the illicit trade directly and indirectly are the 
best estimations available.  
 As it is not possible for me to directly collect data for each of the indicators in my study, I 
chose to necessarily rely on these available archival data sets. As such, the internal validity of my 
MANAGEMENT OF IVORY STOCKPILES 
 
177 
study is susceptible to the accuracy of each archival data set. In order to safeguard my study from 
this unavoidable risk, I measured at least two archival data sets (indicators) from various sources 
to indicate my variables: (a) behavioral intention to poach and (b) poaching behavior. As 
poaching behavior is more straightforward, I chose two indicators of it. Each indicator measured 
and coded a unique archival data set to indicate the directional change of poaching behavior 
(increased or decreased) for each occurrence in my sample over its applicable five-year period. 
Alternatively, behavioral intention to poach is less straightforward and more complex with three 
determinants that influence an individual’s intent to poach. Therefore, I chose six indicators of 
behavioral intention to poach. Each indicator corresponded to one of the three determinants of 
behavioral intention to poach. Also, each indicator measured and coded a unique archival data 
set to indicate the directional change of behavioral intention to poach (increased or decreased) 
for each occurrence in my sample over its applicable five-year period. Related to the reliability 
of my study, each of my indicators measured a free, public online archival data set. Since these 
data sets are freely available and each of my indicators is thoroughly operationalized, another 
researcher could accurately replicate and feasibly repeat my methodology in a future research 
study.  
Non-Probability Sampling Method and Small Sample 
 Second, I accepted the limitation of using non-probability sampling method and studying 
a small sample. Specifically, my study committed selection bias by using a non-probability 
sampling method. This risk was outweighed by the benefits of studying a certain and small 
sample from my population. My study used purposive sampling to select six occurrences from a 
small population of seventeen ivory stockpile destructions and sales that had occurred since the 
ivory trade ban of 1989 through 2015. Also, I recognized that a small sample threatens the 
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external validity of my research study because my findings are less likely to generalize to the 
whole population. However, my purposive sampling provided a sample that guaranteed each 
occurrence had sufficiently available archival data necessary to conduct my analysis. By being 
able to thoroughly analyze the findings for my sample, I was able to explore and identify 
important correlations. Since I was conducting an inductive, non-experimental study, I was not 
interested in identifying causal relationships. The purpose of my research study was to use 
observed trends, ideally statistically significant, to provide a foundation for and direct future 
research.  
Untested Indicators 
Third, I accepted the limitation of my indicators being untested. Since it is unproven 
whether my indicators accurately indicate either behavioral intention to poach or poaching 
behavior, this limitation threatens the internal validity of my study. I did not statistically test each 
of my indicators to determine their ability to accurately indicate the construct I intended. 
Recognizing this as a potential limitation is important, but it does not mean that my study should 
not have used these indicators. Rather, by understanding the threat of this uncertainty, I actively 
sought to safeguard my study from this risk.  
All of my indicators and the source of their archival data sets were chosen by me after 
thoroughly reviewing the literature on this topic. The literature suggested and, often, showed the 
archival data sets (measured by my indicators) were indicative of my operationalized variables of 
behavioral intention to poach and poaching behavior. The rationale of my choice for each 
indicator and the relevant literature supporting my choice are outlined in each indicator’s 
operationalization (see Chapter 3).  
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Also, my study recognizes the internal validity risk from possible confounding variables 
and extraneous factors that may have influenced my indicators and their findings. Although it is 
important to recognize all these limitations, which were often unavoidable, it was still valuable to 
conduct my study and explore my research question. As my non-experimental study was 
exploratory in nature, it is less concerned with these risks as it is not seeking to find causal 
relationships. Instead, its purpose is to explore for correlations and, therefore, direct future 
research efforts to experimentally determine relationships and control for extraneous factors. 
Overall, my research study faced multiple risks. However, the substantial benefits 
provided by conducting it made recognizing and accepting these risks worthwhile. My study and 
its results positively contributed to the literature on this topic by offering a methodology to 
bridge the gap in the literature. My research also foundationally directs and supports the future 
research necessary to provide statistical evidence for African elephant range states to change 
their governmental policies on management of ivory stockpiles towards collective action. Only 
after substantial research and evidence will African elephant range states shift from their current 
use of dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies to a united and cooperative ivory 
stockpile management strategy. Yet, this collective action is necessary to most effectively 
combat the illegal ivory trade and to eradicate its devastating implications. Next, my final 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I present my conclusions and recommendations for future research. These 
serve to encourage and direct future research towards providing the necessary substantial 
findings and concrete evidence for the development of a united, collaborative approach of ivory 
stockpile management unanimously used by African elephant range states. Through their 
collective management of ivory stockpiles, they will be more effective at combatting the illegal 





















 After thoroughly reviewing the literature and analyzing the results of my research study, I 
have concluded: 
• The illegal wildlife trade is a growing transnational illicit trade. Comparable to illicit drug 
trafficking and human trafficking, the illegal wildlife trade is a serious crime with global 
implications. Its devastating social, economic, national and international security, and 
health implications threaten human security and international development around the 
world in addition to its well-known threat to the survival of wildlife species. One of the 
most illicitly traded products within the illegal wildlife trade is elephant ivory.  
• The illegal ivory trade is fueled primarily by a high demand for ivory in China and 
supplied primarily by unsustainable poaching of African elephants. Yet, ivory from 
unsecure, poorly managed ivory stockpiles, also, supplies the illicit ivory trade. 
Stockpiled ivory owned by African elephant range states frequently enters or renters the 
illicit trade after being robbed from unsecure stockpiles or misappropriated by corrupt 
officials.  
• African elephant poaching and the illicit ivory trade have dramatically increased since 
2007. As of 2011, poaching was unsustainable with the total poaching rate in Africa 
exceeding the growth rate of the total African elephant population.  
• The devastating impact of the illegal ivory trade goes beyond threatening the African 
elephant population. The illicit trade is associated with corruption, weak law 
enforcement, poor governance, poverty, violence, and large organized criminal 
syndicates, including terrorists groups. Thus, the illicit ivory trade undermines and 
threatens the social, economic, and national security of African elephant range states as 
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well as poses an international security threat. It is necessary to effectively combat the 
illegal trade of ivory. 
• Recently recognizing the full implications of the illegal wildlife trade, the international 
community has called for collective action to combat the illegal trade of wildlife and their 
products, specifically the illicit trade of ivory. This culminated in the 2014 London 
Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade [London Declaration]. The declaration outlines 
united, cooperative strategies to be collectively carried out by the international 
community in order to eradicate the illegal wildlife trade. It is accepted that the most 
effective way to combat the illegal wildlife and ivory trades is through united, 
cooperative actions. However, it is not an easy feat as there are many barriers to 
effectively combatting the illegal wildlife and ivory trades.  
• One of the many necessary collective actions to combat the illegal ivory trade is proper 
management of legal government-owned ivory stockpiles, especially stockpiles owned by 
African elephant range states. These states are not collectively using one ivory stockpile 
management strategy; instead, African elephant range states are using two different ivory 
stockpile management strategies – (a) ivory stockpile destruction and (b) ivory stockpile 
sale. This dichotomy threatens effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade as it goes 
against the necessary use of a united, cooperative approach. 
• My review of the literature found that the effectiveness of these two ivory stockpile 
strategies is widely debated and inconclusive. Furthermore, the international community 
contradicts itself by, on one hand, calling for one strategy – ivory stockpile destruction – 
in the London Declaration while, on the other hand, allowing use of the other strategy –
ivory stockpile sale – through CITES-authorized one-off ivory stockpile sales. This  
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contradiction further threatens effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade. 
• Only through substantial research and evidence can the international community and 
African elephant range states shift from their current dichotomies and build agreement for 
unanimous use of a united, cooperative ivory stockpile management strategy, which is 
necessary to most effectively combat the illegal ivory trade. 
• My master thesis explored the use of dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies 
by African elephant range states. My research study sought to answer the following 
question: which elephant ivory stockpile management strategy used by African elephant 
range states – (a) ivory stockpile destruction or (b) ivory stockpile sale – correlates 
better with more effective combatting of the illegal ivory trade, operationalized as 
decreased behavioral intention to poach as well as decreased poaching behavior? 
Although I was unable to directly answer my research question with statistical certainty, 
my research study still positively contributes to the current literature and research.  
• My research study contributed by designing a new research methodology able to bridge 
the current gap in the literature while the trends I observed within my statistically non-
significant results contributed by requiring further research thus directing the focus of 
future research within the field. Additionally, my study and its results provided 
foundational research for future studies to provide statistical evidence of the most 
effective ivory stockpile management strategy. This evidence is crucial in order for 
African elephant range states to change their governmental policies and use a united, 
cooperative ivory stockpile management strategy. Yet, this collective action is necessary 
in order to most effectively combat the illegal ivory trade and eradicate its devastating 
implications.  
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Recommendations for Future Research 
 After conducting a thorough review of the literature as well as conducting my research 
study and evaluating its results, I make the following major recommendations for future 
research.  
Recommendation 1: Determine the Most Effective Ivory Stockpile Management Strategy 
 I recommend that future research determine which ivory stockpile management strategy 
is the most effective at combatting the illegal ivory trade to bridge the current gap in the 
literature. I specifically recommend that a future research study repeat my methodology when a 
greater sample size of ivory stockpile destruction and sale occurrences is available. Using a 
greater sample size will allow for better determination of whether statistically significant 
correlations may exist. Also, I recommend that the trends I observed within my statistically non-
significant results be further researched (see Chapter 5). However, I do not recommend that 
future research be limited to only using my methodology. I encourage exploration of other 
methods as well as other related topics, particularly those that were beyond the scope of my 
study. For example, further research is necessary to understand the economic and political 
factors that influenced and continue to influence African elephant range states’ use of 
dichotomous ivory stockpile management strategies. Overall, future research to compare and 
determine the most effective ivory stockpile management strategy is important because it will: 
(a) bridge a gap in the literature; (b) conclusively end the long-held debate over which strategy is 
more effective; and (c) provide substantial findings and evidence in support of the unanimous 
use of a united, cooperative ivory stockpile strategy by all African elephant range states, which is 
necessary to most effectively combat the illegal ivory trade. 
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Recommendation 2: Reassess the Appendix II Status of African Elephants 
 I recommend future research accurately reassess the status of the four African elephant 
populations listed by CITES as Appendix II. This reassessment is important because the trends I 
observed within my results as well as other researchers suggest that some of these African 
elephant populations may no longer be well protected from the impacts of the illegal ivory trade 
(AEC, 2015; Harvey, 2015). If any of the four Appendix II African elephant populations are 
shown through concrete evidence to no longer be well protected, it will be possible to 
successfully petition CITES to reassess their status and, as necessary, return any threatened 
populations to the protection of an Appendix I listing. My findings were not statistically proven, 
and, therefore, they may not be accurate but regardless further research is important to ensure the 
protection of this species. Additionally, this observed trend is not necessarily suggestive of the 
effectiveness of the ivory stockpile sale strategy. Instead, it simply suggests a country should 
maybe no longer be authorized to sell their ivory stockpiles because the authorization was 
determined based on an outdated status of their African elephant population.  
Recommendation 3: Greater Collective Action to Combat the Illegal Ivory Trade 
 I recommend, in general, for future research to continue to educate and encourage the 
international community, governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, and local grassroots efforts to collectively work together using united, cooperative 
strategies to combat the illegal ivory and other wildlife trades. Thereby, it ensures the survival of 
these vital species as well as prevents these illicit trades from continuing to threaten human 
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